Sonderweg, (literally: sonder= 'special', weg= 'path') is a theory in historiography that considers the German-speaking lands, or the country Germany, to have followed its own, unique course through its evolution and history, separate from other European countries: therefore, a route of development which is 'special' or an 'alternative'. In particular, proponents of the Sonderweg view of German history argue that the way German history developed over the centuries virtually ensured that Nazi Germany was bound to occur. In their view, German mentalities, the structure of society and institutional developments led an "abnormal" course of history in Germany in comparison with the other nations of the West, who had a "normal" development of their histories.

The term Sonderweg was first used by German conservatives in Imperial period as a source of pride for the "Golden mean" that in their view allowed Germany to avoid both the autocracy of Imperial Russia and what they regarded as the weak, decadent and ineffective democratic governments of the United Kingdom and France. German conservatives argued that a strong military and an authoritarian state that practiced reform from above rather than responding to pressure from below and avoided what they considered to be the extremes of autocracy and radical democracy was superior to any other government on the Earth.

Following 1945, there was much debate about the origins of the "German catastrophe". Scholars examined developments in intellectual, political, social, economic and cultural history in order to discover why German democracy had failed during the Weimar republic and what factors had led to the rise of National Socialism. Many historians concluded that the failure of Germany to develop firm democratic institutions in the 19th century had ensured the failure of the Weimar republic in the 20th century. Starting in the 1960s, historians such as Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler argued that, unlike France and United Kingdom, Germany had experienced only "partial modernization" in which industrialization was not followed by changes in the political and social spheres, which in the opinion of Fischer and Wehler continued to be dominated by a "pre-modern" aristocratic elite. In the opinion of the proponents of the Sonderweg thesis, the crucial turning point was the Revolution of 1848, when German liberals failed to seize power for themselves and instead chose to resign themselves to the rule of a reactionary elite.

The leading critics of the Sonderweg thesis have been two British historians, Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn, who in their 1984 book The Peculiarities of German History argued that there is no "normal" course of social and political change; that the experience of France and Britain in the 19th century was not the norm for Europe; and that the liberal German middle class may have possessed only little political power, but dominated the social, economic and cultural life of 19th century Germany and this embourgeoisement of German social life was greater than in Britain and France, which in the opinion of Eley and Blackborun were much more marked by aristocratic values than Germany was. Many scholars such as Jürgen Kocka and Wolfgang Mommsen have disputed Eley's and Blackbourn's conclusions. Kocka in particular has argued that the Sonderweg thesis may not explain the reasons for the rise of the Nazi movement; in his viewpoint, the Sonderweg thesis still explains the failure of the democratic Weimar Republic and why Weimar could not prevent the rise of the Nazi movement.

There is of course significant evidence for this theory. While every other country in Europe (with the exception of the Italian lands) was consolidating into virtually fixed nation states, Germany (or as it was known at the time, the Holy Roman Empire) was in fact falling into ever smaller autonomous regions which were under the nominal control of the Emperor, although after Frederick II's death in 1250, the power of the Emperor, minimal as it had been in the first place, was almost completely broken -- Emperors continued to exist, but without any real influence.

After the Empire's final fall in 1806, Germany remained divided; in 1815 the three hundred or so archbishoprics, city-states, duchies and kingdoms were consolidated down into thirty states. In 1871 the German Empire was formed, and still there were no less than four kings amongst the various dukes holding power in the Empire (Emperorship had passed to the now independent Austria in 1806).

References

• Blackbourn, David & Eley, Geoff The Peculiarities of German History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
• Grebing, Helga Der "deutsche Sonderweg in Europa 1806-1945: Eine Kritik, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1986.
• Groh, Dieter "Le 'Sonderweg' de l'histoire allemande: Mythe ou rèalitè pages 1166-1187 from Annales, Economies, Societè, Civilisations, Volume 38, 1983.
• Jarusch, Konrad "Illiberalism and Beyond: German History in Search of a Paradigm" pages 647-686 from Journal of Modern History, Volume 55, 1983.
• Kocka, Jürgen "German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg" pages 3-16 from Journal of Contempoary History, Volume 23, 1988.
• Moeller, Robert "The Kaiserreich Recast?: Continuity and Change in Modern German Historiography" pages 655-684 from Journal of Social History, Volume 17, 1983-1984.
• Wehler, Hans-Ulrich The German Empire, 1871-1918, trasnlated by Kim Traynor, Leamington Spa: Berg, 1985.

External Link

• Book Review: The Peculiarities of German History

Historiography | History of Germany | Theories of history | Deutscher Sonderweg | Sonderweg