In philosophy, a philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical person that, despite a strong likeness to normal human beings, lacks conscious experience or (in other words) has no qualia at all. Philosophical zombies are mainly used in arguments (zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind, particularly in arguments against functionalism. Note that these arguments are based on the logical possibility of zombies, not on their actuality.

A behavioral zombie is behaviorally identical with humans and yet has no conscious experience.

A neurological zombie has a human brain and is otherwise physically identical to humans; nevertheless, it has no conscious experience.

Since physicalist theories of the mind would typically hold that mental facts are nothing over and above physical facts, the possibility of zombies arguably supports dualism. Physicalists, in turn, argue that something that is physically identical to a person necessarily has the same consciousness and experiences as one.

Daniel Dennett is a well-known opponent of the possibility of philosophical zombies. David Chalmers, a major theorist in the area, holds that philosophical zombies are logically possible, but not "naturally possible" – a notion that is explicated at length in his The conscious mind (1996). Another noted philosopher who theorizes about p-zombies is Robert Kirk.

See also

• Zimboe
• Possible worlds

External links

• A Qwantz comic on the subject of philosophical zombies
• Zombies on the web, compiled by David Chalmers
• The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies, Daniel Dennett

Philosophy of mind

哲学的ゾンビ