Problem of evil

In the philosophy of religion and theology, the problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God or Gods. An answer to the problem of evil is called a theodicy.

History

Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt

The problem of evil takes at least four formulations in ancient Mesopotamian religious thought, as in the extant manuscripts of Ludlul Bel Nemeqi (I Will Praise the Lord of Wisdom), Erra and Ishum, The Babylonian Theodicy, and The Dialogue of Pessimism. In this type of polytheistic context, the chaotic nature of the world implies multiple Gods battling for control. In ancient Egyptian religious thought the problem takes at least two formulations, as in the extant manuscripts of Dialogue of a Man with His Ba and The Eloquent Peasant. Due to the conception of Egyptian Gods as being far removed, these two formulations of the problem focus heavily on the relation between evil and people; that is, moral evil.

Epicurus

Epicurus is generally credited with first expounding the problem of evil, and it is sometimes called the Epicurean paradox (or the riddle of Epicurus). In this form, the argument is not really a paradox or a riddle, but rather a reductio ad absurdum of the premises. Epicurus drew the conclusion that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of the Gods. More generally, no paradox or problem exists for those who do not accept the premises, in particular the existence of a benevolent god or Gods.

"Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. ... If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. ... If, as they say, God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world?" (Epicurus, as quoted in 2000 Years of Disbelief)

Epicurus himself did not leave any written form of this argument. It can be found in Lucretius's "De Rerum Natura" and in Christian theologian Lactantius's "Treatise of the Anger of God" where Lactantius critiques the argument.

Traditional Judeo-Christian Interpretations

The biblical book of Job is, perhaps, the most widely known formulation of the problem of evil in Western thought. Other books of note include Psalms 1 and 82, and Ecclesiastes (Koheleth).

Gnosticism

Christians who believed in dualism were called Gnostics, a fairly prominent group within Christianity up until about the 5th century CE.See, e.g., http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06592a.htm Regarded as a heresy, this kind of dualistic belief was nothing new, having been a principal part of Zoroastrianism before Christianity. The ancient Persians were followers of Zoroastrian dualism, in which this world is seen as the battleground between a god of good and a god of evil. These kinds of dualism involve the creation of the world by a demiurge as a solution to the problem of evil.

In Gnosticism, God exists but he is utterly alienated from the human world. He transcends the universe, which he did not create and does not govern. Encased in one’s body and soul is the pneuma, which is the spark of the divine. The Gnostics believed that this spark was just as evil. The pneuma is encased in one’s body and one’s soul. It’s unconscious, numb, poisoned by the world, and ignorant. It is as alien to the material world and the universe as God is. For Gnostics, that which transforms a person is not deeds, but knowledge (gnosis). This knowledge is the knowledge of god, who is alien to the world. Such knowledge awakens the pneuma, thus equating gnosis with salvation. Because god is alien to the world, according to this theological position, the only way to come to know god is through revelation.

Augustine and Pelagius

In the 5th Century CE, Pelagius denied the Augustianian answer to the paradox of original sin. Augustine's answer was the Limited Sovereignty argument, which stated that Adam and Eve had the power to change nature by bringing sin into the world, but that the advent of sin then limited mankind’s power thereafter (to evade the consequences). The problem of evil then asks: "Is God's creation still good?" Pelagius argued that death is a natural part of the universe. Both he and John Chrysostom believed that Christians, through their baptism, are free to make moral choices; that, although their wills cannot affect the course of nature, it can – and must – affect their moral decisions. This view, however, does not exclude the possibility that death came about as a result of human action. Pelagius' main argument was that God is just, and it would be unjust to punish many people for the sin of two people. Adam and Eve sinned, but universal morality cannot be the result of their sin alone. Morality must be the result of some other cause, which Pelagius held was simply the structure of nature. Pelagius' position is regarded by most Christian denominations as a heresy.See, e.g., http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11604a.htm Augustine's position on the issue is discussed further in the section on Criticisms and responses below.

Qualifications

Many terms and concepts must be decided upon before the problem of evil may be sufficiently analyzed. This is due to the nature of religious belief.

Who or what is God?

For example, the problem of evil changes radically depending on whether God is a personal God, as in most forms of Christianity, distant Gods, as was the case in ancient Egyptian religions, as well as whether there is only one (monotheism) or many Gods (polytheism). (See also demiurge)

What is evil?

What is the nature of omnipotence?

A frequent error is the notion that an omnipotent God would be able to make an agent morally free yet incapable of doing evil to others. This is an error because no amount of power can allow one to make a logical contradiction true. (See the Omnipotence Paradox)

What is the nature of omnibenevolence?

To what extent would God desire to spare people from evil? It is, perhaps, too hasty to assume that not experiencing any evil or harm is in the best interest of the universe.

Formalized arguments

One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil presented by Epicurus may be schematized as follows: - this form of the argument is called 'the inconsistent triad'

If God exists, then there would be no evil in the world.
There is evil in the world.
Therefore, God does not exist.

This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world". Other logical forms of arguments articulating the problem follow.

Logical problem of evil

God exists (premise)
God is omnipotent (premise)
God is benevolent (premise)
Benevolent beings are opposed to all evil. (premise)
Benevolent beings will act immediately with no delay. (premise)
God is opposed to all evil. (conclusion from 3 and 4)
God can eliminate evil completely and immediately. (conclusion from 2)
1. Whatever end result of suffering, God can bring about by ways which do not include suffering. (conclusion from 2)
2. God has no reason not to eliminate evil (conclusion from 7.1)
3. God has no reason not to act immediately (Conclusion from 5)
God will eliminate evil completely and immediately. (conclusion from 6, 7 ,7.2 and 7.3)
Evil exists, has existed, and probably will always exist. (premise)
Items 8 and 9 are contradictory; therefore, one or more of the premises is false: either God does not exist, or he is not both omnipotent and benevolent or there is a reason why He does not act immediately.

Evidential problem of evil

Gratuitous evils exist.
Gratuitous evils are incompatible with the existence of a god (omnipotent, omniscient, all-good).
Therefore, no god exists.

Argument from evil natural laws

A god is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent.
If a god exists, then there exist no instances of an ultimately evil natural law.
The laws of predation are ultimately evil.
There are instances of the laws of predation.
Therefore, no god exists.

Moral argument from evil

The most rational theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.
If a god exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil (even if no-one intervenes to prevent that evil).
1. For any possible world W, if a god exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.
2. If a god exists, then there is an objective justification for every actual instance of evil, (including those evils where there is a witness).
Some members of the class of most rational theists (as defined above) are theists who know (2).
Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.
If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.
Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur. (from 4 and 5)
If the most rational theists know that a god exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur. (from 1 to 6)
Even the most rational theists (including those who know 2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.
Even the most rational theists do not know that a god exists. (from 7 and 8)
If the most rational theists do not know that a god exists, then no theist knows that a god exists.
No theist knows that a god exists. (from 9 and 10)
For any given theist, that theist's belief that a god exists is either false or unjustified.
If a god exists, then some theists are justified in believing that a god exists.
If a god exists, then no theist has a false belief that a god exists.
If a god exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists. (from 13 and 14)
It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that a god exists. (from 12)
No god exists. (from 15 and 16)

Inductive argument from evil

All evil in the kinds of created entities are the result of the fallibility of one or more of its creators. (Premise)
The universe is a created entity. (Premise)
The universe contains evil. (Premise)
Evil is the result of the actions of a fallible creator(s) or is not the result of any creator(s). (From 1, 2 and 3 by predictive inference)
If god created the universe, then he is fallible. (From 4)
Therefore, god did not create the universe, is imperfect, or does not exist. (From 5)

Argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure

Consider the following observations:
- Moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful.
- Sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful.
- Sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful.
The observations in 1 are more probably the result of natural law than a god.
Therefore, probably no god exists.

Criticisms and responses

In Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal, a well-known essay written in 1710, Leibniz introduced the term "theodicy" to describe the formal study of this subject. This term is also used for an explanation of why God permits evil to exist without it being a contradiction of his perfect goodness.

Definition of "evil"

The fifth century theologian Augustine of Hippo mounted what has become one of the most popular defences of the existence of God against the Epicurean paradox. He maintained that evil was only privatio boni, or a privation of good. An evil thing can only be referred to as a negative form of a good thing, such as discord, injustice, and loss of life or liberty. If a being is not totally pure, evil will fill in any gaps in that being's purity. This is commonly called the Contrast Theodicy — that evil only exists as a "contrast" with good. However, the Contrast Theodicy relies on a metaphysical view of morality which few people, even theologians, agree with (that good and evil are not moral judgments). In On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine also argued that Epicurus had ignored the potential benefits of suffering in the world. However, it is pointed out that an omnipotent God could give the world any benefits derived from suffering without those in the world having to suffer.

Another response to this paradox argues that asserting "evil exists" would imply a moral standard against which to define good and evil (see also Argument from morality). Therefore, by using this argument one implies the existence of a moral law, which requires a law-maker. Most theists would assert that this law-maker is God, whilst many atheists would argue that morality can just as easily be reached through reason – that this law is in fact a social contract agreed to by all humans; subconsciously developed from social prisoner's dilemma and/or that this problem is more accurately described as a problem of physical suffering, which can be objectively defined against a standard (of zero physical suffering), or that morality can be reached by its ability to support man's means to attain life.

Another theological answer to this problem is that it takes for granted that humans understand what, exactly, constitutes good and evil. It is a common religious response that there could very well be an entirely positive plan maintained by God that one, as a mere mortal, could not possibly fathom, and that to judge God's existence based on what one perceives in the natural world is shortsighted.

However, this response is plagued by a host of difficulties. First, it is only effective if one presupposes the existence of God. If God does not exist, and if humans are the highest form of sentient life, then our understanding of what constitutes good and evil simply is what constitutes good and evil. Of course, one must define in what sense the word "evil" is being used. In this debate, it simply means any state of affairs in which the sentient beings experiencing them would consider them to be negative. Typical examples of such negativity include pain and suffering. Now, it is plausible that God may allow some suffering in order that we may learn lessons, overcome struggles, and grow stronger. This type of second-order good could reasonably be argued to be superior to a world with no evil but also no second-order good. This higher good seems like it could be part of some plan that humans do not fully understand. Yet certain problems still remain. They are encapsulated in this example: If one less person had died in the Holocaust, could we still have learned a lesson? Could we still have had the opportunity to overcome suffering and achieve second-order good? If the answer is yes, then the problem of evil remains. Even one tiny bit of unjustified evil is enough for the full force of the argument to be felt.

Another problem with the argument from human ignorance is that it is non-empirical, (aka unfalsifiable). No amount of empircal evidence could conclusively rule out the possibility that we do not really understand what constitues evil. In the same way, one cannot know anything beyond one's own existence with absolute certainty. Yet this does not mean that we should not bother to consume breakfast in the morning because we may lack that understanding that we are really dreaming and would therefore be engaging in a futile enterprise. As humans we make certain intuitive assumptions because they work, despite the fact that we may, in reality, all be brains in vats. Among these intuitive assumptions is the universally shared intuition that minimal suffering is better than any amount of suffering that exceeds a minimal amount of suffering.

Free will

Some theists argue that God allows evil to exist so that humans can have freedom of choice, to do good or evil, so that they are whole beings, and not mindless machines.

Some critics of this argument say that beings which are not omnipotent do not have freedom of choice in any case. But others say that free will should be understood as "wanting" and "trying" but not necessarily "getting". For example, not everyone has the ability to become a successful Major League Baseball player, even though they have the freedom to try.

Another argument is that the choices a person can make are determined by one's inherent nature. If someone were naturally good, he would still have some degree of free choice. Many people who have enjoyed this partial free will have lived their lives without causing suffering or other evil. Why wouldn't God make everyone predisposed to being good? Why would he make some who are predispoded to performing evil acts?

The other side of this argument is that there "are no" naturally good people. All people are capable of both good and evil acts. An individual does either good or evil acts, depending not only on their inherent nature, but also upbringing, experiences, morals, choices, circumstances, society, and many other factors. The same group of people might be good or evil depending on the society they live in.

Some critics claimed that fundamentally, there is a question that if a god cannot create people that are both entirely good and enjoy free will, then it is not all-powerful. However, this statement is contradictory in itself. It is equivalent to the statement that if God cannot create a circle that is square, then He is not all-powerful.

Other criticisms

A unique response to the problem of evil comes from the ill-defined body of early Christian belief known as Gnosticism. Many Gnostics claimed that the god of the Jewish Bible or Old Testament who created the world, is not God, but an inept, though highly powerful, being that they call the Demiurge. They view him as a malicious being who made the world of matter and flesh as a prison to hide humanity's true spiritual nature. Hence, part of their answer to the problem of evil is that the true God, whom they sometimes call "the True Father," did not in fact make this world of suffering, evil and pain. However they do not provide an explanation for why the true God would allow another being to create them instead, and in such an evil manner.

Problem of evil in Hinduism

In Hinduism, the problem of evil is present but does not exist per se as souls are eternal and not directly created by God. In Dvaita philosophy, jivas (souls) are eternally existent and hence not a creation of God ex nihilo (out of nothing). The souls are bound by beginningless avidya (ignorance) that cause a misidentification with products of nature (body, wealth, power) and hence suffering. In effect, Hinduism identifies avidya (ignorance) as the cause of evil and this ignorance itself is uncaused. Suffering from natural causes are explained as karmic results of previous births.

Moreover, even within the realm of avidya, "good" and "evil" are an individual's deeds and God only dispenses the results of action (Karma).

External links

Notes

References

Beebe, James R. "Logical Problem of Evil," The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.).
Crouch, William, "Is there a defensible argument for the non-existence of God?," On Philosophy, James Nicholson (ed.).
Farrer, Austin. Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961.
Hein, David and Henderson, Edward, Captured by the Crucified: The Practical Theology of Austin Farrer. New York and London: Continuum / T & T Clark, 2004. 100-118.
Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love, first edition. London: Macmillan, 1966.
Mackie, J. L. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Murray, Michael. "Leibniz on the Problem of Evil," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977.
Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.
Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
Tooley, Michael, "The Problem of Evil," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
Trakakis , Nick. "Evidential Problem of Evil," The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.).

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