Third battle of Panipat

The Third Battle of Panipat took place on January 14, 1761 at Panipat (Haryana State, India) about 80 miles (130 km) north of Delhi, between the Maratha forces of north-western India aiding their allies, the Mughals, and Afghan forces under Ahmad Shah Abdali. It is believed that nearly 100,000 people either died or were injured on both sides in the one-day battle, though some historians estimate the total to be nearer to 60,000.

The battle pitted the French-supplied and trained artillery of the Marathas against the famous light cavalry of the Afghans. The matchup would have been rather one sided in favour of the Marathas had not their own cavalry decided to charge prematurely leading to their defeat. Both forces were so heavily attritted that the Mughal Empire fell, the expansion of the Maratha's power ended, and Ahmad Shah's Durrani Empire suffered continual attacks by the growing Sikh power and eventually retired to the north of Kandahar. The Marathas had also pursued his fleeing army right up to Attock at the foothills of Afghanistan in 1756 under Raghobadada.

Prelude to Panipat

The Mughal Empire of north-western India had been in decline for some time after Ahmad Shah's first attacks against them in 1749, eventually culminating in his sacking of Delhi in 1757. He left them in nominal control however, which proved to be a fateful mistake when his son, Timur Shah, proved to be utterly incapable of maintaining control of the Afghan troops. Soon the local Sikh population rose in revolt and asked for the protection of the Marathas, who were soon in Lahore. Timur retreated to Afghanistan.

Ahmad Shah could not allow this to go unchecked, and in 1759 raised an army from the Pashtun tribes with help from the Baloch, and invaded India once again. By the end of the year they had reached Lahore, but Marathas continued to pour into the conflict and by 1760 had formed a single army of over 100,000 to block him.

There followed much manoeuvring, with skirmishes fought at Karnal , Kunjapura. After the Marathas failed to prevent Abdali's forces crossing the Yamuna river, they set up defensive works in the excellent ground near Panipat, thereby blocking Ahmad's access back to Afghanistan just as his forces blocked theirs to south. Abdali slowly tightened the noose by cutting off the Maratha Army's supply lines. Sikhs and Jats (with the exception of Ala Singh) did not support Marathas because of their refusal to sack Delhi, which was at that time a Maratha protectorate. Their supplies and stores dwindling, the Marathas then moved in almost 150 pieces of modern long-range rifled French made artillery. With a range of several kilometres, these guns were some of the best of the times.

Siege

The Afghan forces arrived in late 1760 to find the Marathas in well-prepared works. Realizing a direct attack was hopeless, they set up for a siege. The resulting face-off lasted two months. During this time Ahmad continued to receive supplies from locals, but the Marathas own supply line was cut off.

Realizing the situation was not in their favour, the Marathas under Sadashiv Bhau decided to break the siege. His plan was to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Muslims were thoroughly softened up. With the Afghans now broken, he would move camp in a defensive formation towards Delhi, where they were assured supplies.

The line would be formed up some 12km across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of battlefield had been fully established.

Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle tested, and then the roughly 30,000 civilians entrained. Many were middle class men, women and children on their pilgrimage to the Hindu holy places and shrines, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see Aryavarta (Aryan Land). The civilians were irrationally confident of the Maratha army, regarding it as one of the best in the world, and definitely one of the most powerful in Asia. Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line, of young inexperienced soldiers.

Battle opens

Before dawn on January 14, 1761 the Maratha forces emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their pre-arranged lines, some 2km from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad positioned his 60 smoothbore cannon and opened fire. However, because of the short range of the weapons, the Maratha lines remained untouched. Ahmad then launched a cavalry attack to break their lines.

The first defensive salvo of the Marathas went over the Afghans' heads and inflicted very little damage, but the Afghan attack was nevertheless broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with some famed Maratha gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point blank range, and the resulting carnage sent the Afghans reeling back to their lines. The European-style plan had worked just as envisioned.

The Marathas then started moving their infantry formation forward, led by the artillery. The Afghans responded with repeated cavalry attacks, all of which failed. About 12,000 Afghan cavalry and infantrymen lost their lives in this opening stage of the battle.

The Marathas cavalry charge

At this stage it looked as though Bhausaheb would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. However, some of the Maratha lieutenants, particularly Vitthal Vinchurkar and Damaji Gaikwad, jealous of the exploits of their artillery chief (Commandant de la gard - Ibrahim khan Gardi), decided to exploit the gaps in the enemy lines & dash; despite strict instructions not to charge or engage Afghan cavalry in hand to hand fight. The mass of Maratha horsemen raced through their own artillery lines and charged towards the demoralised Afghans, intending to cut the faltering army in two.

The over-enthusiasm of the charge saw many of the half starved Maratha horses exhausted long before they had travelled the two kilometres to the Afghan lines; some simply collapsed. Making matters worse was the suffocating odour of the rotting corpses of men and animals left on the field from the fighting of the previous months. Still, a major mass of Maratha cavalry collided with the Afgan cavalry, initially taking down a few thousand of afghani troops.

In response, the Afghan officers stiffened their troops resistance. Abdali sent his body guards to call up his reserves of 10,000 from his camp and arranged it as column right in front his and cavalry of musketeers, and swivel mounted cannons (shaturnals) on the back of camels. because of their positioning on camels they could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry and at the Maratha cavalry, who were unable to withstand the rifled muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans. Abdali had 2000 such shaturnals. They could be fired without the rider having to dismount and were especially effective against fast moving cavalry.

With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond, and about 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry perished before the hand to hand fighting began at around 2PM. By 4PM the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armoured leather jackets.

Attack from within

The maratha army had captured some afghan slaves earlier during the siege of Kunjpura. They had not been trusted to be in the front line because their loyalty was suspect, now responded to the calls of the Afghan army for jihad and revolted. This caused brought confusion and great consternation to loyal Maratha soldiers, who thought that the enemy had attacked from behind.

Sadashivrao Bhau, seeing his forward lines dwindling and civilians behind, felt he had no choice but to come down from his elephant and lead the battle at the head of household troops. He left instructions with his bodyguards that, if the battle were lost, they must kill his wife Parvati bai for he could not tolerate her being dishonoured by the afghans.

Some Maratha soldiers, seeing that their general had disappeared from his elephant, panicked and began to flee. Vishwasrao, the son of Prime Minister Nanasaheb, had already fallen to a stray shot, in the head. Sadashivrao Bhau and his loyal bodyguards fought to the end, the maratha leader having three horses shot down from under him.

Rout

The Afghans pursued the fleeing Maratha army, while the Maratha front lines remained largely intact, with some of their artillery units fighting until sundown. Choosing not to launch a night attack, made good their escape that night. Parvatibai escaped the armageddon with her bodyguards, and eventually returned to Pune.

The Massacre

The mass of surrendered Maratha soldiers were handcuffed and then killed.

The unhappy prisoners were paraded in long lines, given a little parched grain and a drink of water, and beheaded; and the women and children who survived were driven off as slaves - twenty-two thousand, Many of them of the highest aristocratic rank in the land, says the Siyar-ut-Mutakhirin.

The Afghan cavalry and pikemen ran wild through the streets of Panipat, killing any Maratha soldiers who offered resistance. About 6,000 women and children sought shelter with the north Indian local ruler, the Shuja-ud-Daula (ally of Abdali), who was actually undecided before the war about joining the Marathas or Abdali. His Hindu officers persuaded him to protect the Maratha women and children. Another 22,000 women and children seeking refuge in the streets of Panipat were herded back to the Afgan camps as slaves.

A conservative estimate places Maratha losses at 35,000 on the Panipat battlefield. According to Mr. Hamilton of the Bombay Gazette about half a million people were present there on Panipat town from Maharashtra and he gives figure of 40,000 prisoners as executed. Most of the Maratha prisoners were camp-followers and pilgrims.

The Afghans losses were around 40,000. As far as battle casualties are concerned, the Afghans too suffered heavily. It was more like a battle lost by the Marathas than a battle won by the Afghans.

Following the battle

To save their kingdom, and in the name of Islam, the Mughals once again changed sides and welcomed the Afghans to Delhi, forgetting that Marathas had just lost 100,000 men and women for their cause. However, the news soon arrived that Marathas had organised another 100,000 men in the south to avenge their loss and to rescue the captured prisoners. Ahmad shah left Delhi two months after the battle, heading for Afghanistan.

The Mughals remained in nominal control over small areas of India, but were never a force again. The empire officially ended in 1857 when its last emperor was accused of being involved in the Sepoy Mutiny and exiled.

This 3rd battle of Panipat saw an enormous number of casualties and deaths in a single day of battle, perhaps unmatched even today in the later wars. It was the scene of uncommon valour, unwanted strategic blunders,and internal bickering. The Marathas expansion was stopped in the battle, and soon broke into infighting within their empire. They never regained any unity, and were soon under increasing pressure from the British.

In March 1761, Ahmad Shah Abdali was returning triumphant. He had destroyed Maratha power in Haryana at the battle of Panipat.

Descendants of Maratha prisoners of war

Though it is a historical fact that a large number of prisoners around the scene of the battle were taken as slaves to Afghanistan, it is only fair to presume that many could have died from the extreme climatic conditions of Afghanistan to which they were unaccustomed. Despite this, today a large number of people in Maharashtra feel that some of them could have survived. Even after 244 years, some probable descendants of these prisoners of war can be found, at least in Balochistan and in the Bugti and Marri tribal areas.

According to them, the Maratha Bugtis and Marri in Balochistan are an interesting case of what may be a caste forming even under Islamic rule. Theirs is a clan claiming descent from Marathas captives of war brought back by members of the Bugti tribe, who served the armies of Ahmad Shah Durrani (Abdali) after the battle of Panipat. In time they underwent forceful 'Bugti-ization' and became Muslims although they were once considered as bonded labour. They could not own or buy land. Until a generation ago they could be 'bought' for twenty or thirty rupees.

The Maratha and Marri Bugtis took jobs as unskilled labourers, which their tribal overlords disdained. Over the years some of them have come to occupy higher positions. However, they continue to be victims of discrimination. It is interesting to note that this caste-like phenomenon has endured for more than two centuries, even in a region largely devoid of Hindus. After the defeat lot of marhatas took refuge with local Sikh & Jat Chieftons especially women & children ,who later on converted to sikhism as seen in several sikh ladies named as Gajananbai,Tukabai or Indumati ,after partition with no acess in punjab province of pakistan it is very difficult to acess such lieage in other communities settled in Pakistan,also many Jat familes acknowledge about mixing of maratha lineage especially those settled around Panipat,Kunjpura &Karnal The fate of the descendants of other groups of Maratha prisoners taken to Afghanistan remains a mystery. Maharashtra as a nation and Maratha leadership has failed to recognise the existence of such descendants as a distinct group. There are some who feel that more investigation into these matters needs to be done, and that there is a case for repatriating these descendants, if they can be identified and are willing.

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