Deflation is an increase in the market value of money which is equivalent to a decrease in the general price level, over a period of time. Deflation is the opposite of inflation. The terms is also used to refer to a decrease in the size of the money supply.*
The 'general price level' comprises the price of wages, consumption goods and services. As with inflation, there are economists who regard deflation as a purely monetary effect, when the monetary authority constricts the money supply, and there are those who believe that price deflation follows dramatic falls in business confidence, which reduces the velocity of money, i.e. the speed with which money is circulating. However, it is at least theoretically possible to have a falling money supply but stable or rising prices, if the rate of increase of the velocity of money is substantially greater than the rate at which the money supply is falling. Presumably, this is what happens in the early stages of a hyper-inflation as the monetary authorities lose control over the money supply (but are initially, at least, trying to put on the brakes by the usual remedy of restricting money supply).
In the recent years, economists have also started to use the term inflation and deflation in relation to assets (i.e., as a short-hand for price inflation or price deflation), such as stocks and housing (production goods). Indeed policies designed to fight inflation in goods, services and wages, have seemed to spur stock and housing price inflation, or asset bubbles. During deflation, while consumers can buy more with the same amount of money, they also have less access to money (e.g., as wages, debt, or the return realized on sales of their products). Consumers and producers who are in debt, such as mortgagors, suffer because as their (money) income drops, their (money) payments remain constant. Central bankers worry about deflation, because many of the tools of monetary policy become ineffective as the real cost of money (the interest rate minus the inflation rate) begins to turn higher again once the inflation rate drops below zero (nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero; that would be equivalent to the banks paying customers to borrow money!). Deflation may set off a deflationary spiral, where businesses slow or stop investing, because the investment risk is perceived as higher than just letting the money appreciate due to deflation. (The deflationary spiral is the opposite of the hyper-inflationary spiral.)
Deflation is generally regarded as a negative in modern currency environments, because a deflationary spiral may cause large falls in GDP and purchasing power, and may take a very long time to correct.
However, a deflationary bias is the norm under specie or specie backed money economies, as population and production tend to increase faster than the stock of specie. (Conversely, an inflationary bias is the norm under credit money economies.) There are also episodes where there may be deflation in only a particular kind or type of goods, such as commodities during the Great commodities depression of 1982-1998.
Deflation should not be confused with disinflation which is a slowing in the rate of inflation, that is, where the general level of prices are still increasing, but slower than before.
Deflation is generally regarded negatively, as it is a tax on borrowers and on holders of illiquid assets, which accrues to the benefit of savers and of holders of liquid assets and currency. In this sense it is the opposite of inflation (or in the extreme, hyperinflation), which is a tax on currency holders and lenders (savers) in favor of borrowers and short term consumption. In modern economies, deflation is caused by a collapse in demand (usually brought on by high interest rates), and is associated with recession and (more rarely) long term economic depressions.
In modern economies, as loan terms have grown in length and financing is integral to building and general business, the penalties associated with deflation have grown larger. Since deflation discourages investment and spending, because there is no reason to risk on future profits when the expectation of profits may be negative and the expectation of future prices is lower, it generally leads to, or is associated with a collapse in aggregate demand. Without the "hidden risk of inflation", it may become more prudent just to hold onto money, and not to spend or invest it.
Deflation is, however, the natural condition of hard currency economies when the rate of increase in the supply of money is not maintained at a rate commensurate to positive population (and general economic) growth. When this happens, the available amount of hard currency per person falls, in effect making money scarcer; and consequently, the purchasing power of each unit of currency increases.
Deflation also occurs when improvements in production efficiency lowers the overall price of goods. Improvements in production efficiency generally happen because economic producers of goods and services are motivated by a promise of increased profit margins, resulting from the production improvements that they make. But despite their profit motive, competition in the marketplace often prompts those producers to apply at least some portion of these cost savings into reducing the asking price for their goods. When this happens, consumers pay less for those goods; and consequently deflation has occurred, since purchasing power has increased.
While an increase in the purchasing power of one's money sounds beneficial, it can actually cause hardship when the majority of one's net worth is held in illiquid assets such as homes, land, and other forms of private property. It also amplifies the sting of debt, since-- after some period of significant deflation-- the payments one is making in the service of a debt represent a larger amount of purchasing power than they did when the debt was first incurred. Consequently, deflation can be thought of as a phantom amplification of a loan's interest rate. (But, conversely, inflation may be thought of as a regressive, across the board general tax.)
This lesson about protracted deflationary cycles and their attendant hardships has been felt several times in modern history. During the 19th century, the Industrial Revolution brought about a huge increase in production efficiency, that happened to coincide with a relatively flat money-supply. These two deflationary catalysts led, simultaneously, not only to tremendous capital development, but also to tremendous deprivation for millions of people who were ill-equipped to deal with the dark side of deflation. Business owners-- on average, better educated in economic theory than their unfortunate cohorts (or just better able to withstand the economic stresses)-- recognized the deflation cycle as it unfolded, and positioned themselves to leverage its beneficial aspects.
Hard money advocates argue that if there were no "rigidities" in an economy, then deflation should be a welcome effect, as the lowering of prices would allow more of the economy's effort to be moved to other areas of activity, thus increasing the total output of the economy. However, while there have been periods of 'beneficial' deflation (especially in industry segments, such as computers), more often it has led to the more severe form with negative impact to large segments of the populace and economy.
Since deflationary periods favor those who hold currency over those who do not, they are often matched with periods of rising populist sentiment, as in the late 19th century, when populists in the United States wanted to move off hard money standards and back to a money standard based on the more inflationary (because more abundantly available) metal silver.
Most economists agree that the effects of modest long-term inflation are less damaging than deflation (which, even at best, is very hard to control). Deflation raises real wages which are both difficult and costly for management to lower. This frequently leads to layoffs and makes employers reluctant to hire new workers, increasing unemployment. However, in the last 5 years or so, real wages for the average worker has remained fixed or actually decreased, with little effect on unemployment.
A distinction then, should be drawn between deflation in hard currency economies, such as those on the gold standard and economies which run on credit. In modern credit based economies, a deflationary spiral may be caused by the (central bank) initiating higher interest rates (e.g., to 'control' inflation), thereby possibly popping a(n asset) bubble or the collapse of a command economy which has been run at a higher level of production than it could actually support. In a credit based economy, a fall in money supply leads to markedly less lending, with a further sharp fall in money supply (since debt is money), and a consequent sharp fall-off in demand for goods. Demand falls, and with the falling of demand, there is a fall in prices as a supply glut develops. This becomes a deflationary spiral when prices fall below the costs of financing production. Businesses, unable to make enough profit no matter how low they set prices, are then liquidated. Banks get assets which have fallen dramatically in value since the (mortgage) loan was made, and if they sell those assets, they further glut supply, which only exacerbates the situation. To slow or halt the deflationary spiral, banks will often withhold collecting on non-performing loans (as in Japan, most recently). This is often no more than a stop-gap measure, because they must then restrict credit, since they do not have money to lend, which further reduces demand, and so on.
In unstable currency economies, barter and other alternate currency arrangements are common, and therefore when the 'official' money becomes scarce (or unusually unreliable), commerce can still continue (e.g., most recently in Russia and Argentina). Since in such economies the central government is often unable, even if it were willing, to adequately control the internal economy, there is no pressing need for individuals to acquire official currency except to pay for imported goods. In effect, barter acts as protective tariff in such economies, encouraging local consumption of local production. It also acts as a spur to mining and exploration, since one easy way to make money in such an economy is to dig it out of the ground.
When the central bank has lowered nominal interest rates all the way to zero, it can no longer further stimulate demand by lowering interest rates - "deflation is when the central bank cannot give money away". This is the famous liquidity trap. When deflation takes hold, it requires "special arrangements" to "lend" money at a zero nominal rate of interest (which could still be a very high real rate of interest, due to the negative inflation rate) in order to (artificially) increase the money supply.
This cycle has been traced out on the broad scale during the Great Depression. Specifically when the collapse of the Viennese Credit-Anstalt bank led to the subsequent collapse of the entire global financial system.* International trade contracted sharply, severely reducing demand for goods, thereby idling a great deal of capacity, and setting off a string of bank failures. A similar situation in Japan, beginning with the stock and real estate market collapse in the early 1990s, was arrested by the Japanese government preventing the collapse of most banks and taking over direct control of several in the worst condition. These occurrences are the matter of intense debate. There are economists who argue that the post-2000 recession had a period where the US was at risk of severe deflation, and that therefore the Federal Reserve central bank was right in holding interest rates at an "accommodative" stance from 2001 on.
For instance if there is a fixed money supply of 400 kg of gold in an economy that produces 200 widgets, then one widget will cost 2 kg of gold. However, next year if output is 400 widgets with the same money supply of 400 kg of gold the price of each widget will drop to 1 kg of gold. In this case the general fall in price was caused by increased productivity.
The opposite of the above scenario has the same effect on prices, but a different cause. If there is a fixed money supply of 400 kg of gold in an economy that produces 200 widgets, then once again each widget will cost 2 kg of gold. However, if next year the money supply is cut in half to 200 kg of gold with the same output of 200 widgets, the price of each widget will now only be 1 kg of gold. When capital profits are dropping rapidly, there is no reason to invest gold, which breaks the savings identity, and thus the automatic tendency of the economy to move back to equilibrium.
Austrians view increased productivity to be a good cause of a general fall in prices, while credit/money supply contraction as being a bad cause of a general fall in prices. Austrians contend that in the first scenario wages will remain the same because of the unchanged money supply but that a general increase in wealth will be reflected in lower prices. Austrians also take the position that there are no negative distortions in the economy due to a general fall in prices in the first scenario. However, in the second scenario where a general fall in prices is caused by deflation, Austrians contend that this confers no benefit to society. For in this scenario wages will simply be cut in half and lower prices will not reflect a general increase in wealth. In addition, Austrians believe that deflation causes negative distortions in the economy with debtors and creditors as well as other areas.
Inflation and deflation occur when the economic policies allow wages to increase or decrease at differing rates than productivity. Wages rising faster than productivity lead to inflation. Wages failing to increase at the rate of inflation for protracted periods will cause deflation as it will lead to reduced consumption or debt accumulation as producers lend to wage earning consumers part of their profits, in order to sell their products. When debt payments exceed the borrower's ability to pay, debt accumulation and endogeneous money creation stops, demand and goods' prices fall (deflation), manufacturers reduce production, employment falls, and fewer borrowers are thus able to pay their debts, and the cycle exacerbates.
Keynesians advocate "pump priming" or government creation of credit/money that has a cost interest rate below inflation or market rates. As witnessed since 1990 in Japan, and in the 1930's in the USA, this policy is not very effective unless government creates employment via public works projects or military manufacturing.
When nominal prices are sticky due to institutional factors then a monetary deflation can lead to widespread bankruptcy. It is only after this process allows certain institutional barriers to be broken (ie contract commitments) that the downward price spiral can be fully transmitted to other sectors.
This view was challenged in the 1930s during the Great Depression. Keynesian economists argued that the economic system was not self correcting with respect to deflation and that governments and central banks had to take active measures to boost demand through tax cuts or increases in government spending. Reserve requirements from the central bank were high and the central bank could then have effectively increased money supply by simply reducing the reserve requirements and through "open" market operations (e.g., buying treasury bonds for cash) to offset the reduction of money supply in the private sectors due to the collapse of credit (credit is a form of money).
With the rise of monetarist ideas, the focus in fighting deflation was put on expanding demand by lowering interest rates (i.e., reducing the "cost" of money). This view has received a setback in light of the failure of accommodative policies in both Japan and the US to spur demand after stock market shocks in the early 1990s and in 2000 - 2002, respectively. Economists now worry about the (inflationary) impact of monetary policies on asset prices. Sustained low real rates can be the direct cause of higher asset prices and excessive debt accumulation. Therefore lowering rates may prove only a temporarily palliative, leading to the aggravation of a(n eventual) future debt deflation crisis.
"The Great Sag of 1873-96 could be near the top of the list. Its scope was global. It featured cost-cutting and productivity-enhancing technologies. It flummoxed the experts with its persistence, and it resisted attempts by politicians to understand it, let alone reverse it. It delivered a generation’s worth of rising bond prices, as well as the usual losses to unwary creditors via defaults and early calls. Between 1875 and 1896, according to Milton Friedman, prices fell in the United States by 1.7% a year, and in Britain by 0.8% a year.*
The second was between 1930-1933 when the rate of deflation was approximately 10 percent/year. The first was possibly spurred by the deliberate policy in retiring paper money printed during the Civil War; the second was part of America's slide into the Great Depression, where banks failed and unemployment peaked at 25%. Both were world-wide phenomena.
The deflation of the Great Depression did not occur because of any sudden rise or surplus in output. It occurred because there was an enormous contraction of credit (money), bankruptcies created an environment where cash was in frantic demand, and the Federal Reserve did not adequately accommodate that demand, so even sound banks toppled one-by-one (because they were unable to meet the sudden demand for cash— see Fractional-reserve banking). From the standpoint of the Fisher equation (see above), there was a concommitant drop both in money supply (credit) and the velocity of money which was so profound that deflation took hold despite the increases in money supply spurred by the Federal Reserve.
Systemic reasons for deflation in Japan can be said to include:
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