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Sino-American relations () refers to international relations between the United States and China. Most analysts have characterized present Sino-American relations as complex and multi-faceted, with the United States and China being neither allies nor enemies. At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that the nature of Sino-American relations will be a major factor in determining the state of the world in the 21st century.

Sino-American relations have generally been volatile, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, which removed a common enemy and ushered in a world characterized by American dominance. Some in the United States remain suspicious of the Communist Party of China and believe that its goal is to establish hegemony in East Asia and threaten US interests. There are also grievances which relate to human rights in the People's Republic of China and the PRC's claims on Taiwan. For its part, there are suspicions in China that the United States wishes to keep China weak and divided and that criticisms pertaining to its human rights record are unwarranted in light of the economic and living standard improvements that have occurred in the country.

While there are many irritants in Sino-American relations, there are also many stabilizing factors. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States are major trade partners and have common interests in the prevention and suppression of terrorism and in preventing nuclear proliferation. While the end of the Cold War removed a common enemy, the War on Terror has produced a new common enemy, which has stabilized relations to some degree.

In addition, while there is still a great deal of Chinese mistrust at American intentions, there is also the grudging realization that the United States will likely remain a global power for a great deal of time, and any direct challenge to the United States' position is likely beyond China's capability for several decades. There is also a realization that most of China's challenges and difficulties are internal, and therefore there is a desire on the part of China to maintain stable relations with the United States.

Images and conceptions

Much of the complexity of Sino-American relations comes from the images that the two have of themselves and of the other.

The Chinese see their national goal as a rich, powerful, and united China, with centuries of humiliation erased and some of its ancient glory restored. Americans see their national goal as bringing freedom and democracy to the world, and many within the United States see their country as the natural leader of the free world.

Within China, there is a love-hate relationship with the United States. On the one hand, American products and culture are seen as stylish and superior to local products. At the same time, there is resentment of American intervention into other nations' affairs, combined with a fear of American power. The Chinese are often perplexed at the stated motives of American foreign policy and tend to conclude that these goals, (such as promoting freedom and democracy) are an insincere cover for darker motives, namely to keep China weak and divided. The Chinese leadership often expresses confusion as to how others could interpret Chinese foreign and domestic policies as threatening.

Americans tend to see China as a far off and distant land. Since the 19th century, there has been a missionary impulse in American dealings with China, and the United States often believes that as part of its mission to advance freedom and democracy, it has the duty to advance the cause of human rights in China. Over the past 150 years, Americans have also tended to see the Chinese people as oppressed and abused by either the Japanese in World War II and more recently by their own Communist government. Americans do not generally accept the notion that many Chinese support the PRC government despite its authoritarian nature and are critical of the government's ability to make decisions which are of benefit to the Chinese people. In addition, Americans also tend to be confused by the notion that people may find American criticism of human rights to be insincere and meddlesome.

Many in the United States, such as adherents of neoconservatism and the Blue Team, view the possibility that China may eventually challenge American global dominance as an alarming outcome. Echoes of this suspicion have presented themselves in suspicion of trade with China.

History

From American Independence to the Treaty of Wangxia

First contact between the post-revolutionary Americans and the Chinese occurred during the voyage of the trader ship Empress of China, which arrived at Canton in 1784. Given the Chinese demand for raw goods as well as the American demand for anything remotely exotic, the voyage of the Empress was a financial windfall for its owners and thus began the lucrative Sino-American relationship known as the Old China Trade.

The result was the considerable exportation of specie, ginseng, and furs to China, not to mention the even larger influx of teas, cottons, silks, lacquerware, porcelains, and furniture to the United States. The merchants, who served as middlemen between the Chinese and American consumers, became fabulously wealthy from this trade, eventually giving rise to America's first generation of millionaires. In addition, many Chinese artisans began to notice the American desire for exotic wares and adjusted their practice accordingly, manufacturing goods made specifically for export. These export wares often sported American or European motifs in order to fully capitalize on the consumer demographic.

The end of the First Opium War in 1842 led to the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Nanking, which forced open many Chinese ports to foreign trade. To this point, Sino-American relations had been conducted solely through trade; however, this new pact between the British and Chinese severely threatened further American business in the region, and, as a result, the John Tyler administration sought to secure a similar treaty to that of the British. This resulted in the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia, which not only put American trade on par with the British but also secured Americans the right of extraterritoriality. The Treaty of Wangxia effectively ended the era of the Old China Trade, giving the United States as many trading privileges as other foreign powers.

The Open Door Policy

''Main article: Open Door Policy In the late 19th century, the major world powers (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia) began carving out spheres of influence amongst themselves in China. The United States perceived this development as a threat to the potential market for their goods that China constituted. Therefore, in 1899, US Secretary of State John Hay sent diplomatic notes to all of these powers, asking them to guarantee the territorial and administrative integrity of China, as well as to not interfere with the free use of treaty ports within their respective spheres of influence. The major powers evaded responding, saying they could not commit to anything until all the other powers had assented first, but Hay took this as acceptance of his proposal, which came to be known as the Open Door Policy.

The Open Door Policy, while generally respected internationally, did suffer serious setbacks. The first one occurred with Russian encroachment in Manchuria in the late 1890s; protested by the US, it would lead to a Russian war with Japan in 1904. Japan then presented a further challenge to the Policy with its Twenty-One Demands in 1915. Japan would conclude secret treaties with the Allies which promised them the German territories in China. However, the biggest setback to the Open Door Policy came in 1931, when Japan invaded and occupied Manchuria, setting up the puppet state of Manchukuo. The Americans, along with other countries, strongly condemned the action but did little at the time to stop it.

World War II

The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 saw aid flow into the Republic of China (ROC, which was led by Chiang Kai-shek) from the United States (under President Franklin D. Roosevelt). A series of Neutrality Acts had been passed in the US with the support of isolationists that forbade American aid to countries at war. However, since the Second Sino-Japanese War was undeclared, Roosevelt denied that a state of war existed in China and proceeded to send aid to Chiang.

American public sympathy for the Chinese was aroused by reports from Protestant missionaries, novelists such as Pearl Buck, and Time Magazine of Japanese brutality in China, including those surrounding the "Nanking Massacre". Japanese-American relations were further soured by the USS Panay Incident during the bombing of Nanjing. Roosevelt demanded an apology from the Japanese, which was received, but relations between the two countries would continue to deteriorate.

China formally declared war on Japan in 1941 following the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought the Americans into World War II. Massive amounts of aid were given by the Roosevelt administration to Chiang's beleaguered government, now headquartered in Chongqing. However, a perception grew that Chiang's government was unable or incapable to effectively resist the Japanese, or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the Communist Party of China under Mao Zedong; the two factions had been in conflict for years, and the same has been argued of the CPC. After World War II ended in 1945, the obvious hostility between the ROC and the CPC exploded into open civil war. General Douglas MacArthur directed the military forces under Chiang Kai-shek to go to the island of Taiwan to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, thus beginning the military occupation of Taiwan. American general George C. Marshall tried to broker a truce between the ROC and the CPC in 1946, but it quickly came undone, and the Nationalist cause went steadily downhill until 1949, when the Communists emerged victorious and drove the Nationalists from the Chinese mainland onto Taiwan. Mao established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland, while Chiang's ROC on Taiwan was for decades considered a government-in-exile.

People's Republic of China

For 30 years after its founding, the United States did not formally recognize the People's Republic of China. Instead, it maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China government on Taiwan, and recognized the ROC as the sole legitimate government of all China.

As the People's Liberation Army moved south to complete the communist conquest of mainland China in 1949, the American embassy followed the Republic of China government headed by Chiang Kai-shek to Taipei later that year. US consular officials remained in mainland China. However, the new PRC Government was hostile to this official American presence, and all US personnel were withdrawn from the mainland in early 1950.

Korean War

Any remaining hope of normalizing relations ended when the US and China's forces fought directly against each other in the Korean War. The Soviet Union was more of a factor than the People's Republic of China in instigating the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea. In response, the United Nations Security Council undertook to assist by military means the Republic of Korea. This was only possible due to the then-Soviet boycott of the Security Council due to the fact that the ROC continued to occupy China's seat, preventing a veto from either power. Once the American-led UN forces' counter-attack crossed the pre-war dividing line into the north and began to reach the Yalu river on the China-Korea border, the Chinese undertook a massive intervention into the conflict on the side of the communists. The subsequent Chinese counterattack caused the longest retreat in American military history and heavy casualties on both sides, before the UN forces were able to repel the Chinese back, near the original division. Two years of continued and often locally bitter fighting ended in an overall stalemate that ensued while negotiations dragged on, until a cease-fire was agreed to in 1953. The war officially did not end, and the Korean issue has had an important role in Sino-American relations ever since.

Relations very cold

The United States continued to work to prevent the PRC from taking China's seat in the United Nations and encouraged its allies not to deal with the PRC. The United States placed an embargo on trading with the Chinese, and encouraged allies to follow it. China developed nuclear weapons in 1964 and, as later declassified documents revealed, President Johnson considered preemptive attacks to halt its nuclear program. Ultimately he decided the measure was too risky and it was abandoned.

Despite this official non-recognition, beginning in 1954 and continuing until 1970, the United States and the People's Republic of China held 136 meetings at the ambassadorial level, first in Geneva and later in Warsaw.

Rapprochement

Both the Chinese and the Americans had issued feelers to try to improve relations between the two major powers. This became an especially important concern for the People's Republic of China after the Sino-Soviet Split created military tension and military clashes on both the Soviet and Indian borders. The PRC were isolated and the leadership came to believe that improved relations with the United States would be essential to guarantee the PRC's security. Zhou Enlai, the PRC premier foreign minister, was at the forefront of this effort, but he had the committed backing of Mao.

In the United States, some were of the opinion that excluding Communist China from the world stage had primarily a harmful effect. The Americans hoped that improved relations with China could help them in Southeast Asia to deal with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and that if China would align with the US it would mean a major redistribution of global power against the Soviets. It was also postulated that China's market of over a billion consumers could be a boom to American business.

One of the American political figures most interested in China was Mike Mansfield, the Democratic Senate Majority Leader. He was contacted by the PRC and they proposed a meeting. Mansfield passed the note on to the State Department and President Richard Nixon.

Nixon had long been interested in Asia as well and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger believed approaching the PRC would be valuable. Domestic political concerns also entered into Nixon's thinking; the boost from a successful courting of the PRC could help him greatly in the 1972 American presidential election. He also worried immensely that one of the Democrats would preempt him and go to China before he had the opportunity.

Communications were ongoing between the PRC and American leadership through various intermediaries including Pakistan, Romania, and American journalist Edgar Snow.

In 1969, the United States thus initiated measures to relax trade restrictions and other impediments to bilateral contact. On April 6, 1971, while negotiations over improving relations were proceeding, the young American ping pong player, Glenn Cowan, missed his US team bus and was waved by a Chinese table tennis player onto the bus of the Chinese team at the 31st World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan. Cowan spoke with the Chinese players in a friendly fashion, and the Chinese player, Zhuang Zedong, a three-time World Men's Singles Champion, presented him with a silk-screen portrait of the famous Huangshan Mountains. While this was a purely spontaneous gesture of friendship from the American athlete, the PRC took it as an officially sanctioned outreach. According to sources of information from China, the friendly contact between Zhuang Zedong and Glenn Cowan, as well as the photograph of the two players in Dacankao, had an impact on Mao's decision making. He had earlier decided not to invite the US team along with teams of other western countries that had been invited. Later known as Ping Pong Diplomacy, the PRC responded by inviting the American ping pong team to tour China. The Americans agreed and on April 10, 1971 the athletes became the first Americans to officially visit China since the communist takeover in 1949.

In July of 1971 Henry Kissinger, while on a trip to Pakistan, was announced to the media to be ill and did not appear in public for a day. He was actually on a top-secret mission to Beijing to open relations with the government of the PRC. On July 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon revealed the mission to the world and that he would initiate direct contact with the communist Chinese leadership and that he, the President, had been invited to visit China.

This announcement caused immediate shock around the world. In the United States, some of the most hardline anti-communists spoke against the decision, but public opinion supported the move and Nixon saw the jump in the polls he had been hoping for. Since Nixon had sterling anti-communist credentials he was all but immune to being called "soft on communism."

Within the PRC there was also opposition from the most dedicated communists. This effort was led by Lin Biao, head of the military. Lin Biao, however, died in a mysterious plane crash over Mongolia while trying to defect to the Soviet Union, silencing most internal dissent over the move.

Internationally, the reactions varied. The Soviets were immensely concerned that two major enemies seemed to have resolved their differences, and the new world alignment contributed significantly to the policy of détente.

America's European allies and Canada were pleased by the initiative, especially since many of them had already recognized the PRC. In Asia, the reaction was far more mixed. Japan was extremely annoyed that it had not been told of the announcement until fifteen minutes before it had been made, and feared that the Americans were abandoning them in favor of the PRC. A short time later, Japan also recognized the PRC and would commit to substantial trade with the continental power. South Korea and South Vietnam were both concerned that peace between the United States and the PRC could mean an end to support for them against their communist enemies. Throughout the period of rapprochement both these states had to be regularly assured that they would not be abandoned.

From February 21 to February 28, 1972, President Nixon traveled to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai. At the conclusion of his trip, the US and the PRC issued the Shanghai Communiqué, a statement of their shared foreign policy views. In the Communiqué, both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of diplomatic relations. The US acknowledged the PRC position that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The statement enabled the US and PRC to temporarily set aside the "crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations" - Taiwan - and to open trade and other contacts.

The rapprochement with the United States benefited the PRC immensely and greatly increased its security for the rest of the Cold War. It has been argued that the United States, on the other hand, saw fewer benefits than it had hoped for. The PRC continued to heavily support North Vietnam in the Vietnam War and also backed the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Eventually, however, China's suspicion of Vietnam's motives would lead to a break in Sino-Vietnamese cooperation and, upon the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese War. In the meantime, China would openly participate on the side of the US during the Soviet war in Afghanistan and conflicts in Africa with Soviet and Cuban supported movements. The economic benefits of normalization were slow as it would take decades for American products to penetrate the vast Chinese market. While Nixon's China policy is regarded by many as the highlight of his presidency, others such as William Bundy, have argued that it provided very little benefit to the United States.

Liaison Office, 1973-1978

In May 1973, in an effort to build toward the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, the US and the PRC established the United States Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a counterpart Chinese office in Washington, DC. In the years between 1973 and 1978, such distinguished Americans as David Bruce, George H. W. Bush, Thomas S. Gates, and Leonard Woodcock served as chiefs of the USLO with the personal rank of Ambassador.

President Gerald Ford visited China in 1975 and reaffirmed the US's interest in normalizing relations with Beijing. Shortly after taking office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter again reaffirmed the goals of the Shanghai Communiqué. The United States and the People's Republic of China announced on December 15, 1978 that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.

US-China relations since normalization

In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations dated January 1, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The US reiterated the Shanghai Communiqué's acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; Beijing acknowledged that the American people would continue to carry on commercial, cultural, and other unofficial contacts with the people of Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act made the necessary changes in US domestic law to permit such unofficial relations with Taiwan to flourish.

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's January 1979 visit to Washington, DC initiated a series of important, high-level exchanges, which continued until the spring of 1989. This resulted in many bilateral agreements - especially in the fields of scientific, technological, and cultural interchange as well as trade relations. Since early 1979, the United States and China have initiated hundreds of joint research projects and cooperative programs under the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, the largest bilateral program.

On March 1, 1979, the United States and the People's Republic of China formally established embassies in Beijing and Washington, DC. During 1979, outstanding private claims were resolved, and a bilateral trade agreement was concluded. Vice President Walter Mondale reciprocated Vice Premier Deng's visit with an August 1979 trip to China. This visit led to agreements in September 1980 on maritime affairs, civil aviation links, and textile matters, as well as a bilateral consular convention.

As a consequence of high-level and working-level contacts initiated in 1980, US dialogue with the PRC broadened to cover a wide range of issues, including global and regional strategic problems, political-military questions, including arms control, UN and other multilateral organization affairs, and international narcotics matters.

The expanding relationship that followed normalization was threatened in 1981 by Chinese objections to the level of US arms sales to the Republic of China on Taiwan. Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China in June 1981 in an effort to resolve Chinese questions about America's unofficial relations with Taiwan. Eight months of negotiations produced the US-China joint communiqué of August 17, 1982. In this third communiqué, the U.S. stated its intention to gradually reduce the level of arms sales to the Republic of China, and the Chinese described as a fundamental policy their effort to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question. Meanwhile, Vice President Bush visited China in May of 1982.

High-level exchanges continued to be a significant means for developing US-PRC relations in the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang made reciprocal visits in 1984. In July 1985, President Li Xiannian traveled to the United States, the first such visit by a Chinese head of state. Vice President Bush visited China in October 1985 and opened the US Consulate General in Chengdu, the US's fourth consular post in China. Further exchanges of cabinet-level officials occurred between 1985-1989, capped by President Bush's visit to Beijing in February 1989.

In the period before the June 3-4, 1989 crackdown, a large and growing number of cultural exchange activities undertaken at all levels gave the American and Chinese peoples broad exposure to each other's cultural, artistic, and educational achievements. Numerous Chinese professional and official delegations visited the United States each month. Many of these exchanges continued after the suppression of the Tiananmen protests.

Bilateral relations after Tiananmen

Following the communist Chinese authorities' suppression of demonstrators in June 1989, the US and other governments enacted a number of measures to express their condemnation of the PRC's violation of human rights. The US suspended high-level official exchanges with the PRC and weapons exports from the US to China. The US also imposed a number of economic sanctions. In the summer of 1990, at the G-7 Houston summit, Western nations called for renewed political and economic reforms in China, particularly in the field of human rights.

Tiananmen disrupted the US-PRC trade relationship, and US investors' interest in China dropped dramatically. The US government also responded to the political repression by suspending certain trade and investment programs on June 5 and 20, 1989. Some sanctions were legislated; others were executive actions. Examples include:

  • The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) - new activities in China were suspended from June 1989 until January 2001, when then-President Clinton lifted this suspension.
  • Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC) - new activities suspended since June 1989.
  • Development Bank Lending/International Monetary Fund (IMF) Credits - the United States does not support development bank lending and will not support IMF credits to China except for projects that address basic human needs.
  • Munitions List Exports - subject to certain exceptions, no licenses may be issued for the export of any defense article on the U.S. Munitions List. This restriction may be waived upon a presidential national interest determination.
  • Arms Imports - import of defense articles from China was banned after the imposition of the ban on arms exports to China. The import ban was subsequently waived by the Administration and reimposed on May 26, 1994. It covers all items on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' Munitions Import List.

In 1996, the PRC conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in an apparent effort to intimidate the Taiwan electorate before the pending presidential elections, triggering the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis. The United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region. Subsequently, tensions in the Taiwan Strait diminished, and relations between the US and the PRC improved, with increased high-level exchanges and progress on numerous bilateral issues, including human rights, nonproliferation, and trade. President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in the fall of 1997, the first state visit to the US by a PRC president since 1985. In connection with that visit, the two sides came to a consensus on implementation of their 1985 agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, as well as a number of other issues (U.Hawaii, 1997). President Clinton visited China in June 1998. He traveled extensively in China, and had direct interaction with the Chinese people included live speeches and a radio show, allowing the President to convey first hand to the Chinese people a sense of American ideals and values. President Clinton was criticized by some, however, for failing to pay adequate attention to human rights abuses in China (Eckholm).

Relations between the US and the PRC were severely strained for a time by the NATO Bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, accredited to an intelligence error but which some Chinese believed to be deliberate. By the end of 1999, relations began to gradually improve. In October 1999, the two sides reached agreement on humanitarian payments for families of those who died and those who were injured as well as payments for damages to respective diplomatic properties in Belgrade and China.

In April 2001, a Chinese J-8 fighter jet collided with a US EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft flying over international waters south of China. The EP-3 was able to make an emergency landing on China's Hainan Island despite extensive damage; the PRC aircraft crashed with the loss of its pilot, Wang Wei. Following extensive negotiations resulting in the Letter of the two sorries, the crew of the EP-3 was allowed to leave China 11 days later, but the US aircraft was not permitted to depart for another 3 months. Subsequently, the relationship, which had cooled following the incident, gradually improved.

Sino-American relations after 9/11

Sino-American relations changed radically following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The PRC offered strong public support for the war on terrorism. The PRC voted in favor of UNSCR 1373, publicly supported the coalition campaign in Afghanistan, and contributed $150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan reconstruction following the defeat of the Taliban. Shortly after 9-11, the U.S. and PRC also commenced a counterterrorism dialogue. The third round of that dialogue was held in Beijing in February 2003.

In the United States, the terrorist attacks greatly changed the nature of discourse. It was no longer plausible to argue, as the blue team had earlier asserted, that the PRC was the primary security threat to the United States, and the need to focus on the Middle East and the War on Terror made it a priority for the United States to avoid potential distractions in East Asia.

Initially, there were fears among the Chinese leadership that the war on terrorism would lead to an anti-Chinese effort by the US, especially as the US began establishing bases in Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and renewed efforts against Iraq. Because of the setbacks the US has faced in its Iraq campaign, these fears have largely subsided. Among the Chinese public, there were some celebrations at the fact that 9-11 showed that the United States was not invulnerable, but this quickly dissipated as the magnitude of the attack became known. Many Chinese citizens died in the WTC rubble, and Chinese companies and individuals sent expressions of condolences to their US counterparts. The application of American power in Iraq and continuing efforts by the United States to cooperate with China has significantly reduced the popular anti-Americanism that had been fostered in the mid-1990s.

The PRC and the US have also been working closely on regional issues, such as those pertaining to North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. The People's Republic of China has stressed its opposition to the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its concerns over North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and its desire for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. It also voted to refer the DPRK's noncompliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency obligations to the UN Security Council. However, many Americans have accused the PRC of dragging its feet on this issue and even secretly propping up North Korea, as a cudgel against the US and particularly Japan.

Taiwan remains a volatile issue, but one that remains under control. The United States policy toward Taiwan has involved emphasizing the Four Noes and One Without, and in several cases the United States appeared to step in when it seemed that the Republic of China government on Taiwan would move away from that policy. However, in 2005, China passed an anti-seccession law which implied that China would reunify with Taiwan through whatever means possible, had Taiwan declared formal independence. Many critics of the PRC, such as the Blue team, argue that China was trying to take advantage of the US war in Iraq to assert its claims on Taiwan.

Important issues in Sino-American relations

Chinese military spending

Main article: Military budget of the People's Republic of China

China's military budget is often mentioned as a threat by many, such as the blue team, in the United States. The PRC's investment in its military is growing at a fast rate. The United States, along with independent analysts, remain convinced that China conceals the real extent of its military spending. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4351422.stm These concerns may be caused by concerns by the United States that China is attempting to challenge the United States or threaten their neighbors.

Taiwan

The Republic of China remains a focus of difficulties in the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The United States exports large amounts of weaponry to Taiwan and there is a great deal of sympathy for Taiwan partly because it, unlike the PRC, is a pluralistic, liberal democracy and because of residual sympathy over the ROC's anti-communism during the Cold War. Any accession of Taiwan to the PRC may also change the balance of power in that region in both political and military terms; this potentiality has been of increasing concern to Japan, a traditional ally of Taiwan, as well.

At the same time, neither the PRC nor the US appears interested in provoking a conflict over Taiwan. The United States sees war in East Asia as disruptive to its interests, while the PRC believes that the long term trends are in favor of Chinese reunification and that there is no point in provoking a war in which it stands a high chance of losing. However, with improvements in China's military capability since the 1990s, the threat of an invasion of Taiwan remains real and some have put in doubt the capability of the US to effectively defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion. Furthermore, increased economic engagement with China is making it more difficult for the US to react as many American conservatives consider Taiwan as ultimately expendable next to the likely financial impact of a US-PRC conflict.

On Taiwan, there is a general public consensus in favor of the status quo. However, some supporters of Taiwan independence, such as Lee Teng-hui, have expressed the idea that Taiwan must act quickly to declare independence because the long term trends are against it. In several cases in which the administration of Chen Shui-bian appeared to be moving away from the status-quo and toward independence, the United States has asked for and received assurances that the ROC remains committed to the "Four Noes and One Without" policy.

Officially, US policy is governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, by the Six Assurances, and by the Three Communiques; it has stated a commitment to a one China policy. The strength of that commitment and the relationship between these policies, which are contradictory, changes from administration to administration.

US diplomatic representation in the ROC is achieved through the American Institute in Taiwan and ROC diplomatic representation in the US is achieved through the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices. These institutions act as embassies and consulates all but in name.

''See also: Political status of Taiwan

US-China economic relations

China and the US resumed trade relations in 1972 and 1973. US direct investment in China covers a wide range of manufacturing sectors, several large hotel projects, restaurant chains, and petrochemicals. US companies have entered agreements establishing more than 20,000 equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in China. More than 100 US-based multinationals have projects in China, some with multiple investments. Cumulative US investment in China is valued at $48 billion. The US trade deficit with China exceeded $350 billion in 2006 and was the United States' largest bilateral trade deficit. Total two-way trade between China and the US has grown from $33 billion in 1992 to over $230 billion in 2004 (Bunton). Some of the factors that influence the US trade deficit with China include:

  • The strength of the US economy: a shift of low-end assembly industries to China from the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in Asia. China has increasingly become the last link in a long chain of value-added production. Because US trade data attributes the full value of a product to the final assembler, Chinese value added is overcounted.

  • US demand for labor-intensive goods exceeds domestic output. The PRC has restrictive trade practices, which include a wide array of barriers to foreign goods and services, often aimed at protecting state-owned enterprises. These practices include high tariffs, lack of transparency, requiring firms to obtain special permission to import goods, inconsistent application of laws and regulations, and leveraging technology from foreign firms in return for market access. China's accession to World Trade Organization is meant to help address these barriers.

At the September 2002 Joint Economic Committee meeting in Washington, the United States and People's Republic of China discussed strengthening cooperation in fighting terrorist finance and money laundering, prospects for foreign direct investment in mainland China's financial services, and the regional reliance on US macroeconomic developments. China's continued strong growth has made it an important regional engine of growth, and the PRC reiterated its commitment to a strategy of market reforms and global economic openness.

Human rights

''Main article: Human rights in the People's Republic of China

The United States maintains the view that China needs to improve its human rights in a wide array of fields, from the treatment of dissidents to the strict enforcement of its One child policy. China, however, argues that its human rights concerns are a strictly internal matter and should have no effect on trade or other bilateral relations. Because of this, there remain disputes over issues such as the treatment of political prisoners, the crackdown on Falun Gong, the rights of religious practicioners (particularly Chinese Christians), China's forced labor camp (laogai) network, torture, and widespread media and internet censorship. Additionally, the US remains concerns over reports of such practices as forced abortions and organ harvesting, though these allegations are in contention.

The War on Terror has been seen by many foreign observers as a step backwards for human rights in China, when the PRC convicted a dissident of terrorism in a closed trial. This incident was strongly criticized by the US and other nations, due to China's refusal to release any of the evidence, leading to speculation that China was using terrorism as an excuse to jail dissidents. However, separatist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, allegedly linked to al-Qaeda, were deemed terrorist groups by both China and the United States. Some observers see this as an attempt to improve relations with China in the War on Terror.

More recently, the democratic status of Hong Kong, which was transferred to Chinese administration in 1997, has become a concern. In 2003, a proposed anti-terrorism law in Hong Kong was met with concern and demonstrations because it was widely viewed as an attempt to clamp down on dissidents who were based in Hong Kong.

The United States Department of State regularly publishes human rights reports which are harshly critical of Chinese government policies and practices. In its 2006 report, the State Dept. charged that China was one of the world's "most systematic" violators of human rights. The report accused the Chinese government of "serious abuses" and stated that there was a trend towards increased "harassment, detention and imprisonment, by government and security authorities, of those perceived as threatening". It also detailed a "significant" increase in protests and public disturbances, saying that "several incidents were violently suppressed", and accused China of increasing censorship of the internet. But the State Department report did mention that there were "notable developments" in Chinese legal reforms, as well as greater personal freedoms and increased protection of some religious activities.

In return, Beijing has been publishing reciprocal reports on human rights in the United States, in which it urges the US to "look squarely" at its own problems, such as a high murder rate and jail population. The reports are issued by China's cabinet, the State Council, and list what it says are "a multitude of cases to show the serious violations of human rights both in and outside the US," according to state news agency Xinhua. It described alleged abuses including secret surveillance, police abuse, racial discrimination and wrongful convictions.

Footnotes

  • "China-US Joint Statement October 29, 1997." University of Hawaii. 10 Apr. 2006 .
  • Eckholm, Erik. "Clinton Urged to Meet Top China Dissident." New York Times 20 June 1998: A3. Historical New York Times. Proquest. DuBois Library, UMASS Amherst. 10 Apr. 2006.
  • Bunton, T. S., and Kathleen J. Michels. "2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION." USCC 2005 Annual Report Page. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. .
  • "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005." 8 Mar. 2006. US Department of State. 11 Apr. 2006 .

References

See also

Sino-American relations

Other Chinese relations

Other American relations

External links

Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China | Sino-American relations

中美关系

 

This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the "Sino-American relations".

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