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Gerrymandering is a controversial form of redistricting in which electoral district or constituency boundaries are manipulated for an electoral advantage. The word "gerrymander" is named for the American politician Elbridge Gerry (July 17, 1744 – November 23, 1814) Gerry pronounced his name (with a hard G), and is a portmanteau of his name and the word "salamander," which was used to describe the appearance of a tortuous electoral district Gerry created in order to disadvantage his electoral opponents. "Gerrymander" is used both as a verb meaning "to commit gerrymandering" as well as a noun describing the resulting electoral geography. Ideally, it is pronounced with a hard G, as with Elbridge Gerry's actual name, but ignorance of this has made the "jerry" pronunciation common.

Gerrymandering may be used to advantage or disadvantage particular constituents, such as members of a racial, linguistic, religious or class group, often in the favor of ruling incumbents or a specific political party. Although all electoral systems which use multiple districts as a basis for determining representation are susceptible to gerrymandering to various degrees, governments using single winner voting systems are the most vulnerable. Most notably, gerrymandering is particularly effective in nonproportional systems that tend towards fewer parties, such as first past the post.

Among western democracies, only Israel and the Netherlands are not susceptible to gerrymandering in the national government, as they employ electoral systems with only one (nationwide) voting district. Other countries, such as the UK and Canada, attempt to prevent gerrymandering by having the constituency boundaries set by non-partisan organisations such as the UK's Boundary Commission. Gerrymandering is most common in countries such as the United States of America where elected politicians are responsible for drawing districts.

Methods: "Packing and cracking"

There are two principle strategies behind gerrymandering: maximizing the effective votes of supporters, and minimizing the effective votes of opponents. One form of gerrymandering, packing, is to place as many voters of one type into a single district to reduce their influence in other districts. A second form, cracking, involves spreading out voters of a particular type among many districts in order to reduce their representation by denying them a sufficiently large voting block in any particular district. The methods are typically combined, creating a few "forfeit" seats for packed voters of one type in order to secure even greater representation for voters of another type.

Gerrymandering is effective because of the wasted vote effect - by packing opposition voters into districts they will already win (increasing excess votes for winners) and by cracking the remainder among districts where they are moved into the minority (increasing votes for eventual losers), the number of wasted votes among the opposition can be maximized. Similarly, with supporters now holding narrow margins in the unpacked districts, the number of wasted votes among supporters is minimized.

The Dame Shirley Porter case

An interesting, albeit unusual method of achieving the effects of gerrymandering is to attempt to move the population within the existing boundaries. This occurred in Westminster, in the United Kingdom, where the local government was controlled by the Conservative party, and the leader of the council, Dame Shirley Porter, conspired with others to implement the policy of council house sales in such a way as to shore up the Conservative vote in marginal wards by selling the houses there to people thought likely to vote Conservative. An inquiry by the district auditor found that these actions had resulted in financial loss to taxpayers, and Porter and three others were surcharged to cover the loss. Porter was accused of "disgraceful and improper gerrymandering" by district auditor John Magill. Those surcharged resisted this ruling with a legal challenge, but, in December 2001, the appeal court upheld the district auditor's ruling. Despite further lengthy legal argument Porter eventually accepted a deal to end the long-running saga, and paid £12 million (out of an original claimed £27 million plus costs and interest) to Westminster Council in July, 2004.

Effects of gerrymandering

Reduction in electoral competition and voter turnout

The most immediate and obvious effect of gerrymandering is for elections to become less competitive in all districts, particularly packed ones. As electoral margins of victory become significantly greater and politicians have safe seats, the incentive for meaningful campaigning is reduced. Similarly, voter turnout is likely to be adversely affected as the chance of influencing electoral results by voting becomes greatly reduced and, correspondingly, political campaigns are less likely to expend resources encouraging turnout.

An additional effect of this reduction in competition is the increased importance of securing nomination rather than ultimate approval of the general electorate for a given district, as a general win once nominated becomes more or less guaranteed in a gerrymandered district. In 2004, for example, when California's 3rd Congressional District became an open seat after Republican Congressman Doug Ose ran for higher office, the state's three strongest Republican congressional candidates campaigned vigorously against one another for nomination in the district's primary election, even though several other districts remained uncontested with no Republican nominee making even a token campaign effort.

Increased incumbent advantage and campaign costs

The effect of gerrymandering on incumbents is particularly focused, as incumbents are far more likely to be reelected under conditions of gerrymandering. This is due in part both to the high likelihood of incumbents to be the ones orchestrating a gerrymander as well as the relative ease of renomination for incumbents in subsequent elections, including incumbents among the minority. This shows another commonly cited effect of gerrymandering: a deleterious effect on the principle of democratic accountability. No longer fearing removal from office with their renomination and electoral success secured due to uncompetitive elections, incumbent politicians have a greatly reduced incentive to govern based on the interests of their constituents, even when these interests reflect an issue that enjoys majority support across the electorate as a whole.

Gerrymandering can also have a more practical effect on the campaign costs for district elections. As districts become increasingly concave and oddly elongated, the difficulty of finding transportation and focusing campaign advertising across a district increases significantly, resulting in higher costs to run for office. When incumbents have an advantage at securing campaign funds (as is commonly the case), this further amplifies the advantage to incumbents that gerrymandering provides.

Less descriptive representation

Gerrymandering also has significant effects on the representation received by voters in gerrymandered districts. Because gerrymandering is designed to increase the number of wasted votes among the electorate, the relative representation of particular groups can be drastically altered from their actual share of the voting population. This effect can significantly prevent a gerrymandered system from achieving proportional and descriptive representation, as the winners of elections are increasingly determined by who is drawing the districts rather than the preferences of the voters.

Sometimes, however, gerrymandering is advocated as a solution for improving representation amongst otherwise underrepresented groups by packing them into a single district. This can be controversial, and may lead to those groups remaining marginalized in the government as they become confined to a single district and representatives outside that district no longer need to represent them to win election. As an example, much of the redistricting conducted in the United States in the early 1990s involved the intentional creation of additional "majority-minority" districts where racial minorities such as African Americans were packed into the majority. Curiously, this "maximization policy" was supported by elements of both the Republican Party (who had little support among the minority groups) and minority representatives elected as Democrats from these constituencies, who then had "safe seats".

Incumbent gerrymandering

Gerrymandering can also be done to help incumbents as a whole, effectively turning every district into a packed one and greatly reducing the potential for competitive elections. This is particularly likely to occur when the minority party has significant obstruction power - unable to enact a partisan gerrymander, the legislature instead agrees on ensuring their own mutual reelection.

In an unusual occurrence in 2000, for example, the two dominant parties in the state of California cooperatively redrew both state and federal legislative districts to preserve the status quo, ensuring the electoral safety of the politicians from possibly unpredictable voting by the electorate. This move proved completely effective, as no State or Federal legislative office changed party in the 2004 election, with 53 congressional, 20 state senate, and 80 state assembly seats potentially at risk.

Reforms targeted against gerrymandering

Due to the myriad issues associated with gerrymandering and the subsequent impact it has on competitive elections and democratic accountability, numerous countries have enacted reforms making the practice either more difficult or less effective. Countries such as the UK, Canada and most of Europe have moved the responsibility of drawing constituency boundaries to neutral or cross-party bodies.

In the United States, however, these reforms remain controversial and frequently meet particularly strong opposition from groups that are benefitting from gerrymandering who stand to lose considerable influence in such a system.

Redistricting by neutral or cross-party agency

The most commonly advocated electoral reform proposal targeted at gerrymandering is to change the redistricting process. Under these proposals, an independent, and presumably objective, commission is created and charged with redistricting rather than the legislature. To help ensure neutrality, members of the board can come from relatively apolitical sources such as retired state judges or longstanding members of the bureaucracy, possibly requiring adequate representation from competing political parties. Additionally, members of the board can be denied access to information that might aid in gerrymandering, such as the demographic makeup or voting patterns of the population. As a further constraint, consensus requirements can be imposed to ensure that the resulting district map reflects a wider perception of fairness, such as a requirement for a supermajority approval of the commission for any district proposal. However, in some states (such as Missouri following 2000 census) this has lead to deadlock where the equally numbered partisan apointees where unable to reach consensus in a reasonable timeframe resulting in the courts having to draw the lines.

In Iowa, the nonpartisan Legislative Services Bureau (akin to the federal Congressional Research Service) draws the districts. Aside from the federally mandated contiguity and population equality criteria, the LSB mandates unity of counties and cities. Political factors such as location of incumbents, previous boundary locations, and party makeup are specifically forbidden. Since Iowa's counties are mostly regularly-shaped polygons, the process has led to districts that follow county lines and thus appear more elegant. *

In the state of Ohio, Issue 4, a ballot proposition, was placed for the voters that created an independent commission whose first priority was competitive districts, a sort of "reverse gerrymander". A complex mathematical formula was used to determine the competitiveness of a district. The measure failed largely due to concerns that it would break up communities of interest. *

Shortest splitline algorithm

The Center for Range Voting has proposed a way to draw districts by a simple algorithm. Because the algorithm uses only the shape of the state, the number N of districts wanted, and the population distribution as inputs - and does not know the party loyalties of those people - the result cannot be biased. The algorithm (slightly oversimplified) is:
  1. Start with the boundary outline of the state.
  2. Let N=A+B where A and B are as nearly equal whole numbers as possible. (For example, 7=4+3.)
  3. Among all possible dividing lines that split the state into two parts with population ratio A:B, choose the shortest. (Note: since the Earth is round, when we say "line" we more precisely mean "great circle.")
  4. We now have two hemi-states, each to contain a specified number (namely A and B) of districts. Handle them recursively via the same splitting procedure. This district-drawing algorithm has the advantage of simplicity, ultra-low cost, clear unbiasedness, and it produces fairly nice-looking convex polygonal districts. But it has the disadvantage that it ignores geographic features such as rivers, cliffs, and highways. That causes it to produce districts worse than those an enlightened and unbiased human would produce - although in practice in the USA, the humans usually intentionally abuse these features (such as the district in Arizona featuring a fine filament winding for 200 miles along the river inside the Grand Canyon) anyhow.

    Changing the voting system

    Because gerrymandering relies on the wasted vote effect to be effective, the use of a different voting system with fewer wasted votes can help reduce gerrymandering. In particular, the use of multimember districts alongside voting systems establishing proportional representation can greatly reduce the proportion of wasted votes, and therefore the potential for gerrymandering. Similarly, the use of semi-proportional voting systems such as cumulative voting or the single non-transferable vote can also help achieve a large reduction in the number of wasted votes, and due to their relative simplicity and similarity to first past the post they are often advocated as a replacement system by advocates of electoral reform.

    Changing the size of districts and the elected body

    If a proportional or semi-proportional voting system alongside multimember districts is used, then increasing the number of winners in any given district will reduce the number of wasted votes. This can be accomplished both by merging separate districts together and by increasing the total size of the body to be elected. Since gerrymandering relies on exploiting the wasted vote effect to secure electoral advantage, reducing the number of wasted votes by increasing the number of winners in a district can greatly reduce the potential for gerrymandering. Unless all districts are merged, however, this method cannot eliminate gerrymandering entirely.

    In contrast to proportional methods, if a nonproportional voting system with multiple winners (such as a form of bloc voting) is used, then increasing the size of the elected body while keeping the number of districts constant will not reduce the amount of wasted votes, leaving the potential for gerrymandering the same. Merging districts together under such a system, however, can reduce the potential for gerrymandering, but doing so also amplifies the effect of bloc voting's tendency to produce landslide victories, which has a similar effect in concentrating wasted votes among the opposition and denying them representation.

    If a system of single-winner elections is used, then increasing the size of the elected body will implicitly increase the number of districts to be created. This change can actually make gerrymandering easier when raising the number of single-winner elections, as opposition groups can be more efficiently packed into smaller districts without accidentally including supporters, further increasing the number of wasted votes amongst the opposition.

    Using fixed districts

    Another possible method of avoiding further gerrymandering is to simply avoid redistricting altogether and continue to use existing political boundaries such as state, county, or provincial lines. Doing this makes further increasing electoral advantage by changing boundaries impossible, however any existing advantage may become deeply ingrained. The United States Senate, for instance, has far more competitive elections than the House of Representatives due to the use of existing state borders rather than gerrymandered districts—Senators are elected by their entire state, while Representatives are elected by only a single district.

    The use of fixed districts creates an additional problem, however, in that fixed districts do not take into account changes in population and individual voters can therefore grow to have vastly different degrees of influence on the legislative process. This malapportionment, in turn, can have a particularly focused effect on representation after long periods of time or large population movements. The United States Senate, for instance, provides nearly 66 times the representation to voters in the state of Wyoming (the smallest) than voters in the state of California (the largest). In the United Kingdom during the Industrial revolution, several districts which had been fixed since the formation of the British Parliament became so small that they could be won with only a handful of voters (rotten boroughs).

    Establishing objective rules for the creation of districts

    Another avenue of tying the hands of potential gerrymanderers is to create objective, precise criteria to which any district map must comply. Courts in the United States, for instance, have ruled that congressional districts must be contiguous in order to be constitutional. This, however, is not a particularly binding constraint, as very narrow strips of land with few or no voters in them may be used to connect separate regions into the same district. Another objective criterion is maximized compactness, subject to other constraints such as geographic features and the boundaries of local governments.

    One idea is to constitutionally define a specific minimum (Isoperimetric Quotient), or minimum ratio between the perimeter and area of any given congressional voting district. Computer technology could ensure that population districts were drawn in such a way so as to minimize (Isoperimetric Inequality) and effectively eliminate Gerrymandering. Although technologies presently exist to define districts in this manner, there are no rules in place mandating their use, and no national movement to implement such a policy.

    Gerrymandering computer technology

    The introduction of modern computers and the development of elaborate voter databases alongside special districting software has made gerrymandering a far more precise science. Using these databases, politicians can obtain detailed information about every household including political party registration, previous campaign donations, and the number of times residents voted in previous elections. Using this information alongside other predictors of voting behavior such as age, income, race, or education level, drawers of a new electoral map can predict the voting behavior of each potential district with an astonishing degree of precision, greatly increasing the efficiency of gerrymandering and reducing the chance of accidentally making a district competitive.
    See also: Geographic information system

    National historical examples

    Gerrymandering in the United States

    The United States has been subject to gerrymandering since the initial carving of territories into US states. Combined with malapportionment rules for representation in the Senate and Electoral College, gerrymandering allowed the United States Congress significant amounts of control over its own political makeup. Prior to the American Civil War, with the contentious issue of slavery dividing the Congress, states were admitted on a formula of "one free state for each slave state" in order to prevent one side from gaining the upper hand. This nearly prevented the state of Maine from seceding from Massachusetts until the Missouri Compromise was agreed upon, and it was decided that Texas and California would both enter as single, but large, states.

    The practice of gerrymandering the borders of new states continued past the Civil War and into the late 19th century, where the territories of the Rocky Mountains were split up into relatively low-population states to help the Republican Party maintain control of the Presidency - each new state brought in three electoral votes regardless of its population size (Compare a map of the United States in 1860 with a map from 1870 [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/united_states/us_terr_1870.jpg).

    Throughout U.S. history, the possibility of gerrymandering has made the process of redistricting extremely politically contentious within the United States. Under the U.S. constitution, districts for members of the House of Representatives are redrawn every ten years following each census; it is common practice for state legislative boundaries to be redrawn at the same time. Intense political battles over contentious redistricting typically take place within state legislatures responsible for creating the electoral maps, however federal courts are often also involved. Sometimes this process creates strange bedfellows interested in securing reelection; in some states, Republicans have cut deals with opposing black Democratic state legislators to create majority black districts. By packing black Democratic voters into a single district, these districts essentially ensure the election of a black Congressman or reelection of a black state legislator, however due to the packed concentration of Democratic voters the surrounding districts are more safely Republican.

    Ironically, this kind of gerrymandering along racial lines has been used to both increase and decrease minority representation in state governments and congressional delegations.

    International election observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, who were invited to observe and report on the 2004 U.S. national elections, expressed criticism of the U.S. congressional redistricting process and made a recommendation that the procedures be reviewed to ensure genuine competitiveness of Congressional election contests*.

    Voting Rights Act of 1965
    After the Civil War, with the rewarding of voting rights to freed slaves, state legislatures turned to racial gerrymandering and poll taxes to disenfranchise minorities, most of whom were in geographically distinct areas. Eventually, these practices led to a major civil rights conflict; gerrymandering for the purpose of reducing the political influence of a racial or ethnic minority group became illegal in the United States under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (along with poll taxes by the Twenty-fourth Amendment in 1964), however gerrymandering for political gain remained legal.

    After the Voting Rights Act, racial gerrymandering was ironically "flipped around" to create "majority-minority" districts. Using this practice, also called "affirmative gerrymandering", these districts were created with the stated purpose of redressing previous discrimination to ensure higher ethnic minority representation in government. Since the 1990s, however, gerrymandering based solely on race has been ruled unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment first by Shaw v. Reno (1993) and subsequently by Miller v. Johnson (1995). The constitutionality of racial considerations in creating districts remains ambiguous, however; in Hunt v. Cromartie (1999), the Supreme Court approved a racially focused congressional gerrymandering on the grounds that the drawing was not pure racial gerrymandering but instead partisan gerrymandering, which is constitutionally permissible.

    Recent steps
    In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld on June 28th most of a Texas congressional map engineered in 2003 by former U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay. The 7-to-2 decision now allows politicians in all U.S. states to redraw and gerrymander districts as often as they like (not just after census-mandated reapportionment and redistricting) to protect their political parties and seats, so long as they do not harm minorities. A 5-4 majority threw out one Congressional district in the case for this reason.

    Some states have taken or at least considered steps to revoke and separate redistricting authority from politicians and give it to other more neutral commissions, in order to prevent the repeated abuse of process. Two major examples are the standing Washington State Redistricting Commission and Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission Rhode Island Reapportionment Commission [http://www.riredistricting.org" target="_blank" >* is ad-hoc, but was used in both of the past two reapportionments. The city of San Diego also uses such a system accoring to its municipal charter.

    Gerrymandering in Northern Ireland

    A particularly famous case of gerrymandering occurred in Northern Ireland, where the Ulster Unionist Party government created electoral boundaries for the Londonderry County Borough Council which ensured the election of a Unionist council in a city where Nationalists were in the overwhelming majority. The perceived and alleged discrimination of housing (which was later proven to be entirely inaccurate"in fact, in all but one income category, the proportion of Catholics in subsidized housing is slightly higher than that of Protestants. The difference, while consistent, averages only four per cent." (Rose 1971 p294)"The greatest bias appears to favour Catholics in that small part of the population living in local authorities controlled by Catholic councillors." (Rose 1971 p293)), combined with the electoral voting system carried over from the old Westminster system when the Northern Ireland government was set up of giving business and property owners more than one vote led to the creation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. In Londonderry in 1967, 35% of the vote returned 60% Unionist seats and 27.4% of the vote returned 40% Nationalist seats. While the balance is obviously uneven, the real losers at the election were the Northern Ireland Labour Party and the various Independent candidates.

    In 1929 the Parliament of Northern Ireland passed a Bill returning the local electoral system from the relatively proportional Single Transferable Vote (where seat numbers approximately equate to vote percentage) first introduced in Sligo in 1918 and throughout Ireland in 1919 to the less proportional First Past the Post or block voting systems (where the seat percentage does not always equate even closely to the percentages.) The only exception was for the election of four Stormont MPs to represent Queen's University of Belfast). The British Government was so opposed to the change, which it viewed as the abolition of the electoral safeguards provided in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, that it advised the King's representative in Northern Ireland, the Governor of Northern Ireland to withhold the Royal Assent from the legislation. After a major row the British government backed down and advised the Governor to sign the Bill into law.

    Allegations have been made that the boundaries were gerrymandered to under represent Nationalists, though some geographers and historians (for instance Professor John H. Whyte [http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/hnihoc.htm) have strongly challenged allegations of gerrymandering in Northern Ireland-wide parliamentary elections, arguing that the electoral boundaries for the Parliament of Northern Ireland were not gerrymandered to a greater level than that produced by any single-winner election system and that the number of Nationalist MPs barely changed with the system. The change to single-member seats is generally acknowledged however as being a key factor in stifling the growth of smaller groups such as the Northern Ireland Labour Party and independent Unionists.

    The Parliament of Northern Ireland and its government were suspended in 1972, and STV was restored for elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly in the following year. Currently in Northern Ireland, only elections to the Westminister parliament do not use STV, following the pattern in the rest of the United Kingdom by using First Past the Post.

    When the electoral boundaries were updated to address the issue of gerrymandering, the result was better overall for Unionist candidates. However, when William Whitelaw announced his choice of successful candidates to serve on the power-sharing executive, nearly half the members appointed were Nationalist candidates, despite the fact that Nationalists only received 22.1% of first preference votes. This was seen by many as being a gerrymander.

    Republic of Ireland, "Tullymandering"

    In the Republic of Ireland, in the mid-1970s, the Minister for Local Government, James Tully, attempted to arrange constituencies to ensure that the governing National Coalition would win a parliamentary majority. This was planned as a major reversal of previous gerrymandering by the Fianna Fáil party (then in opposition). Tully ensured that there were as many as possible three-seat constituencies where the governing parties were strong, in the expectation that the governing parties would each win a seat in many constituencies, relegating the Fianna Fáil party to one out of three. In areas where the governing parties were weak four-seat constituencies were used so that the governing parties had a strong chance of winning two still. In fact the process backfired spectacularly due to a larger than expected collapse in the vote, with Fianna Fáil winning a landslide victory, two out of three seats in many cases, relegating the National Coalition parties to fight for the last seat. Consequently, the term tullymandering was used to describe the phenomenon of a failed attempt at gerrymandering.

    Gerrymandering in Germany

    When the electoral districts in Germany were redrawn in 2000, together with the administrative districts, the ruling Social-Democrat Party SPD was accused of gerrymandering to marginalize the socialist PDS party in its strongholds in eastern Berlin by combining them into new districts with more populous areas of western Berlin, where the PDS had very limited following. After winning four seats in Berlin in the 1998 national election, the PDS kept only two of them after the following 2002 elections. This caused the PDS to drop out of the Bundestag, the German federal parliament (as a faction with its associated rights in parliament; the individually elected representatives held their seats). Under German electoral law a political party has to win either more than five percent of the votes or at least three seats to move in. In the election of 2005 the PDS (renamed "Left Party") managed to get 8,7% of the votes and thus moved back in.

    However, the number of Bundestag seats of parties which traditionally get over 5% of the votes can't be affected very much by gerrymandering, because seats are awarded to these parties on a proportional basis. Only when a party wins so many districts in any one of the 16 federal states that those seats alone count for more than its proportional share of the vote in that same state does the districting have some influence on larger parties - those extra seats, called "Überhangmandate", remain.

    Gerrymandering in Canada

    Early in Canadian history gerrymandering at both the federal and provincial levels was common. Over time this has been largely eliminated as responsibility for drawing electoral boundaries was handed over to independent agencies. The first to do this was Manitoba in the 1950s with the federal government delegating the drawing of boundaries to the "arm's length" Elections Canada in 1964. Today gerrymandering is not a major issue in Canada.

    There is some debate and minor controversy about gerrymandering at the provincial level in Quebec on the Island of Montreal where some Liberal Party members argue that the ridings (electoral districts) have been drawn to elect as few Liberals as possible, especially in the western part of the island.

    In 2006, a controversy arose on Prince Edward Island over the provincial government's decision to throw out an electoral map drawn by an independent commission, and instead design two new maps; the third, which was adopted, was designed by the caucus of the governing party. Opposition parties and the media have attacked Premier Binns for what they see as gerrymandering. Among other things, the third map ensures that every current Conservative Member of the Legislative Assembly has a seat to run in, whereas in the original map several had been redistricted into the same ridings.

    Gerrymandering in Singapore

    The People's Action Party in Singapore is often accused of using gerrymandering, among other unfair electoral practices, to maintain gigantic majorities in the Parliament of Singapore.

    As the Elections Department is under the office of the Prime Minister of Singapore, it is able to draw polling districts and polling sites with pinpoint precision by alleged electorate engineering, which is speculated to be the secret of the ruling party's success. Hence the opposition parties allege battle for the next election is won or lost over the next few years with the seeming of redrawing and absorbing based on polling districts.

    See also

    External links

    References

    Pejorative political terms | Political corruption | Portmanteaus | Voting systems

    Afbakeningsknoeiery | Gerrymandering | Gerrymandering | Gerrymander | Gerrymandering | Découpage électoral | ゲリマンダー | Gerrymandering

 

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