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- This article is written in Pinyin transliteration (which had not been devised in 1936), except for the name Chiang Kai-shek. Contemporary English accounts will mostly use Hsian, Chang Hsüeh-liang, Chang Tso-lin and similar forms.
Background
Zhang Xueliang, known also as The Young Marshal, was the son of Zhang Zuolin warlord of Manchuria in northeast China. For sometime before the KMT-led China-uniting Northern Expedition, Zhang was being quietly supported by the Japanese government. When it became imminent that the advancing Expedition forces would defeat Zhang and thus threaten Japanese interests in Manchuria, rogue elements within the Kantogun (Japan's Army in Manchuria) forcibly halted the Expedition at Ji'nan and assassinated Zhang on the grounds that he was an unreliable ally, hoping to capitalise on the confusion caused by his death. They miscalculated however, and his son quickly pledged his allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek, turning his forces over to KMT control and supported Chiang in his war of unification against other warlords such as Li Zongren, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. As a reward, Zhang remained ruler of Manchuria and even extended his influence to Northern China around Beijing and Hebei. Following the Mukden Incident of 1931, when the Japanese invaded and took full and direct control over Manchuria, forcing Zhang, his army and all other Chinese to evacuate, the public placed the responsibility of the disaster on Zhang, who suffered great humiliation in China. By 1936 then, his father's assassination and the loss of his homeland made Zhang into an ardent opponent of the Japanese.
Zhang left China for military training in Europe. After his return, Zhang and his Northeastern China Army were sent to Anhui and Hubei to suppress the Red Army of the Communist Party of China. The CPC was forced on the Long March after suffering heavy losses and then set up another base in Yanan, Shanxi. Zhang and his troops were transferred to Shaanxi again for suppression in 1936, where he worked with General Yang Hucheng, who used to be a general of Northwestern China Army and a favorite of Feng Yuxiang but later defected to Chiang’s camp.
Zhang and Yang suffered great losses in their attempted suppression of the CPC, and Chiang did not give them any support in manpower and weaponry. It was quite natural for them to think Chiang would take advantage of CPC’s resistance to eliminate their own armies, which were not of Chiang’s own Whampoa Clique. Zhang and Yang began to contact the CPC secretly, and overtly agreed with while covertly opposing Chiang’s policies. Zhang and Yang reached an agreement with CPC for temporary peace. CPC even sent lots of members to work for Yang.
At the same time, the tension between China and Japan rose day by day. Japan was hoping to conquer China in its entirety by invading vast areas of Northern China. For example, Japanese troops fought against KMT troops along the Great Wall in 1933. Then in 1935, under the accord signed between He Yingqin, the commander of KMT armies in Northern China, and Yoshijiro Umezu, the commander of Japanese troops in Northern China, elite KMT troops related to the group Blue Shirts Society, core of Chiang’s Whampoa Clique, had to evacuate from Beijing and Northern China, which put the whole of Northern China under direct threat of Japanese invasion. But Chiang preferred to unite China by eliminating warlords and CPC forces first. Chiang believed that he was still too weak to launch an offensive to chase out Japan and that China needed time for a military build-up. Only after unification would it be possible for KMT to mobilize a war against Japan. So he would rather disregard the discontent and anger among Chinese people at his policy of compromise with the Japanese, and urged Zhang and Yang to carry out suppression efficiently.
Meanwhile, Stalin and his Soviet Union in the 1920s and early of 1930s stood by Japan’s invasion of China at first, for they had also invaded Manchuria and waged a war against Zhang and his father. The Soviets were hoping to make their own territorial gains at the expense of China, dividing it with the Japanese as they had done with Germany over Poland in Europe. Soon the Soviets became wary of the Japanese ambition and success, fearing it might hurt Soviet interests in the Far East. Thus, Stalin began to favor a stronger Chinese resistance to Japan.
Under the authorization of Stalin and Comintern, the delegation of CPC to Comintern led by Wang Ming issued a manifesto urging Chinese to set up a new united front against the Japanese, which was later called the August 1st Manifesto. In this manifesto Wang acknowledged that the archenemy of CPC at the present stage was Japan instead of Chiang. But this received a cold shoulder from Mao Zedong and his associates, who ruled CPC and had great hatred for Chiang.
These were the complicated situations of, and relationships between, the domestic and foreign parties which preceded the incident.
Events
On 22 October 1936, Chiang flew to Xian from Nanjing and announced his new plan of suppression of the communist forces, raising opposition from both Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. On 4 December 1936, Chiang came to Xian again, accompanied by many of senior KMT leaders including Chen Cheng to monitor the suppression campaign. After unsuccessfully attempting to persuade Chiang to voluntarily join forces with the CPC to meet the impending threat of Japan, Zhang and Yang finally decided to take matters into their own hands. In the early hours of 12 December 1936, Chiang and his entourage were arrested by Zhang's bodyguards. During the conflict, Shao Yuanchong ( in Chinese), the incumbent minister of the propaganda department of the KMT, died after he was hit in his testicles while attempting to climb over a fence. Colonel Jiang Xiaoxian ( in Chinese), Chiang’s arrogant nephew and bodyguard, was also brutally murdered during the chaos for past grievances.
Misperceived as a coup by Zhang, news of the incident shocked the world. But Zhang and Yang had a different plan. While the country was reeling in confusion, they contacted the CPC and requested a delegation be sent to Xian to discuss Chiang’s fate and that of the whole of China.
There were big disagreements within both the CPC and KMT on how to handle the incident. In KMT, senior leaders decided to set up an acting commission for resolution. Chiang’s wife Soong May-Ling () was excluded from this commission although she desperately asked for a peace negotiation. General Tung Cheuk Heem was appointed to take charge of military. His role was quite controversial. He was voted as acting commander to lead the KMT armies for the rescue of Chiang. Historians used to say that He strongly supported solving this incident by force, which He contacted Wang Jingwei and asked him back to China to take charge of KMT, and sent two armies marching to Xian to fight Zhang’s army. There was a saying that when Madam Chiang came to He and asked for a peaceful solution, He refused her as a woman knowing little politics and should stay away from state issues. But new evidence showed that actually it was the Whampoa Clique, especially the young and extremist officers of the Blue Shirts Society, that wanted to launch military attacks against Zhang, even though He rejected their request for military support. The radical young officers of the Blue Shirts Society and Whampoa Clique could not wait for the decisions made by senior leaders and launched expditions against Zhang. Although He did not support the young officers in public, his connivance did promote conditions calling for Chiang's death. However, warlords such as Li Zongren and Yan Xishan who used to oppose Chiang, did not want Chiang to die. They knew that if they advocated the execution of Chiang, Japan would benefit the most from a China without a national leader. These warlord generals sent their telegrams of reprimand to Zhang Xueliang and Yang and voiced their support of Chiang. Furthermore, most of the western powers such as the United States and United Kingdom preferred a peaceful resolution to the incident, for they regarded Chiang as the ideal person to govern China.
In the CPC, there were two opinions too. Most of the leaders such as Mao and Zhu De proposed the execution of Chiang for his suppressions, which had damaged the CPC immensely. Some of them, such as Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian, did realize it could bring more damage to the anti-Japan movement if Chiang was executed. At last they only made a resolution to send a delegation consisting of senior leaders such as Zhou, Ye Jianying and Qing Bangxian to Xian at the request of Zhang and Yang.
As the fury over Chiang and pressure for his execution intensified among the CPC members and armies of Zhang and Yang, the situation worsened for Chiang. Madam Chiang did not believe that the KMT would be effective in freeing her husband. Thus, on 14 December 1936, Madam Chiang sent her Australian advisor, who also used to be Zhang’s advisor, to Xian for negotiation. The winds began to change his way after Stalin gave his guidance on this incident. Stalin believed that Chiang's execution would not be beneficial to either Chinese resistance to Japan or Soviet interests in the Far East. Desperately in need of Soviet aid, Mao relented to Stalin’s opinion and showed his enthusiasm for peace talks. On 17 December 1936, CPC delegation was sent to Xian and met with Zhang and Yang to find a peaceful resolution. On 22 December 1936, Madam Chiang and her elder brother T.V. Soong flew to Xian to meet the CPC delegation, Zhang, and Yang. On 24 December 1936, the parties reached an agreement to establish a united front against Japan and to release prisoners accused of inciting anti-Japanese riots. The next day Chiang and his entourage were released. Zhang escorted him back to Nanjing, although Zhou expressed his concern.
Effects
Although Chiang described his perseverance through the whole ordeal in the later published Half Month In Xian, parts of the journal were obviously fabricated. In his own diary, Chiang regarded this as the greatest humiliation of his whole life. Thus it was no surprise that he would take revenge on Zhang. And as Chiang was the legitimate premier of China at that time, Zhang’s movement would naturally be deemed a coup and treason. Although some argued for a public trial, Chiang insisted on trying Zhang in a military court. Zhang was sentenced to ten years in prison, but Chiang quickly granted amnesty while insisting on Zhang’s being kept in custody.
Zhang was kept in custody for most of the rest of his life, as a result his armies split apart and never gained power again. Zhang revealed no more details about the incident, and died in 2001. Zhou Enlai expressed his regret in public, and Zhang told others that CPC had betrayed him in some degree, since the incident saved the CPC from total annihilation but put Zhang in custody for life. Furthermore, Zhang’s real status and beliefs are still in question. Zhang’s enthusiasm for Communism was no secret. He did apply for membership in the CPC. According to the biography of Zhou, Zhou told others that Zhang’s application was opposed by Stalin, as he thought Zhang's status as a warlord made him a poor candidate for CPC membership. However, new theories argue that Zhang was indeed a CPC member, but that his real status was so secret that only a few people such as Zhou and Ye Jianying knew about it. With all these witnesses passing away, the true status of Zhang may remain secret. But if Zhang’s CPC membership could be proved, the history of Xian Incident could be rewritten as a CPC conspiracy instead of a spontaneous patriotic action.
The incident's biggest loser would not be Chiang and Zhang, but Yang Hucheng, who was soon removed from his position and sent abroad for review. Then Yang was kept in custody in a Concentration Camp for a long time. When the KMT retreated to Taiwan, Chiang ordered the execution of Yang and his family.
It is generally accepted that the CPC benefitted most from this incident. Chiang did abide by the peace agreement and stopped the suppression until the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in 1945. Mao exploited this precious peace to enlarge his power base and strengthen his power grip. By conforming to Soviet policy, Mao pleased Stalin and avoided his further interference. In particular, CPC won great support from the Chinese people for being an open advocate of the anti-Japan United Front. All this work laid a stable foundation for the CPC’s victory over the KMT after the end of the anti-Japanese war.
References
- Chiang Kai-shek, Half Month in Xian
- Gao Wenqian, Later Years Of Zhou EnLai
- JUNG CHANG and JON HOLLIDAY, MAO – the untold Story
- Fenby, Jonathian, Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation he Lost
- Koutsoukis, A.J. From Samurai to Sanyo: A History of Modern Japan
Zwischenfall von Xi’an | Accord de Xi'an | תקרית שיאן | 西安事件 | Xian-episoden | 西安事变
"Xi'an Incident"