The plurality voting system (also known as first past the post) is a voting system used to elect a single winner in a given election. In political science, the use of the plurality voting system alongside multiple, single-winner constituencies to elect a multi-member body is often referred to as single-member district plurality or SMDP. Plurality voting is also variously referred to as winner-take-all or relative majority voting; however, these terms can also refer to elections for multiple winners in a particular constituency using bloc voting.
The term first past the post (abbreviated FPTP or FPP) was coined as an analogy to horse racing, where the winner of the race is the first to pass a particular point on the track (in this case a plurality of votes), after which all other runners automatically and completely lose (that is, the payoff is "winner-take-all"). There is, however, no "post" that the winning candidate must pass in order to win, as they are only required to receive the largest number of votes in their favour. This sometimes results in the alternate name "furthest past the post".
Historically, FPTP has been a contentious electoral system, giving rise to the concept of electoral reform and a multiplicity of different voting systems intended to address perceived weaknesses of plurality voting.
Plurality voting is used in 43 of the 191 countries in the United Nations for either local or national elections. In particular, plurality voting is particularly prevalent in the United Kingdom and former British colonies, including the United States and Canada. "The Global Distribution of Electoral Systems"
In an election for a legislative body, each voter in a given geographically-defined electoral district votes for one candidate from a list of candidates competing to represent that district. Under the plurality system, the winner of the election acts as representative of the entire electoral district, and serves with representatives of other electoral districts.
In an election for a single seat, such as president in a presidential system, the same style of ballot is used and the candidate who receives the largest number of votes represents the entire population.
Plurality voting is based on minimal information — a person's vote can be entirely represented by a binary choice, so anything can be used to signify a vote — the ancient Greeks would vote on ostracizing someone with pebbles. Votes cast as physical objects can also create a realistic display of the election results, such as an array of candidates with jars filled with differently coloured beans, with the winner being the most-filled.
For this example, consider the election for the president of a school class. Each class has a president, who sits on a school council. Further assume that, in this imaginary school, male and female students disagree with each other on most issues, and students prefer to vote for others of the same sex as themselves.
In our hypothetical election, there are three candidates: Amy, Brian and Cathy. Each class member gets a ballot, with these three names on it. Each voter must put an "X" by one of the names on their ballot.
The largest pile decides the winner. If Amy's pile has 11 votes, Brian's has 16, and Cathy's has 13, Brian wins.
Notice that there were a total of 40 votes cast, and the winner had only 16 of them — only 40%.
Note that the class members (the "electors") only vote once, and their votes help to choose both a class president and a member of the school council (the same person).
Suppose that all the other classes hold similar elections. Across all the classes, 8 of the class presidents that were elected were girls, and 9 were boys. That makes the boys the overall winner. The only influence that the pupils in this particular class had was to vote for Amy, Brian or Cathy to represent themselves.
Some might argue that a boy won for this class because there were two girls, who "split the vote": some of the girls in the class voted for Amy and others for Cathy. Perhaps if Amy had not been a candidate, all the girls would have voted for Cathy and she would have won this class; this in turn would make the girls the winners of the whole council. Arguments exactly like this, but on a larger scale, are common wherever there are plurality elections.
Voting is accomplished whereby each voter in each city selects one city on the ballot (Memphis voters select Memphis, Nashville voters select Nashville, etc.) Votes are tabulated; Memphis is selected with the most votes (42%). Note that this system does not require that the winner have a majority, but only a plurality. Memphis wins because it has the most votes, even though 58% of the voters in this example preferred Memphis least.
In addition, not all voters see party politics or policies as a major issue. Some voters see an election primarily as a form of recruitment for an individual representative, a point of contact between the state and themselves. FPTP gives such voters a direct choice of single candidate, with no extra votes to be shared or balanced between parties. This may be especially important to voters who want to vote for individuals based on particular ethical frameworks that are not party aligned, and who do not want their vote to have a "side effect" of electing others they may not approve of.
However this can also have the opposite effect. A candidate who is very popular among the electorate in general may lose if the candidate or the candidate's party is unpopular or has caused dissatisfaction in his or her seat. An example was how Winston Churchill lost the 1945 UK Parliamentary elections. Churchill had over a 90% approval rating, but the Labour Party won overall defeating Churchill's Conservative Party and making Clement Attlee the Prime Minister.
Similarly, in the 1999 Ontario provincial election, Mike Harris and his Progressive Conservative party was re-elected to a majority government, but symbolic of the growing discontent among voters about cuts to education, his education minister and strong ally was resoundingly defeated by the opposition candidate.
It is often claimed that because each electoral district votes for its own representative, the elected candidate is held accountable to his own voters, thereby helping to prevent incompetent, fraudulent or corrupt behavior by elected candidates. The voters in the electoral district can easily replace him since they have full power over who they want to represent them. In the absence of effective recall legislation, however, the electors must wait until the end of the representative's term. Moreover, it is possible for a winning candidate or government to increase support from one election to the next, but lose the election, or vice-versa. Also, it is generally possible for candidates to be elected if the party regards them as important even if they are fairly unpopular, by moving the candidate to a safe seat which the party is unlikely to lose or by getting a candidate in a safe seat to step down.
However, proponents of other systems, such as approval voting, point out that the OMOV principle was made to control the magnitude of districts; that each district must be relatively in proportion to one another in population. Approval voting does not actually represent some voters more than others, so the OMOV principle would be a weak one to discount it on. In any case, it could be argued approval voting grants one vote for each candidate to each voter - which they may choose not to cast, and cannot vote cumulate on one candidate.
A good example of this is Canada, where, in 1993, the separatist Bloc Québécois formed the opposition, despite getting only 13% of the vote. In the 2006 election, the Bloc Québécois received 51 seats (16.6% of the total seats) with 10.5% of the total votes. In contrast, the New Democratic Party received 29 seats (9.4% of the total seats) with 17.5% of the total votes.
In the example above, Cathy's voters would have done much better to have voted for Amy instead of Cathy; that way, Amy would have beaten Brian by eight votes. They would not have gotten their most desirable person elected, but rather their second choice; in this case plurality voting led to the paradoxical result that attempting to get their 1st most desired person elected led to their 3rd most desired person being elected instead. Likewise, in the Tennessee example, if all the voters for Chattanooga and Knoxville had instead voted for Nashville, then Nashville would have won (with 58% of the vote); this would only have been the 3rd choice for those voters, but voting for their respective 1st choices (their own cities) actually results in their 4th choice (Memphis) being elected.
The difficulty is sometimes summed up, in an extreme form, as "All votes for anyone other than the second place are votes for the winner", because by voting for other candidates, they have denied those votes to the second place candidate who could have won had they received them. It is often claimed by United States Democrats that Democrat Al Gore lost the 2000 Presidential Election to Republican George W. Bush because some voters on the left voted for Ralph Nader of the Green Party, who presumably would have preferred Gore to Bush. (It should be noted that despite such claims of potential Gore votes going to Nader, Gore still had a plurality of the popular vote. Bush won due to having more electoral votes.) Conversely, Republicans can claim that Ross Perot was a spoiler who enabled Bill Clinton to win the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections with a minority of the popular vote, because Perot had split the conservative vote.
Such a mentality is reflected by elections in Puerto Rico and its three principal voter groups: the Independentistas (pro-independence), the Populares (pro-commonwealth), and the Estadistas (pro-statehood). Historically, there has been a tendency for Independentista voters to elect Popular candidates and policies. This phenomenon is responsible for some Popular victories, even though the Estadistas have the most voters on the island. It is so widely recognized that the Puertoricans sometimes call the Independentistas who vote for the Populares "melons", because the fruit is green on the outside but red on the inside (in reference to the party colours).
Because voters have to predict in advance who the top two candidates will be, this can cause significant perturbation to the system:
A feature of the FPTP system is that invariably, voters can select only one candidate in a single-member district, whilst in multi-member districts they can never select more candidates than the number of seats in the district. Some argue that FPTP would work better if electors could cast votes for as many candidates as they wish. This would allow voters to "vote against" a certain despised candidate if they choose, without being forced to guess who they should vote for to defeat that candidate, thus eliminating the need for tactical voting. Such a system would also serve to reduce the spoiler effect. This system is called approval voting.
The most commonly expressed disadvantage — perhaps because it is easiest to express and explain — of first-past-the-post is that it does not reflect the voter's thoughts. Thus, substantial bodies of opinion can be rendered irrelevant to the final outcome, and a party can obtain a majority of seats without a majority of the vote. Examples include the recent United Kingdom general election of 2005 where the new government won a majority of the seats with less than 36% of the national vote. The disproportionate nature of this system also means that whole regions may have MPs from only one party. The British Conservatives won large majorities of seats in the 1980s on a minority of votes while almost all the Scottish seats were Labour, Liberal or SNP; this disparity created tremendous dissatisfaction in Scotland.
A further example of disproportionality arose in the Canadian federal election of 1926 for the province of Manitoba. The province was entitled to 17 seats in that election. The result was very different from how people voted.
| Political party | % votes | Number of seats | % seats | Conservative | 42.2% | 0 | 0% | Liberal-Progressive | 19.5% | 7 | 41% | Liberal | 18.4% | 4 | 24% | Progressive | 11.2% | 4 | 24% | Labour | 8.7% | 2 | 12% | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Conservatives clearly had the largest number of votes across the province, but received no seats at all.
The usual cause for these disproportionate results is that a party has a large number of votes across the entire territory, but they are spread out across the territory rather than being concentrated in particular constituencies. Parties with less overall support, but where that support is concentrated in particular constituencies, will win plurality in those constituencies over a party with widely distributed support.
This presents a problem because it encourages parties to focus narrowly on the needs and well-being of specific electoral districts where they can be sure to win seats, rather than be sensitive to the sentiments of voters everywhere. A further problem is that the party in power often has the ability to determine where the boundaries of constituencies lie: to secure election results, they may use gerrymandering — that is, redistricting to distort election results by enclosing party voters together in one electoral district. Moreover, it can be demonstrated that even the use of non-partisan districting methods - such as computers - to determine constituency boundaries tends to generate results very similar to those produced by a majority party with the power to gerrymander in its favour.Seats, Votes and the Spatial Organisation of Elections, Gudgin & Taylor (1979) Conversely, there are cases where there may be no possible way of drawing contiguous boundaries that will allow a minority representation.
It often seems fundamentally unfair that a party should have a substantially greater or lesser share of seats than their share of the vote. A further consequence of the system is that many such elections can be considered won before all votes are tallied, once there are no longer enough uncounted votes to override an established plurality count. Though not necessarily a disadvantage, this can produce a feeling of disenfranchisement among voters when running tallies are reported through the media.
This argument applies to most other single-winner voting systems.
In the first table labour has rightly won, but the size of its victory is unjusitified by votes. Also, the LibDems have won a seat with half the Conservative vote when the Conservatives have no seats!
| Data | Cons. votes | Labour votes | LibDem votes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constituency A | 40 | 50 | 10 |
| Constituency B | 45 | 55 | 0 |
| Constituency C | 40 | 10 | 50 |
| Constituency D | 35 | 40 | 25 |
| Constituency E | 40 | 60 | 0 |
| Overall votes | 200 40% | 215 43% | 85 17% |
| Seats | 0 | 4 | 1 |
Below are two table of the six most marginal seats in a country. They both show the same seats but the second table is more polarized. Both show what would happen when there is a 5 per cent swing from Cons. to Labour. Amongst the non-polarized seats, Labour would makes a larger gain than it would with polarized seats.
| Non-polarized | Cons. votes | Labour votes | Change? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constituency A | 59 | 41 | Cons. hold |
| Constituency B | 57 | 43 | Cons. hold |
| Constituency C | 54 | 46 | Labour gain |
| Constituency D | 54 | 46 | Labour gain |
| Constituency E | 52 | 48 | Labour gain |
| Constituency F | 51 | 49 | Labour gain |
| Seats that would change hands | -4 | +4 | n/a |
| Polarized | Cons. votes | Labour votes | Change? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constituency A | 67 | 33 | Cons. hold |
| Constituency B | 64 | 36 | Cons. hold |
| Constituency C | 62 | 38 | Cons. hold |
| Constituency D | 59 | 41 | Cons. hold |
| Constituency E | 56 | 44 | Cons. hold |
| Constituency F | 52 | 48 | Labour gain |
| Seats that would change hands | -1 | +1 | n/a |
First-past-the-post tends to reduce the number of political parties to a greater extent than most other methods, thus making it more likely that a single party will hold a majority of legislative seats. (In the United Kingdom, 18 out of 22 General Elections since 1922 have produced a majority government.)
Some argue that this is an advantage, in that single party rule enables quicker decision-making with less need for back and forth negotiation.
Multi-party coalitions, on the other hand, require consent among all coalition partners to pass legislation, which some argue gives small parties a disproportionate amount of power. In the UK, arguments for plurality often look to Italy where the frequent government changeovers are presented as undesirable.
FPTP's tendency toward fewer parties and more frequent one-party rule can also produce disadvantages. One such disadvantage is that the government may not consider as wide a range of perspectives and concerns. It is entirely possible that a voter will find that all major parties agree on a particular issue. In this case, the voter will not have any meaningful way of expressing a dissenting opinion through his or her vote.
Another disadvantage is that fewer choices are offered to the voters, often pressuring voters to vote for a candidate with whom they largely disagree so as to oppose a candidate with whom they disagree even more (See tactical voting above); this feature pressures candidates to appeal to the extremes in order to avoid being undercut. This appeal-to-extremes operates by giving those voters who are more centrist no choice but to vote for them. The likely result of this is that candidates will less closely reflect the viewpoints of those who vote for them.
It may also be argued that one-party rule is more likely to lead to radical changes in government policy that are only favoured by a plurality or bare majority of the voters, whereas multi-party systems usually require greater consensus in order to make dramatic changes.
A safe seat is one in which a plurality of voters support a particular candidate or party so strongly that their votes for that candidate are guaranteed in advance of the election. This causes the difficulty that all other voters in the constituency can then make no difference to the result, since the winner of the seat is already known in advance. This results in serious feelings of disenfranchisement, and to abstention.
As an example Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin holds the 4th safest parliamentary seat in Westminster for his West Belfast constituency.
It is argued that a weak or absent opposition due to an electoral wipeout is bad for the government. Provincial elections in several Canadian provinces provide suitable examples.
The United Kingdom continues to use the first-past-the-post electoral system for general elections, and for local government elections in England and Wales. Changes to the UK system have been proposed, and alternatives were examined by the Jenkins Commission in the late 1990s but no major changes have been implemented. Canada also uses this system for national and provincial elections. In May 2005 the Canadian province of British Columbia had a referendum on abolishing single-member district plurality in favour of multi-member districts with the Single Transferable Vote system after the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform made a recommendation for the reform. The referendum obtained 57% of the vote, but failed to meet the 60% requirement for passing.
Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, New Zealand and Australia are notable examples of countries within the UK, or with previous links to it, that use non-FPTP electoral systems.
Recent examples of nations which have undergone democratic reforms but have not adopted the FPTP system include South Africa, almost all of the former Eastern bloc nations, Russia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
The plurality election system is used in the Republic of China on Taiwan for executive offices such as county magistrates, mayors, and the president, but not for legislative seats which used the single non-transferable vote system. This has produced an interesting party structure in which there are two broad coalitions of parties which cooperate in executive elections but which compete internally in legislative elections. Making Votes Count, Gary Cox (1997)
India uses a proportional representation system for its upper house.
Single winner electoral systems | Positional electoral systems
Escrutini uninominal majoritari | Mehrheitswahl | Majoritaarne valimissüsteem | Majoritata balotsistemo | Scrutin uninominal majoritaire à un tour | בחירות בשיטה הרובנית | 小選挙区制 | 單一選區制
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It uses material from the
"Plurality voting system".
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