Oil reserves refer to portions of oil in place (STOOIP) that are recoverable under economic constraints.
Oil in the ground is not a reserve unless it is economically recoverable, since as the oil is extracted, the cost of recovery increases incrementally. The recovery factor (RF) is the percentage of STOOIP which is economically recoverable under a given set of conditions.
Between 1859 and 1968, 200 gigabarrels (200 billion barrels, 31 km³) of oil were used. As of 2006, as prices approached the inflation-adjusted record highs from 1980, world consumption is on track to reach 30 gigabarrels per year. *
As the price of oil increases a vast number of oil-derived products will become more expensive to produce, including gasoline, lubricating oils, plastics, tires, roads, synthetic fabrics, etc. Science has so far been unable to find an affordable alternative to any of these products, even when compared to crude oil prices of $50/bbl and above.
Proven, probable and possible reserves are the three most common categories of reserves. They represent the certainty that a reserve exists based on the geologic and engineering data and interpretation for a given location. The international authority for reserves definitions is generally the Society of Petroleum Engineers. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has, in recent years, demanded that oil companies with exchange listed stock adopt reserves accounting standards that are consistent with conservative industry practice. In a notable case, Royal Dutch Shell was required to write down the value of its oil reserves for 2001 and 2002 based on application of more strict definitions of reserves categories.
The World Energy Resources Program of the United States Geological Survey produces the official estimates of the world oil resources for the U.S. Federal Government. They estimate the remaining world oil reserves are about 1,000 gigabarrels, and current estimates place the exhaustion of the remaining known reserves within the next 50 years. Estimates of undiscovered reserves range widely from 275 to 1,469 gigabarrels (44 to 234 km³). (It should be noted that one barrel equals 42 US gallons, or 158.97 litres.) The Middle East has about 50% of the known remaining world oil reserve. The USGS estimates the total reserves are about three times the known amount.
There are margins of uncertainty concerning the actual size of proven oil reserves.* Presumably for political reasons, some nations have not allowed audits of the size of their fields. This is especially true of Middle East members of OPEC, as well as nations that belonged to the USSR. OPEC limits the amount of oil output a member nation can produce to a portion of the remaining reserves, giving an incentive to manipulate the data. For example, in 1985 Kuwait increased the estimated size of their oil fields by 50%, which allowed them to increase their output. Other member nations quickly followed suit. The Saudi national oil company controls the largest amount of proven oil reserves in the world.
Some estimates, such as the USGS, predict that oil reserves will become economically unrecoverable by the 2050s. However, these numbers are open to debate as they include only reserves that are presently in development or considered economically recoverable. They do not include tar sands and bitumen, nor do they take into account possible coal-derived production, methane extraction from waste, the recycling of tires, or recycled plastics. Estimates also do not include any reserves in Antarctica, which is protected from exploration by environmental treaties. Although none of these sources are currently economical, they could be used to produce significant quantities of hydrocarbons in the future, and they may become important as crude oil production dwindles, or if new technology makes them easier to recover. Higher crude oil prices also make these sources more attractive; industry observers believe that sustained prices above $40/bbl will provide the incentive and return on investment to make previously undesirable oil deposits economically viable.
Oil and gas reserves are the main asset of an oil company - Booking is the process by which they are added to the Balance sheet. This is done according to a set of rules developed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE). The Reserves of any company listed on the New York Stock Exchange - which in practice means virtually every commercial company in the world - have to be stated to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In many cases these reported reserves are audited by external geologists, although this is not a legal requirement. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission rejects the probability concept and prohibits companies from mentioning probable and possible reserves in their filings. Thus, official estimates of proven reserves will always be understated compared to what oil companies think actually exists. For practical puposes companies will use proven plus probable estimate (2P), and for long term planning they will be looking primarily at possible reserves
Other countries also have their national hydrocarbon reserves authorities for example the GKZ - State reserves commission of Russia where companies operating in these countries have to report
Other types of risk also exist - economic risk, technological risk, and political risk. Economic risk is the probability that the oil exists but cannot be produced at current prices and costs. There is a vast quantity of oil in this category, so economists will always be more optimistic than geologists. Technological risk is the probability that the oil exists but cannot be produced using existing technology. Again, there is a great deal of oil and near-oil in this category, such as the world's oil shale deposits. And political risk is the risk that oil exists but cannot be produced because political conditions prevent it. Since most of the world's oil is in politically unstable countries, political risk is usually the biggest risk and the most difficult to quantify.
An example of technology increasing reserves is the recent increase of Canadian oil reserves from 5 to 179 gigabarrels, moving Canada to second place in world oil reserves. There is no geological risk in the Canadian oil sands - their existence has been known for centuries. The change occurred because of the learning curve combined with disruptive technology. Under heavy cost pressure, companies reduced their production costs from $30 per barrel to $10/bbl. Meanwhile, the Alberta Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority developed a new process called steam assisted gravity drainage (SAGD) to recover the deeper oil sands. At the same time, improvements in directional drilling technology made drilling horizontal SAGD wells much cheaper. At the end of it all, the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) plugged new numbers into its computer models and with the stroke of a keyboard, quadrupled North American proven oil reserves. No new oil had been found, some potential reserves had just reached an economic and technological tipping point.
However, oil company estimates of oil sands reserves can be misleading to the average person because oil sands do not really contain oil at all, but a semisolid hydrocarbon known as bitumen. Oil companies only book them as oil reserves after they build a strip mine or thermal facility to extract them and an upgrader to convert them to synthetic crude oil (syncrude or SCO).
When oil prices were low, Albertan oil sands companies such as Suncor Energy and Syncrude reduced their costs to around US $15/bbl. As a result, the oil price increases of 2004 and 2005 to over $60/bbl is definitely high enough to attract investment capital, and there are now nearly $100 billion worth of projects under construction or planned in the Albertan oil sands. The main constraint on their development is a severe labor and housing shortage in Fort McMurray, the only significant community in the oil sands area. Albertan oil sands production in 2005 was around 0.4 gigabarrels per year, or half of total Albertan and one hundredth of total global production. It is expected to rise to 0.7 gigabarrels per year or 67% of Albertan production by 2010 and by 2015, if world oil prices stay high, it may be as high as 1.5 gigabarrels per year.
United States crude oil production peaked in late 1970 at over 4 gigabarrels per year, but declined to 1.8 gigabarrels per year by early 2006. In fact, production in the fall of 2005 fell to only 1.5 gigabarrels per year as a result of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico - a level not seen since shortly after World War II. At the same time, US consumption of petroleum products increased to over 7.3 gigabarrels per year. The difference was mostly made up by imports, with the largest supplier being Canada, which increased its exports of crude oil and refined products to the US to 0.8 gigabarrels per year at the end of 2005. Imports of oil and products now account for nearly half of the US trade deficit.
The United States has the largest known concentration of oil shale in the world, according to the Bureau of Land Management and holds an estimated 800 gigabarrels of recoverable oil, enough to meet U.S. demand for oil at current levels for 110 years. Oil shale is developable given high enough oil prices, and the technology for converting oil shale to oil has been known since the middle ages.
However, the main constraint on oil shale development is probably going to be that Albertan oil sands are only about half as expensive to produce, and the US has full access to oil sands production under the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA. In addition, there are environmental concerns about oil shale development. The oil shale areas are semi-arid, in which mine scars last for centuries, and are at the headwaters of several important rivers, notably the Powder River in a region in which water rights are very important. By contrast, the Alberta oil sands are in a largely uninhabited boreal forest that is periodically destroyed by forest fires, and the rivers are very large and flow into the Arctic Ocean. As a result, the oil shales are probably not going to see development until oil sands production is well underway.
Since 1979, Mexico has produced most of its oil from the supergiant Cantarell Field, which is the second-biggest field in the world by production, but which has recently peaked and started a terminal production decline. In 1997, PEMEX started a massive nitrogen injection project to maintain oil flow, which now consumes half the nitrogen produced in the world, but this largely just accelerates depletion rather than adding new reserves.
As for its other fields, 40% of Mexico's remaining reserves are in the Chicontepec Field, which was found in 1926, but which has remained undeveloped because the oil is trapped in impermeable rock. The remainder of Mexico's fields are much smaller, much more expensive to develop, and contain heavy oil that buyers do not want. As a result of concentrating on its one good oil field and ignoring everything else, Mexico's proven reserves have fallen every year for more than a decade, and it has less than 10 years worth of oil reserves at current production levels.
The OPEC contries decided in 1985 to link their production quotas to their reserves. What then seemed wise provoked important increases of the estimates; in order to increase their production rights. This also permits the obtainment of bigger loans at lesser interest rates. This is a suspected reason for the reserves rise of Iraq in 1983, then at war with Iran.
| Declared reserves with suspicious increases (in billion of barrels) Colin Campbell, SunWorld, 80-95 | |||||||
| Year | Abou Dhabi | Dubai | Iran | Iraq | Kuwait | Saudi Arabia | Venezuela |
| 1980 | 28.00 | 1.40 | 58.00 | 31.00 | 65.40 | 163.35 | 17.87 |
| 1981 | 29.00 | 1.40 | 57.50 | 30.00 | 65.90 | 165.00 | 17.95 |
| 1982 | 30.60 | 1.27 | 57.00 | 29.70 | 64.48 | 164.60 | 20.30 |
| 1983 | 30.51 | 1.44 | 55.31 | 41.00 | 64.23 | 162.40 | 21.50 |
| 1984 | 30.40 | 1.44 | 51.00 | 43.00 | 63.90 | 166.00 | 24.85 |
| 1985 | 30.50 | 1.44 | 48.50 | 44.50 | 90.00 | 169.00 | 25.85 |
| 1986 | 31.00 | 1.40 | 47.88 | 44.11 | 89.77 | 168.80 | 25.59 |
| 1987 | 31.00 | 1.35 | 48.80 | 47.10 | 91.92 | 166.57 | 25.00 |
| 1988 | 92.21 | 4.00 | 92.85 | 100.00 | 91.92 | 166.98 | 56.30 |
| 1989 | 92.20 | 4.00 | 92.85 | 100.00 | 91.92 | 169.97 | 58.08 |
| 1990 | 92.20 | 4.00 | 93.00 | 100.00 | 95.00 | 258.00 | 59.00 |
| 1991 | 92.20 | 4.00 | 93.00 | 100.00 | 94.00 | 258.00 | 59.00 |
| 1992 | 92.20 | 4.00 | 93.00 | 100,00 | 94,00 | 258.00 | 62.70 |
| 2004 | 92.20 | 4.00 | 132.00 | 115.00 | 99.00 | 259.00 | 78.00 |
The table suggests that, firstly, the OPEC countries declare that the discovery of new fields, year after year, replaces exactly or near exactly the quantities produced, because the declared reserves do not vary a lot from one year to the other. For example, Saudi Arabia extracts 3 billion barrels a year, which will diminish by this amount. However, Abu Dhabi, in the United Arab Emirates, declares exactly 92.3 billion barrels since 1988, but in 16 years, 14 billion barrels were extracted.
Also, there is much competition between states. For example, Kuwait gave to themselves 90 billion barrels of reserves in 1985, the year of the reserves link. Abu Dhabi and Iran responded with slightly higher numbers, to guarantee similar production quotas. Saddam Hussein, fearing to be left behind by nations he disliked, replied with around 100. Apparently, with all this amount of inflation, Saudi Arabia was forced to reply, two years later, with its own revision.
Other examples suggest the inaccuracy of official reserve estimates:
Note however that the definition of proven reserves varies from country to country. In the USA, the conservative rule is to classify as proven only the reserves that are being produced. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia classifies as proven reserves known fields not yet in production. Venezuela includes non-conventional oil (bitumens) of the Orinoco in its reserve base.
According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Saudi Arabia contains 262 gigabarrels of proven oil reserves, around one-fourth of proven, conventional world oil reserves. Although Saudi Arabia has around 80 oil and gas fields, more than half of its oil reserves are contained in only eight fields, and more than half its production comes from one field, the Ghawar field.
One challenge for the Saudis in maintaining or increasing production is that their existing fields sustain 5-12 percent annual decline rates, meaning that the country needs around 2 to 4 gigabarrels per year in new capacity each year just to compensate. The challenge is that the Ghawar field, found in 1948, has produced about half its total reserves, and is starting to run into production problems - notably there are rumors that it is now producing more water than oil. Other Saudi fields are not only smaller, but more difficult to produce. Historically, when Saudi Arabia has run into production problems in other fields, it has simply shut them in and stepped up production in Ghawar, but if Ghawar runs into problems that no longer will be possible.
Since Saudi Arabia is the world's largest producer of oil, their reserves are analyzed very closely and estimates vary on the amount of economically recoverable oil in Saudia Arabia. The raw data is not available to outside scrutiny. The International Energy Agency has predicted that Saudi oil output will double during the next two decades, projecting production of 7 gigabarrels per year in 2020 - although this seems unlikely, if only for political reasons.
A dissenting opinion regarding Saudi oil reserves came from Matthew Simmons who claimed in his 2004 book "Twilight in the Desert" that Saudi Arabia's oil production is declining, and that it will not be able to produce more than current levels - about 4 gigabarrels per year *. In addition to his belief that the Saudi fields have hit their peak, Simmons also argues that the Saudis may have irretrievably damaged their large oil fields by overpumping salt water into the fields in an effort to maintain the fields' pressure and thus make the oil easier to extract. Additionally, ever since 1982 the Saudis have withheld their well data as well as any detailed data on their reserves, giving outside experts no way to verify the overall size of Saudi reserves and output.
Iran averages about 1.5 gigabarrels per year, which is a significant decline from the 6 gigabarrels per year it produced when the Shah of Iran was in power. The United States prohibits imports of oil from Iran, which limits its exposure to an Iranian oil cutoff, but does not reduce the likelihood that an interruption of Iranian oil would cause a spike in world oil prices. American pressure on Iran to renounce Iran's nuclear program makes the possibility of military confrontation quite high, and the political risks of Iranian oil far outweigh any geological ones.
The US EIA (Energy Information Administration) reduced their forcast for Saudi oil production to 15.4 mb/day in 2020 and Middle East OPEC countries increasing to 35.2 mb/day by 2020 from 20.7 mb/day in 2002 Energy Outlook 2005 table E1 *.
Arctic basins tend to be richer in natural gas than in oil. The abundance of gas in the Arctic so far from main markets will require moving gas long distances. Problems of ensuring that oil and gas keep flowing freely in arctic subsea pipelines are virtually identical to those experienced at a depth of 8,000 feet in the Gulf of Mexico, where temperatures are at or close to the freezing point along the seafloor where hydrates can form. Technology for moving oil from the seafloor to the shore is similar to that employed in Norway, and may someday have application in Alaska.
Shell, one of the world's largest oil companies, believes Arctic waters, including those of northern Alaska, hold great potential as an oil and natural gas frontier. Shell sees the Arctic as a very tantalizing opportunity to develop new oil and gas resources and the last remaining frontier. The company's views tend to support studies by academics and agencies that Arctic basins contain 25% of the world's remaining undiscovered resources. Most of these basins are unexplored and undeveloped. Shell recognizes how "difficult and challenging" the social, environmental, and economic aspects will be. Shell believes that technology solutions developed for other areas, such as the deepwater, will have applications in the offshore Arctic.
However, in early 2006, Royal Dutch Shell made a bold move into non-conventional oil when purchased C$465 million worth of leases in northern Canada just outside the Athabasca Oil Sands. Mysteriously, Shell did not assign the property to Shell Canada, which already has a large oil sands operation in the area, but created a new, wholly-owned subsidiary called SURE Northern Energy Ltd. (SURE Northern) to develop the leases. While the area is known to contain large oil deposits, it is not included in current Canadian oil reserves because the geology is harder and more rocky than the sand which characterizes most oilsands projects.
The United States maintains a Strategic Petroleum Reserve at four sites in the Gulf of Mexico, with a total capacity of 0.727 gigabarrels of crude oil. The sites are enormous salt caverns that have been converted to store crude oil. The US SPR has never been filled to capacity; the largest amount reached thus far was 0.7 gigabarrels on August 17, 2005, whereafter reserves were drawn down to meet demand in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This reserve was created in 1975 following the 1973-4 oil embargo, and as of 2005 it is the largest emergency petroleum supply in the world. At current US consumption rates (over 7 gigabarrels per year), the SPR would supply all normal US demand for approximately 37 days.
China, the second largest consumer of oil after the United States, has begun a plan to build strategic crude reserves as the country's demand for energy continues to grow. The size of this future Chinese strategic petroleum reserve will be in the neighborhood of approximately 0.15 gigabarrels. It has also told its three largest state oil groups to purchase foreign oil holdings to ensure adequate strategic energy supplies to power the country's rapidly growing economy. Separately, Kong Linglong, director of the National Development and Reform Commission's Foreign Investment Department, said that the Chinese government would soon move to establish a government fund aimed at helping its state oil groups purchase offshore energy assets.
Japan, the third largest consumer of oil, has its own state controlled strategic petroleum reserve. According to Japan's Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Japan has state reserves of petroleum for 92 days of consumption and privately held reserves for another 78 days of consumption, for a total of 171 days of consumption. These reserves are particularly important for Japan since they have practically no domestic petroleum production and import at least 95% of their oil.
Many countries with extensive oil reserves are members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC. The members of the OPEC cartel hold about two-thirds of the world's oil reserves, allowing them to significantly influence the international price of crude oil.
As the amount of oil left is an estimate, not a known amount, there are many differing estimates for the amount of oil remaining in different regions of the world. The following table lists the highest and lowest estimates for regions, and countries, with significant oil reserves in gigabarrels (109 barrels), as listed here *. The large range of some country's estimates, Canada in particular, stems from factors such as the potential future development of non-conventional oil from tar sands, oil shale, etc.
| Regular Oil (light, heavy, deepwater, polar) | Other hydrocarbon reserves | Total Recoverable Hydrocarbons Depletion (projected) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State | Oil Discovery peak | Oil Production peak | Oil Depletion midpoint | Natural Gas peak | Coal peak | Tar sand, oil shale peak | Recoverable Oil Depletion | Recoverable Natural Gas depletion | Recoverable Coal depletion | ||
| North America | |||||||||||
| Canada | 1958 | 1973 | 1988 | ||||||||
| USA | 1930 | 1971 | 2003 | ||||||||
| Mexico | 1977 | 2002 | 1999 | ||||||||
| South America | |||||||||||
| Argentina | 1960 | 1998 | 1994 | ||||||||
| Colombia | 1992 | 1999 | 1999 | ||||||||
| Venezuela 1 | 1941 | 1970 | 2003 | ||||||||
| Chile | 1960 | 1982 | 1979 | ||||||||
| Ecuador 2 | 1969 | 2004 | 2007 | ||||||||
| Peru | 1861 | 1983 | 1988 | ||||||||
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1969 | 1978 | 1983 | ||||||||
| Europe | |||||||||||
| Albania | 1928 | 1983 | 1986 | ||||||||
| Austria | 1947 | 1955 | 1970 | ||||||||
| Croatia | 1950 | 1988 | 1987 | ||||||||
| Denmark | 1971 | 2002 | 2004 | ||||||||
| France | 1958 | 1988 | 1987 | ||||||||
| Germany | 1952 | 1966 | 1977 | ||||||||
| Hungary | 1964 | 1987 | 1987 | ||||||||
| Italy | 1981 | 1997 | 2005 | ||||||||
| Netherlands | 1980 | 1987 | 1991 | ||||||||
| Norway | 1979 | 2003 | 2003 | ||||||||
| Romania | 1857 | 1976 | 1970 | ||||||||
| Ukraine | 1962 | 1970 | 1984 | ||||||||
| United Kingdom | 1974 | 1999 | 1998 | ||||||||
| Africa | |||||||||||
| Cameroon | 1977 | 1986 | 1994 | ||||||||
| Congo | 1984 | 2001 | 2000 | ||||||||
| Egypt | 1965 | 1995 | 2007 | ||||||||
| Gabon 2 | 1985 | 1996 | 1997 | ||||||||
| Libya 1 | 1961 | 1970 | 2011 | ||||||||
| Sudan | 1980 | 2005 | 2009 | ||||||||
| Tunisia | 1971 | 1981 | 1998 | ||||||||
| Middle East | |||||||||||
| Bahrain | 1932 | 1970 | 1977 | ||||||||
| Oman | 1962 | 2001 | 2003 | ||||||||
| Qatar 1 | 1940 | 2004 | 1998 | ||||||||
| Syria | 1966 | 1995 | 1998 | ||||||||
| Saudi Arabia | 1946 | 2006 | 2010 | ||||||||
| Yemen | 1978 | 1999 | 2003 | ||||||||
| Eurasia and Central Asia | |||||||||||
| Turkey | 1969 | 1991 | 1992 | ||||||||
| Uzbekistan | 1992 | 1998 | 2008 | ||||||||
| Rest of Asia | |||||||||||
| Brunei | 1929 | 1978 | 1989 | ||||||||
| China | 1953 | 2003 | 2003 | ||||||||
| India | 1974 | 2004 | 2003 | ||||||||
| Indonesia 1 | 1955 | 1977 | 1992 | ||||||||
| Malaysia | 1973 | 2004 | 2002 | ||||||||
| Pakistan | 1983 | 1992 | 2001 | ||||||||
| Thailand | 1981 | 2005 | 2008 | ||||||||
| Oceania | |||||||||||
| Papua New Guinea | 1987 | 1993 | 2007 | ||||||||
| Australia | 1967 | 2000 | 2001 | ||||||||
| Regular Oil (light, heavy, deepwater, polar) | Other hydrocarbon reserves | Total Recoverable Hydrocarbons Depletion (projected) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State | Oil Discovery peak | Oil Production peak (projection) | Oil Depletion midpoint | Natural Gas peak | Coal peak | tar sand, oil shale peak | Recoverable Oil Depletion | Recoverable Natural Gas depletion | Recoverable Coal depletion | ||
| North America - no such states (but some are still unclassified) | |||||||||||
| South America | |||||||||||
| Bolivia | 1966 | 2010 | 2016 | ||||||||
| Brazil | 1996 | 2012 | 2012 | ||||||||
| Europe - no such states (but some are still unclassified) | |||||||||||
| Africa | |||||||||||
| Algeria 1 | 1956 | 2006 | 2010 | ||||||||
| Angola | 1998 | 2019 | 2011 | ||||||||
| Chad | 1977 | 2008 | 2014 | ||||||||
| Nigeria 1 | 2001 | 2009 | 2009 | ||||||||
| Middle East | |||||||||||
| Iran 1 | 1961 | 1974 2 | 2009 | ||||||||
| Iraq 1 | 1948 | 2015 | 2021 | ||||||||
| Kuwait 1 | 1938 | 1971 2 | 2018 3 | ||||||||
| United Arab Emirates 1 | 1964 | 2011 | 2026 | ||||||||
| Eurasia and Central Asia | |||||||||||
| Azerbaijan | 1871 | 2009 | 2014 | ||||||||
| Kazakhstan | 2000 | 2030 | 2036 | ||||||||
| Russia | 1960 | 1987 2 | 1992 | ||||||||
| Rest of Asia | |||||||||||
| Vietnam | 1975 | 2009 | |||||||||
| Oceania - no such states (but some are still unclassified) | |||||||||||
| Antarctica - still unclassified | |||||||||||
| Regular Oil (light, heavy, deepwater, polar) | Other hydrocarbon reserves | Total Recoverable Hydrocarbons Depletion (projected) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State | Oil Discovery peak | Oil Production peak | Oil Depletion midpoint | Natural Gas peak | Coal peak | Oil peak (tar sand, shale) | Recoverable Oil Depletion | Recoverable Natural Gas depletion | Recoverable Coal depletion | ||
| North America | |||||||||||
| Costa Rica | |||||||||||
| Panama | |||||||||||
| Jamaica | |||||||||||
| Bahamas | |||||||||||
| multiple additional countries | |||||||||||
| South America | |||||||||||
| Suriname | |||||||||||
| Guyana | |||||||||||
| Paraguay | |||||||||||
| Uruguay | |||||||||||
| Europe | |||||||||||
| Estonia | |||||||||||
| Serbia | |||||||||||
| Latvia | |||||||||||
| multiple additional countries | |||||||||||
| Africa | |||||||||||
| Equatorial Guinea | |||||||||||
| Sahrawi Republic Western Sahara | |||||||||||
| multiple additional countries | |||||||||||
| Middle East | |||||||||||
| Lebanon | |||||||||||
| Jordan | |||||||||||
| Israel | |||||||||||
| Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) | |||||||||||
| Eurasia and Central Asia | |||||||||||
| Armenia | |||||||||||
| Cyprus | |||||||||||
| Georgia | |||||||||||
| Kyrgyz Republic | |||||||||||
| Tajikistan | |||||||||||
| Turkmenistan | |||||||||||
| Rest of Asia | |||||||||||
| Japan | |||||||||||
| Taiwan | |||||||||||
| multiple additional countries | |||||||||||
| Oceania | |||||||||||
| Tonga | |||||||||||
| multiple additional countries | |||||||||||
| Antarctica 1 | |||||||||||
Several types of fuels exist that offer alternatives to petroleum. The United States Department of Energy officially recognizes the following alternative fuels:
Transportation Alternatives:
This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License.
It uses material from the
"Oil reserves".
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