Treaties between Rome and Carthage

The treaties between Rome and Carthage are of fundamental importance in understanding the changing relations—diplomatic and otherwise—between the two Mediterranean centres of power. In particular, they are important in revealing the changing ways in which each perceived not only their relationship but also their own roles in the Mediterranean world.

As city-states that became empires, Rome and Carthage eventually found it necessary to formalize their relations, clarifying the rights of the other in their respective zones of influence. Under these treaties, the two cities managed to survive side by side for centuries, occasionally even operating as allies. In many ways their economic interests and methods of expansion were complementary symmetric, avoiding potential trouble.

In its early days—under the kings and the early Republic—Rome did not fight at sea because it was engaged first in defending itself from its neighbours—Samnites, Etruscans, Gauls, and Greeks—and later in conquering them. Carthage, which did not possess an real civic army, and was contained in Sicily by the Greeks, appeared indecisive regarding its expansion strategy: while the aristocratic party wanted to extend the city's power into the surrounding country, the commercial party was more interested in exploiting trade routes.

In neither case the two powers found themselves in conflict with each other till the First Punic War, and through the stipulation of four treaties, relations between Rome and Carthage followed for centuries a route of reciprocal tolerance.

Background

Carthage

Carthage was founded in 814 BC by Phoenician colonists from Tyre. By the 6th century BC, the sailors and merchants of Carthage were known throughout the western Mediterranean. In the 4th century BC, following a series of military conquests, Carthage controlled many territories west of the gulf of Sirte in present-day Libya, like much of the coasts of Numidia and Iberia. The coasts of Sardinia and Corsica were already under Carthaginian control when the city-state attempted, in three wars between 480 and 307 BC, to conquerSicily, but were stopped by the Greeks, who had already heavily colonized the island. Primarily interested in commerce, Carthage had no standing civic army, and mostly used mercenary forces composed of Libyans and Iberians, augmented by mercenary Numidian cavalry.

Rome

Rome was founded only seventy years after Carthage (753 BC, following Varronian chronology). For the first several centuries of its history, Rome was involved in a lengthy series of wars with its surrounding neighbours, which resulted in the specialization of the Roman army in fighting wars on land. Moreover, the Roman economy and social structure began to incorporate the results of these wars: taking loot or tribute, redistributing conquered land, sometimes even using subjugated peoples as military allies (socii). As for the maritime commerce, the Romans simply entrusted itself itself to the Etruscan and Greek fleets.

Commercial control

In the 2nd century BC, a great line divided the commerce of the Mediterranean: the Aegean, Adriatic and Ionian seas were largely controlled by the maritime cities of the Greeks (in Greece, Asia Minor, and, after Alexander the Great, Egypt). The western Mediterranean was the commercial zone of the Carthaginians, with the exception of the Tyrrhenian Sea, in which Carthage shared the waters with the Etruscans and the Greek colonies of southern Italy.

First treaty

The first treaty between the two city-states was formed in the year of the founding of the Roman Republic, 509 BC. The dating is Varronian and is slightly different from the calculations made by Polybius. The Greek historian bases himself on the years of the Persian expedition against the Greek free cities. Xerxes, the king of Persia, crossed the Hellespont with his armies in June, 480 BC, and Polybius writes of the treaty,

...it is of the time of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius Pulvillus, the first consuls ^*. These events were twenty-eight years before the passage of Xerxes into Greece. We have transcribed the most precise interpretation possible.

(Polybius, Histories, III, 22)Polybius, Historiae, iii. 23

During the war with Ardea, following the overthrow of Tarquin the Proud, the Republic found that it needed to secure itself and its supplies, which were controlled for the most part by Greek and especially Etruscan merchants. (The Etrsucan Cerveteri and its port of Pyrgi supplied Rome.) Rome therefore tried the support of the Carthaginians—who for their part were already operating in Cerveteri, as evidenced by votive writings found in Etruscan and Phoenician.

At the same time, Carthage was engaged in fighting the Greek colonies that had spread from Greece across the western Mediterranean. Greek cities along the coasts of southern Italy and the eastern part of Sicily limited Phoenician commerce with the populations of the interior. In Spain and Provence, Carthage fought to compete with Phocaean colonies. In Sardinia and Corsica, Carthage was joined by the Etruscans in their competition with the Phocaeans, with the result that the Phocaeans were driven out: Corsica and the Tyrrhenian became Etruscan, and Sardinia and the western half of Sicily Carthaginian (eastern Sicily would remain Greek for centuries). In 510 BC, Carthage had to fight to hold off Spartan incursions into western Sicily.

Text

Γίνονται τοιγαροῦν συνθῆκαι Ῥωμαίοις καί Καρχηδονίοις πρῶται, κατὰ Λεύκιον Ἰούνιον Βροῦτον καὶ Μάρκον Ὡράτιον, τοὺς πρώτους κατασταθέντας ὑπάτους... ταῦτα δ΄ἔστι πρότερα τῆς Ξέρξου διαβάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τριάκοντ΄ἔτεσι λείπουσι δυεῖν. ἃς καθ ὅσον ἦν δθνατὸν ἀκριβέστατα διερμηνεύσαντες ἡμεῖς ὑπογεγράφαμεν.^*. ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων σύμμαχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίων σύμμαχοις μὴ πλεῖν 'Ρωμαίους μηδὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχους ἐπέκεινα τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτερίου, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἢ πολεμίων ἀναγχασθῶσιν ἐὰν δέ τις βίᾳ κατενεχθῇ, μὴ ἐξέστω αὐτῷ μηδὲν ἀγοράζειν μηδὲ λαμβάνειν πλὴν ὅσα πρὸς πλοίου ἐπισκευὴν ἢ πρὸς ἱερά, ἐν πέντε δ'ἡμέραις ἀποτρεχέτω. Τοῖς δὲ κατ'ἐμπορίαν παραγινομένοις μηδὲν ἔστω τέλος πλὴν ἐπὶ κήρκι ἢ γραμματεῖ. Ὅσα δ' ἂν τούτων παρόντων πραθῇ, δημοσίᾳ πίστει ὀφειλέσθω τῷ ἀποδομένῳ, ὅσα δ΄ἂν ἢ ἐν Λιβύῃ ἢ ἐν Σαρδόνι πραθῇ. Ἐὰν Ῥωμαίων τις εἰς Σικελίαν παραγίγνεται, ἧς Καρχηδονίοι ἐπάρχουσι, ἴσα ἔστω τὰ Ῥωμαίων πάντα. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ μὴ άδικείτωσαν δῆμον Ἀρδεατῶν, Ἀντιατῶν, Λαρεντίνων, Κιρκαιιτῶν, Ταρρακινιτῶν, μηδ'ἄλλον μηδένα Λατίνων, ὅσοι ἂν ὑπήκοοι ἐὰν ὡς πολέμιοι εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσελθῶσιν, ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μὴ ἐννυκτερευέτωσαν.

(Polybius, Histories, III, 22)

Conditions on Rome

With the treaty of 509, cited by Polybius, Rome and its allies promised not to sail past Cape Bello (i.e., into the gulf of Carthage), unless driven there by storm or enemies; in any case could buy only what was necessary for repairs or religious ceremonies, and must leave again within five days. The merchants could operate in Sardinia and Africa only under the control of auctioneers to guarantee the vendor. In Carthaginian Sicily, however, Romans had the same rights as Carthaginians.

It is notable that Carthage considered Sardinia and Africa wholly its own, while specifying that they only controlled "non-Greek" Sicily.

Conditions on Carthage

In the treaty of 509, Carthage and its allies promised not to attack a series of settlements in Lazio, which were "subject to the Romans", and also not to attack the independent cities. In the case of conquest, Carthage would restore them to Rome, intact. The Carthaginians could not build fortresses in Lazio and could not stay the night there.

It is also notable that Rome considered only Lazio to be its territory. The treaty did not speak of Campania, or more significantly of Etruria.

In any case, Roman maritime commerce was nonexistent and Carthage couldn't even think of operating militarily in Lazio, engaged as it was in a war with the Greeks: Both cities promised not to do what they weren't in a position to do anyway.

Brief analysis

We may observe that Carthage did not renounce any military actions, except against a small territory (Lazio) in which it probably had little interest anyway, and maintained a free hand for action against the Greeks and Etruscans—both of whom were militarily and economically more powerful and dangerous than Rome.

In the graphic at right, the following areas signify:

This area was forbidden to Rome, and in fact Carthage with its navy blocked any competitive actions beyond the channel of Sicily or on the African coast.
This area was not under such direct Carthaginian control. In fact, Greek and Etruscan mariners sailed here freely. Carthage reserved the right to refuse competition, but "magnanimously" offered the Romans shelter in case of emergencies or bad weather.
This area was under Greek and Etruscan control, and the Romans were almost exclusively contacted by the Carthaginians for mercenary combatants.

It is worthy of note that some cities in Lazio are explicitly cited. Why these and not others? It is possible to hypothesize that Carthage had made motions in these areas before. We recall that the Roman expansion, before the fall of Tarquin the Proud, was directed towards the Tyrrhenian coast to the southwest. The Roman Republic was proclaimed while Tarquin's army was fighting against Ardea.

It can be supposed that Rome, "in its smallness", wanted to formalize the exclusion of competition (i.e., Carthage) while it began pressuring the Greek sphere of influence. Otherwise, the contrast of this diplomacy with the war against Ardea would not be so pronounced, nor would it make sense to specifically exclude Carthaginian fortresses.

Titus Livy reported:

Cum Graecis a Camillo nulla memorabilis gesta res; nec illi tera, nec romano mari bellator erat. ^* Cuius populi ea cuiusque gentis classis fuerit nihil certi est. Maxime Siciliae fuisse tyrannos crederim...

(Titus Livy, History of Rome from its foundation (Ab Urbe condita libri), VII, 26)

Et cum carthaginiensibus legatis romae foedus ictum, cum amicitiam et societatem petentes venissent

(Titus Livy, History of Rome from its foundation (Ab Urbe condita libri), VII, 27)

Second treaty

ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίων καὶ Τυρίων καὶ Ἰτυκαίων δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς τούτων συμμάχοις. τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου, Μαστίας Ταρσηίου, μὴ λῄζεσθαι ἐπέκεινα Ῥωμαίουω μηδ' ἐμπορεύεσθαι μηδὲ πόλιν τινὰ μὴ οὖσαν ὑπήκοον Ῥωμαίοις, τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐχέτωσαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν άποδιδότωσαν. ἐὰν δέ τινες Καρχηδονίων λάβωσί τινας, πρὸς οὓς εἰρήνη μέν ἐστιν ἔγγραπτος Ῥωμαίοις, μὴ ὑποτάττονται δέ τι αὐτοῖς, μὴ καταγέτωσαν εἰς τοὺς Ῥωμαίων λιμένας, ἐὰν δὲ καταχθέντος ἐπιλάβηται ὁ Ῥωμαίοις, ἀφιέσθω. ὡσαύτως δὲ μηδ᾿ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ποιείτωσαν. Ἂν ἔκ τινος χώρας, ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσιν, ὕδωρ ἢ ἐφόδια λάβῃ ὁ Ῥωμαῖος, μετὰ τούτων τῶν ἐφοδίων μὴ ἀδικείτω μηδένα πρὸς οὓς εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία ἐστὶ Καρκηδονίοις. ὡσαύτως δὲ μηδ᾿ ὁ Καρκηδόνιος ποιείτω. εἰ δέ, μὴ ἰδίᾳ μεταπορευέσθω. ἐὰν δέ τις τοῦτο ποιήσῃ, δημόσιον γινέσθω τὸ ἀδίκημα. Ἐν Σαρδόνι καὶ Λιβύῃ μηδεὶς Ῥωμαίων μήτ᾿ ἐμπορευέσθω μήτε πόλιν κτιζέτω, (...) εἰ μὴ ἕως τοῦ ἐφόδια λαβεῖν ἢ πλοῖον ἐπισκευάσαι. ἐὰν δὲ χειμὼν κατενέγχῃ, ἐν πένθ᾿ ἡμέραις ἀποτρεχέτω. Ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσι καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι πάντα καὶ ποιείτω καὶ πωλείτω ὅσα καὶ τῷ πολίτῃ ἔξεστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ποιείτω ἐν Ῥώμῃ.

(Polybius, Histories, III, 24)

It tried, in practice, to copy the first treaty, with the addition of some cities. For their part, the Carthaginians added Tyre and Utica, while promising not to attack the coastal cities of Lazio that had allied themselves with Rome. Did it succeed? Why did the two cities feel it necessary to repeat what had already been said?

Rome: after 150 years, it had conquered a good part of Etruria, eliminated Veii, and repelled the Gallic invasion of 390 BC, although it felt threatened by the second invasion of 360 BC. Above all, Rome had been and still was shaken by internal fights, the greater part between the patricians and the plebians for access to public office and therefore to political activity and the management of land and spoils of the incessant wars. By necessity or by choice, Rome was fighting against the populations of the Ernici, the Volsci, the Tiburtini, and the omnipresent Etruscans, and was preparing to do the same with the Samnites, who were coming down from the mountains to raid rich Campania, which Rome also desired.
In Sicily and in southern Italy, where Dionysis the Great had created the beginnings of a unified state, Dionysius the Younger, his son, tried to enlarge his inheritance, but met with resistance from other Greek forces. A flurry of alliances, including some with the Carthaginians, led to the disintegration of Dionysius' power, and his deposition in 345 BC. Taranto, which had been left out of the fighting, grew in power, and other forces arrived from Greece. Into these struggles, Rome began to insert itself.
Carthage, after having closed the war with the Cyrenaicans, which stabilized the eastern boundary of the Phoenician territory, was always at war with the Greeks, and in particular with Syracuse, for control of Sicily. It was also in conflict with the Etruscans, who, blocked by the Gauls from northern Italy, and by the Romans from Lazio, applied themselves aggressively to the Tyrrhenian Sea to control traffic there.

Brief analysis

Obviously Carthage should have watched Rome as a possible adversary, which had resisted invasion and in war was proving itself potentially dangerous, as well as in relation to the large territory it already controlled; larger—if not richer—than its perennial rival Syracuse. Moreover, the fact of obtaining the possibility for the Phoenician merchants of operating in Rome shows how Carthage did not fear commercial competition from Rome, and that it could operate it own territories while the nascent Italian power was becoming a potential client and should be put under its political control.

It is probably to the credit of Carthaginian diplomacy, therefore, that the revision to the 509 treaty imposed additional restrictions on Rome, written at a time when it was heavily engaged in military (and therefore financial) obligations. Another item of interest is the prohibition against Rome's founding of cities. This did not appear in the first treaty, and shows that Carthage may have caught on to the method of Roman expansion. Commerce did not interest Rome as much as the control and exploitation of its territory. If an area was deserted it would be substantially occupied; if the area was inhabited, it would be conquered and forced to pay in assets and troops, and eventually to accept Roman or Latin colonies. This was probably foreign to the commercial mentality of the Carthaginians in 509 BC, who founded colonies almost exclusively to support warehouses.

Third treaty

In 306 BC was stipulated the third treaty between Rome and Carthage. We do not know the text (Polybius does not report it), but, following the historian Filinus, Rome agreed not to enter Sicily, while Carthage agreed not to set foot on the peninsula. This would seem to imply Rome's inferior condition, as the stipulations on Carthage did not change—whereas for Rome, which before had traded under equal conditions, now found itself shut out of the Sicilian market.

Viewed differently, Rome may have been trying to limit the fronts it had to address while fighting the Samnites, and to prevent any future alliances between the Carthaginians and Etruscans while it fought on the mainland. In fact, Rome, which had in this period put under its control the better part of southern Etruria and the territory of Campania, was in the middle of its wars with the Samnites. Begun in 343 BC, these would not be concluded until 290, and had become, moreover, a global revolt of the populations of Lazio and Etruria trying to escape Roman domination.

Carthage, for its part, had to be feeling the convulsions currently sweeping the eastern Mediterranean. In June of 323 BC, Alexander the Great died. The territory he had conquered had become the battleground of the Diadochi, the generals of the Macedonian army, who were now trying to divide its spoils. Egypt, Greece, Macedonia, Asia Minor, and Syria were involved in incessant wars that threatened peaceful trade. In 316 BC, moreover, Agathocles came to the throne of Syracuse and began a campaign to rid Sicily of the Carthaginians. In 311 BC, having been defeated in Sicily, he carried the war to Africa, and in the following year allied himself with Cyrenaica.

Carthage, which had tried to dominate the whole of the western Mediterranean, may now have found it necessary to protect itself with an increasingly powerful Rome. In 303 BC, in fact, Rome and Taranto concluded a treaty that fixed the limits of Roman navigation at the Lacine promontory (see Capo Colonna) and already by 306 Rome had come to an agreement with Rhodes, another city undergoing strong commercial expansion.

Fourth treaty

Between the first and second treaties, 161 years passed. Between the second and third treaties, 42 years. Between the third and fourth, only 27. The fourth treaty between Rome and Carthage was formalized in 279 BC. What had happened to force the two city-states into a new treaty?

Taranto

In 290 BC, the Samnite Wars officially ended. The actions of Rome in its territory had reduced the pressure of the Italic populations on the Greek cities in southern Italy, and in particular Taranto. Syracuse remained at war with Carthage and—after the death of Agathocles—was further involved in civil war. The Italics were attacked by the Roman legions. Taranto was experiencing a period of splendour and expansion, even to the point of limiting Roman maritime traffic in the 303 treaty. Rome proved a remarkably hard enemy, however, as they had demonstrated against the Samnites. In 282 BC, a squadron of ten Roman ships appeared in Tarantine waters, violating the treaty, but they were destroyed or forced to escape. When a Roman delegation was sent to request restitution for the ships and captured prisoners, it was insulted. War inevitably began in 281 BC. The Tarantines at first tried to form an anti-Roman league with the Italic populations, but it was considered to be insufficient, and thus they requested the assistance of Pyrrhus.

Pyrrhus

In 280 BC, Pyrrhus was 39. He had been held hostage in Egypt by Cassander of Macedonia, was seated on the throne of Epirus in 297 BC by Ptolemy I Soter. Two years later, he married the daughter of Agathocles of Syracuse, Lanossa, who brought as a dowry Leucade and Corcira. This marriage proved decisive.

In 280 BC, Pyrrhus was called into Italy by Taranto, which was succumbing to the Roman legions. He arrived with an army of 25,000 men and 20 elephants, presenting himself as the champion of Greece against the advance of the Italic barbarians. Pyrrhus' attack on Rome was, initially, heralded as a success: the Battle of Heraclea in Lucania against the legions under Publius Valerius Levinus was won thanks to the use of elephants, which the Romans had never seen. It is quite probable that the sudden appearance of a Carthaginian fleet at the Roman port of Ostia at this time forced the Romans to remember the presence of the important Phoenician city.

In 279 BC, a second great battle, the Battle of Asculum, at Ascoli Satriano, seen as a victory by the Epirean king over the forces of the consuls Publius Supilcius and Decius Mus. This battle, however, exacted heavy losses on the victor—so great that it became the original "Pyrrhic victory". After this, Pyrrhus returned to Taranto.

Carthage

Syracuse, trying to change its lot, and taking advantage of the fact that Pyrrhus had married Agathocles' daughter, offered him the crown of Sicily in exchange for helping them throw off the Carthaginians. Pyrrhus accepted, partly to leave the peninsula and avoid the Romans. Pyrrhus landed in Sicily, initially successful in pushing the Carthaginians to the Lilibeo. These manoeuvres by Syracuse and Pyrrhus prompted Carthage to move against Rome, and thus they signed the fourth treaty.

Ἐν αἷς τὰ μὲ ἄλλα τηροῦσι πάντα κατὰ τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ὁμολογίας, πρόσχειται δὲ τούτοις τὰ ὑπογεγραμμένα. Ἐὰν συμμαχίαν ποιῶνται πρὸς Πύρρον ἔγγραπτον ποιείσθωσαν ἀμφότεροι, ἵνα ἐξῇ βοηθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ τῶν πολεμουμένων χώρᾳ, ὁπότεροι δ᾿ ἂν χρείαν ἔχωσι τῆς βοηθείας, τὰ πλοῖα παρεχέτωσαν Καρκηδόνιοι καὶ εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄφοδον, τὰ δὲ ὀψώνια τοῖς αὑτῶν ἑκάτεροι. Καρκηδόνιοι δὲ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν Ῥωμαίοις βοηθείτωσαν, ἂν χρεία ᾖ. Τὰ δὲ πληρώματα μηδεὶς ἀναγχαζέτω ἐκβαίνειν ἀκουσίως.

(Polybius, Histories, III, 25)

Brief analysis

An improvement in Rome's condition soon followed, an acknowledgement of its increased military and economic power, while Carthage showed a greater weakness, probably the result of its difficulties in Sicily. Or so it appeared. Carthage "conceded" to Rome an equal role. Polybius notes that Pyrrhus was explicitly cited, and the two parties would not only not deal with him, but would form an alliance in case of attack on their respective territories.

It was an evident attempt by Carthage to drag Rome into a land war in Sicily, having seen that Rome had already fought Pyrrhus to a standstill. The Carthaginians would supply ships for the transport of troops, and would pay the cost of supplies and cargo, but would not commit their forces to land.

This in particular is an important point: ships could not carry many additional passengers, and generals (like Publius Cornelius Scipio against the Carthaginians themselves, years later in Spain) commonly used the sailors alongside the soldiers when it came time for battle. The help of the Carthaginian navy that was offered against Pyrrhus, was, therefore, consistent. The Phoenicians, evidently, thought of having to fight the Epireans and Greeks only in Sicily on land; sailors were too valuable to waste in combat. But, more than anything, the sailors were Carthaginian, while the larger part of the Carthaginian land forces were mercenaries. In Carthage's view, probably, Rome was nothing more than a source of troops at a good price.

Various effects

Though technically the two cities were not obliged to come to the aid of the other, it seems clear that Carthage was attempting to force Rome into bringing assistance in the case of land war, in which Carthage felt itself less capable. It also appears clear that they failed to recognize Rome's determination to grow: in the eyes of the Carthaginians, the Romans must have seemed similar to the mercenaries that they and Greeks used in their incessant wars.

It fact, it may have been this very treaty that led the Romans to understand their capacity for development: the importance and the power of the Republic and, above all, the true limits of the power of Carthage. If Rome had ever had an inferiority complex with respect to Carthage, they certainly didn't now. Having now defeated Pyrrhus (who in his turn had defeated the Carthaginians), Rome needed only to extend its reach to conquer rich Sicily with its grain reserves.

In 275 BC, after the defeat of Maleventum (Beneventum), Pyrrhus returned definitively to Epirus, leaving Rome master of the entire Italian peninsula south of the Tusco-Emilian Appennines, in close contact with Greek culture, close to mastery of shipbuilding and management, and aware of the power of its legions: aware of the possibility of expansion.

Eleven years later, in 264 BC, the First Punic war began.

Notes

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Background

Carthage

Rome

Commercial control

First treaty

Text

Conditions on Rome

Conditions on Carthage

Brief analysis

Second treaty

Brief analysis

Third treaty

Fourth treaty

Taranto

Pyrrhus

Carthage

Brief analysis

Various effects

See also

Notes