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The Radio Reconnaissance Platoon is the special operations element of the United States Marine Corps Radio Battalion. In addition, a Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) is the tactical signals intelligence collection element of the Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Detachment One.
Mission
The mission of the Radio Reconnaissance Platoon is to conduct tactical signals intelligence/electronic warfare operations in support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander during advance force, pre-assault, and deep post-assault operations, as well as maritime special purpose operations.
The Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) is used when the use of conventionally trained Radio Battalion elements is inappropriate or not feasible.
While deployed with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), or MEU(SOC), the Radio Reconnaissance Team is also a part of the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) as a unit of the Reconnaissance & Surveillance Element. The MSPF is a sub-element of the MEU(SOC), as a whole, and is responsible for performing specialized maritime missions. These missions include, but are not limited to:
- Gas and Oil Platform Operations (GOPLAT)
- Direct Action Missions
- Demolitions
- Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)
- Deep Reconnaissance
- In-Extremis Hostage Rescue (IHR)
- Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
Capabilities
- Indications and Warnings
- Radio Direction Finding (RDF)
- Limited Electronic Warfare
- SIGINT Database Development
- Communications Support
- Reconnaissance and Surveillance via NATO format
- Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG)
Insertion/Extraction Techniques
- Helicopter Touchdown
- Helocast
- Personnel
- Small Boat (Hard Duck, Soft Duck, Rolled Duck)
- Rappel
- Fast Rope
- Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction (SPIE)
- Wet
- Dry
- Parachute
- Over-the-Horizon Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC)
- SCUBA
Team Skills and Training
SIGINT
- Foreign Language
- Arabic
- Russian
- Korean
- Spanish
- Farsi
- Morse Code Intercept (>20 GPM)
- Analysis and Reporting
Reconnaissance Training
- Airborne
- Amphibious Reconnaissance/BRC
- Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE)
- Helicopter Rope Suspension Training (HRST)
- Ranger
- Mountain Survival/Mountain Leader
- Jumpmaster
- SCUBA
- High Risk Personnel (HRP)
Radio Reconnaissance Indoctrination Program (RRIP)
The Radio Reconnaissance Indoctrination Program is the in-house technical training tool used by the Radio Reconnaissace Platoons to ensure that its operators are not only tactically proficient in reconnaissance skills but technically adept in their respective areas of expertise. The RRIP has a duration of several weeks that can be dynamically determined to suit the needs of the platoon and its deployment tempo. During the RRIP, an RRP candidate can expect very long and strenuous days. The RRIP culminates in a series of field training exercises (FTX's) from 72-96 hours in length.Organization
There are currently three Radio Battalions, two with their own Radio Reconnaissance Platoons. 1st Radio Battalion, I MEF, is located at Camp Pendleton, CA. 2nd Radio Battalion, II MEF, is located at Camp Lejeune, NC.
Owing to a restructuring of the entire Radio Battalion organization, the former 1st Radio Battalion, with its Radio Reconnaissance Platoon, moved from Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii to Camp Pendleton, California in October of 2004. To date, there has been no establishment of a Radio Reconnaissance Platoon at the new 3rd Radio Battalion at Kaneohe Bay. The Radio Reconnaissance Teams of 1st Radio Battalion still deploy in support of III MEF's 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Alpha and Bravo cycles based in Okinawa. 1st Radio Battalion also deploys RRT's in support of I MEF's rotating 11th, 13th and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units.
A six-man Radio Reconnaissance Team is typically composed of a Team Leader (Staff Sergeant or Sergeant), Assistant Team Leader (Sergeant or Corporal), Point Man, Navigator, Radio-Telegraph Operator (RTO), and Assistant RTO.
History
Lt. General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., Commanding General of FMFLant and future Commandant of the Marine Corps, and LtCol Bill Keller, Commanding Officer of 2d Radio Battalion, FMFLant, met at MCAS Cherry Point in the spring of 1984 to welcome home the returning members of the 2d Radio Battalion Detachment from Beirut, Lebanon. The Marines of 2d Radio Battalion had conducted tactical cryptologic operations in support of the entire deployment of the US peacekeeping force in Beirut since the initial landings at Beirut International Airport.
During the wait, Gray and Keller were discussing the various problems faced by the Radio Battalion detachment. Both agreed that the most significant problem was the lack of a tactical cryptologic database available from national and theater assets prior to the Marine's landing in Beirut. Equally as significant were the unconventional aspects of the communications networks used by the various factions in Beirut. Those that posed the greatest threat to the Marines did not abide by standard military communications procedures, nor did they follow set frequencies or callsigns.
Since the detachment had received no intelligence from the National Security Agency before arriving in Beirut, they were forced to start with nothing. General Gray wanted to try to integrate a Force Reconnaissance Team with attached Radio Battalion cryptologists, selected and trained for ground reconnaissance and special operations. He directed LtCol. Keller to coordinate with 2d Force Reconnaissance Company to test this idea.
Keller coordinated with the Commanding Officer of 2d Force Reconnaissance Company, Maj. Joe Crockett. Their initial step was to attach a Radio Battalion Marine, equipped with an AN/GRR-8 receiver to a Force Recon Team during an exercise and see if he could keep up and do something worthwhile. The experiment did not go well, and the concept was tabled until that summer, when Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Gallina became CO of 2d Radio Bn. General Gray discussed the idea with Gallina, who became a major proponent of the concept.
In December 1984, Captain E.L. Gillespie arrived at Radio Battalion to develop a concept of operations to integrate Radio Battalion Marines with Force Reconnaissance Teams for independent advance force operations.
Captain Gillespie submitted a draft "Talking Paper" contending that integration with a 4-man Force Recon Team was not viable due to conflicting missions. He suggested that a separate 6-man Radio Bn team be trained in selected airborne and seaborne insertion/extraction techniques, ground reconnaissance and survival skills.
The original mission statement for the team was, "To conduct limited communications intelligence and specified electronic warfare operations in support of Force Reconnaissance operations during advance force or special operations missions.''
The initial list of titles for this proposed group was:
- Force Reconnaissance Support Team (FRST)
- Radio Search Team (RST)
- Signal Search Team (SST)
- Special Search Team (SST)
- Radio Research Team (RRT)
- Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT)
He also ensured that the CO of 2d Force Reconnaissance Company would assist in the personnel selection, training and equipping, and that II MEF's Solid Shield-85 OPLANS, OPORDERS, and Annexes would adequately reflect the integration of the RRT.
Captain Gillespie was directed to immediately commence screening of 2d Radio Battalion personnel. However, most Radio Battalion Marines did not share the officers' enthusiasm for the project. There was also resistance by Company Commanders, who did not want to allow their best Marines to be assigned to the task. By and large, (with the exception of the SNCO's and Sergeants) the majority of the Marines provided to form the initial RRT's were a group of "malcontents" that were just marking time and waiting for their discharge papers.
At this time, Major Carrick insisted that all of the RRT candidates must go through the 2d Force Reconnaissance Company Indocrination Process. Carrick later admitted that the only reason that he insisted on this issue was that he felt that all or most of the Radio Battalion Marines would either quit or fail the Indoc and the project would be put to rest once and for all.
However, all of the RRT candidates and one other Marine from 6th Marines passed the Indoc. Captain Gillespie later talked to the indoc instructors who indicated that they had done everything that they could think of to make the RRT Marines quit, but they wouldn't.
After the Indoc, one RRT was sent to Airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia, while the other Marines prepared and trained for Solid Shield-85. The exercise went well, and by all accounts, the Radio Reconnaissance proof of concept was an unqualified success.
Between 1986 and 1989, RRT's were deployed as an element of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Radio Battalion Detachment assigned to each of the rotating 11th, 13th, 15th, 22nd, 24th, and 26th MEU(SOC) deployments. Captain Gillespie was assigned as the officer in charge of the 2d RadBn Detachment, 24th MEU(SOC) in 1986, which was the first RadBn detachment to conduct real world operations during Operation Earnest Will (a Kuwaiti Oil Tanker escort operation).
The 24th MEU(SOC) RRT was involved in significant cryptologic operations in the Persian Gulf and provided intelligence support for several combat actions against Iranian forces, including the seizure of the Iranian mine-laying vessel, Iran Ajr and the incident at Middle Shoals Light. Other RRT personnel were involved in actions in Panama leading to and during Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama.
In many cases, MEU Commanders would state that the RRT's were the most valuable intelligence and communications asset in the force, and that if only six Marines could be inserted during advance force, pre-assault, or special operations mission, the RRT would be the ones to go.
See also
External links
Units of the United States Marine Corps | Special forces of the United States | Organizations in cryptography
"Radio Reconnaissance Platoon"