Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is the application of population genetics-inspired models of change in gene frequency in populations to game theory. It differs from classical game theory by focusing on the dynamics of strategy change more than the properties of strategy equilibria. Despite its name, evolutionary game theory is practised more by economists than biologists.

The common methodology to study the evolutionary dynamics in games is through replicator equations. Replicator equations assume infinite populations, continuous time, complete mixing and that strategies breed true. The attractors (stable fixed points) of the equations are equivalent with evolutionarily stable state.

See also

• Adaptive dynamics
• Behavioral ecology
• Dynamical systems
• Evolutionary stable strategy

References

• Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games.
• P. Hammerstein and R. Selten, "Game theory and evolutionary biology", in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Eds. (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1994), vol. 2, pp. 929-993
• Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998) Evolutionary games and population dynamics, Cambridge University Press
• Taylor, P. D. (1979). Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Players J. Appl. Prob. 16, 76-83.
• Taylor, P. D., and Jonker, L. B. (1978). Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics Math. Biosci. 40, 145-156.
• Weibull, J. W. (1995) Evolutionary game theory, MIT Press

External links

• EGT at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Google Directory for EGT

Game theory

进化博弈理论