In mathematics, the axiom of choice, or AC, is an axiom of set theory. It was formulated in 1904 by Ernst Zermelo. While it was originally controversial, it is now used without reservation by most mathematicians. However, there are schools of mathematical thought, primarily within set theory, that either reject the axiom of choice or investigate consequences of axioms inconsistent with AC.
Intuitively speaking, AC says that given a collection of bins, each containing at least one object, then exactly one object from each bin can be picked and gathered in another bin - even if there are infinitely many bins, and there is no "rule" for which object to pick from each.
Not every situation requires the axiom of choice. For finite sets X, the axiom of choice follows from the other axioms of set theory. In that case it is equivalent to saying that if we have several (a finite number of) boxes, each containing at least one item, then we can choose exactly one item from each box. Clearly we can do this: We start at the first box, choose an item; go to the second box, choose an item; and so on. There are only finitely many boxes, so eventually our choice procedure comes to an end. The result is an explicit choice function: a function that takes the first box to the first element we chose, the second box to the second element we chose, and so on. (A formal proof for all finite sets would use the principle of mathematical induction.)
For certain infinite sets X, it is also possible to avoid the axiom of choice. For example, suppose that the elements of X are sets of natural numbers. Every nonempty set of natural numbers has a least element, so to specify our choice function we can simply say that it takes each set to the least element of that set. This gives us a definite choice of an element from each set and we can write down an explicit expression that tells us what value our choice function takes. Any time it is possible to specify such an explicit choice, the axiom of choice is unnecessary.
The difficulty appears when there is no natural choice of elements from each set. If we cannot make explicit choices, how do we know that our set exists? For example, suppose that X is the set of all non-empty subsets of the real numbers. First we might try to proceed as if X were finite. If we try to choose an element from each set, then, because X is infinite, our choice procedure will never come to an end, and consequently, we will never be able to produce a choice function for all of X. So that won't work. Next we might try the trick of specifying the least element from each set. But some subsets of the real numbers don't have least elements. For example, the open interval (0,1) does not have a least element: If x is in (0,1), then so is x/2, and x/2 is always strictly smaller than x. So taking least elements doesn't work, either.
The reason that we are able to choose least elements from subsets of the natural numbers is the fact that the natural numbers come pre-equipped with a well-ordering: Every subset of the natural numbers has a unique least element under the natural ordering. Perhaps if we were clever we might say, "Even though the usual ordering of the real numbers does not work, it may be possible to find a different ordering of the real numbers which is a well-ordering. Then our choice function can choose the least element of every set under our unusual ordering." The problem then becomes constructing a well-ordering which turns out to require the axiom of choice for its existence; every set can be well-ordered if and only if the axiom of choice is true.
A proof requiring the axiom of choice is always nonconstructive: even if the proof produces an object then it is impossible to say exactly what that object is. Consequently, while the axiom of choice asserts that there is a well-ordering of the real numbers, it does not give us an example of one. Yet the reason why we chose above to well-order the real numbers was so that for each set in X we could explicitly choose an element of that set. If we cannot write down the well-ordering we are using, then our choice is not very explicit. This is one of the reasons why some mathematicians dislike the axiom of choice. For example, constructivists posit that all existence proofs should be totally explicit; it should be possible to construct anything that exists. They reject the axiom of choice because it asserts the existence of an object without telling what it is.
So the decision whether or not it is appropriate to make use of the axiom of choice in a proof cannot be made by appeal to other axioms of set theory. The decision must be made on other grounds.
One argument given in favor of using the axiom of choice is that it is convenient to use it: using it cannot hurt (cannot result in contradiction) and makes it possible to prove some propositions that otherwise could not be proved.
The axiom of choice is not the only significant statement which is independent of ZF. For example, the generalized continuum hypothesis (GCH) is not only independent of ZF, but also independent of ZF plus the axiom of choice (ZFC). However, ZF plus GCH implies AC, making GCH a strictly stronger claim than AC, even though they are both independent of ZF.
One reason that some mathematicians dislike the axiom of choice is that it implies the existence of some bizarre counter-intuitive objects. An example of this is the Banach–Tarski paradox which says in effect that it is possible to "carve up" the 3-dimensional solid unit ball into finitely many pieces and, using only rotation and translation, reassemble the pieces into two balls each with the same volume as the original. Note that the proof, like all proofs involving the axiom of choice, is an existence proof only: it does not tell us how to carve up the unit sphere to make this happen, it simply tells us that it can be done.
On the other hand, the negation of the axiom of choice is also bizarre. For example, the statement that for any two sets S and T, the cardinality of S is less than or equal to the cardinality of T or the cardinality of T is less than or equal to the cardinality of S is equivalent to the axiom of choice. Put differently, if the axiom of choice is false, then there are sets S and T of incomparable size: neither can be mapped in a one-to-one fashion onto a subset of the other.
A third possibility is to prove theorems using neither the axiom of choice nor its negation, a tactic preferred in constructive mathematics. Such statements will be true in any model of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, regardless of the truth or falsity of the axiom of choice in that particular model. This renders any claim that relies on either the axiom of choice or its negation undecidable. For example, under such an assumption, the Banach–Tarski paradox is neither true nor false: It is impossible to construct a decomposition of the unit ball which can be reassembled into two unit balls, and it is also impossible to prove that it can't be done. However, the Banach–Tarski paradox can be rephrased as a statement about models of ZF by saying, "In any model of ZF in which AC is true, the Banach–Tarski paradox is true." Similarly, all the statements listed below which require choice or some weaker version thereof for their proof are undecidable in ZF, but since each is provable in any model of ZFC, there are models of ZF in which each statement is true.
In class theories such as Von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory and Morse–Kelley set theory, there is a possible axiom called the axiom of global choice which is stronger than the axiom of choice for sets because it also applies to proper classes. And the axiom of global choice follows from the axiom of limitation of size.
Examples of category-theoretic statements which require choice include:
It is also consistent with ZF + DC that every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable; however, this consistency result, due to Robert M. Solovay, cannot be proved in ZFC itself, but requires a mild large cardinal assumption (the existence of an inaccessible cardinal). The much stronger axiom of determinacy, or AD, implies that every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable, has the property of Baire, and has the perfect set property (all three of these results are refuted by AC itself). ZF + DC + AD is consistent provided that a sufficiently strong large cardinal axiom is consistent (the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals).
For proofs, see Thomas Jech, The Axiom of Choice, American Elsevier Pub. Co., New York, 1973.
These are sets, using the axiom of separation. In classical set theory this would be equivalent to
and similarly for . However, without the law of the excluded middle, these equivalences can't be proven; in fact the two sets aren't even provably finite (in the usual sense of being in bijection with a natural number, though they would be in the Dedekind sense).
By the axiom of choice, there will exist a choice function for the set ; that is, a function such that
.
By the definition of the two sets, this means that
,
which implies .
But since (by the axiom of extensionality),
therefore ,
so .
Thus .
As this could be done for any proposition, this completes the proof that the axiom of choice implies the law of the excluded middle. Forms of the axiom of separation are available in many constructive set theories. In the intuitionistic type theory of Per Martin-Löf, on the other hand, subsets of a type have different treatments. A form of the axiom of choice is a theorem, yet excluded middle is not.
Axioms of set theory | Model theory
Axioma d'elecció | Axiom výběru | Udvalgsaksiomet | Auswahlaxiom | Axiome du choix | 선택공리 | Assioma della scelta | אקסיומת הבחירה | Kiválasztási axióma | Keuzeaxioma | 選択公理 | Aksjomat wyboru | axioma da escolha | Аксиома выбора | Urvalsaxiomet | 选择公理
This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License.
It uses material from the
"Axiom of choice".
Home Page • arts • business • computers • games • health • hospitals • home • kids & teens • news • physicians • recreation• reference • regional • science • shopping • society • sports • world