Prodigy Communications Corporation was a dialup service (a sort of "mega-BBS") for home computers in the United States before the advent of the Internet. Prodigy claimed it was the first consumer online service, differentiating itself from the leading service provider, CompuServe, which was used mostly by technophiles.
Prodigy was founded in 1984 as Trintex, a joint venture between CBS, computer manufacturer IBM, and US retailer Sears. CBS left the venture in 1986 during a period where CBS CEO Tom Wyman was divesting of properties outside of CBS's core broadcasting business. The Prodigy service was launched regionally in 1986 in Atlanta, Hartford and San Francisco under the name Prodigy. A nationwide launch followed in 1988.
Thanks to an aggressive marketing campaign in the media, bundling with various consumer-oriented computers such as IBM's PS/1 and Packard Bell computers and Hayes Modems, a retail presence at most major retailers, and due to its basic uniqueness, the Prodigy service soon had more than a million members. Prodigy had done its homework in studying the concentration of homes with computers, building a national network of POP (points-of-presence) sites that made local access numbers available for most homes in the U.S. This was a major factor in the expansion of the service since members did not have to dial long distance to access the service. The member would only pay for the local call while Prodigy paid for the long distance call back to its national data center.
Under the guidance of editor Jim Bellows, Prodigy developed a fully-staffed 24x7 newsroom with editors, writers and graphic artists intent on building the world's first true online medium.
Some of its shopping applications were successful, but others were not, possibly because online purchases were then a novelty of which subscribers were suspicious. Prodigy retains the distinction of having launched ESPN's online presence and growing such firms as PC Flowers into some of the online world's earliest success stories. Still, marketers had yet to recognize the power of this new medium, so revenue from advertising was limited. Cash flow problems soon forced Prodigy to increase its user fees.
Since Prodigy's business model depended on rapidly growing advertising and online shopping revenue, email was developed primarily to aid in the shopping experience, not for general communication between users. However, the bulletin boards and email proved very popular--so popular that Prodigy, alarmed by increasing costs, moved to ration their use by allowing only a limited number (30) of email messages free each month and charging 25 cents for each additional email message. This policy was later recinded. But in the summer of 1993, in a similar attempt to offset usage costs, it began charging hourly rates for what had become it most popular feature, its message boards. Many regular message board users did not fully appreciate what this meant until a few weeks later, when they received stunning three-digit bills for the previous month's activity, in the place of what had been standard bills for about $20. Members began quitting the service in droves, and a downward membership slide began that the company was never fully able to halt. It later recinded the hourly rates for message boards, but the damage had been done.
Perhaps due to the conservative cultural bent of IBM and Sears, Prodigy was slow to adopt features that made its rival, AOL, so appealing -- for example, anonymous handles, online chat, and unmoderated bulletin boards. As with all services at that time, member turnover ("churn") was a major problem.
Prodigy stuck with its graphical interface, its proprietary content, and its dour policies while other services, notably AOL, embraced open standards and grew faster. In the early 1990s the explosive growth of the Internet threatened to leave Prodigy behind, despite its high ranking in consumer satisfaction and reliability surveys (unlike AOL, which was derided for its busy signals, security issues and other problems.)
In 1996 Prodigy was acquired by the former founders of Boston Technology and their new firm International Wireless, with Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim Helú, a principal owner of Telmex, as a minority investor. IBM and Sears sold their interests to this group for $200 million. It was estimated that IBM and Sears had invested more than $1 billion in the service since its founding.
Prodigy continued to operate as before, while Telmex provided Internet access under the Prodigy brand in Mexico and other parts of Latin America, with some services being provided by Prodigy Communications in the United States.
Prodigy went public in 1999, trading on the NASDAQ under the symbol PRGY. Later that year, Prodigy entered a strategic partnership with SBC Communications wherein Prodigy would provide Internet services and SBC would provide sales opportunities and network, particularly DSL, facilities.
On November 6, 2001, Prodigy was bought by SBC Communications. On November 14, 2001, SBC and Yahoo! announced the strategic alliance to create the co-branded SBC Yahoo!. Some time thereafter SBC ceased to provide Prodigy accounts, and customers were encouraged to migrate to the SBC Yahoo! product line.
Telmex still offers Internet access in Latin America under the Prodigy brand, with approximately 80% marketshare in Mexico.
Claims of censorship included users of public forums who were forbidden to mention other users by name. The most infamous example of this was a coin collector's message, banned because it contained the phrase "Roosevelt dime" - there was, as it happened, a Prodigy subscriber named "Roosevelt Dime". A wildlife discussion group found that the word "beaver" was forbidden; they had to call the animal by its scientific name. Moderators on boards dedicated to computer games would delete posts based on the games' storylines rather than gameplay. Criticisms of the Prodigy service in its public forums were often deleted. Users tried to work around Prodigy's various strictures. For instance, to beat the thirty-message email limit, some users set up "undergrounds" -- shared accounts where they communicated by sending messages back to the same account. When they became popular, even typing the abbreviation "UG" (Underground Garden) could get a message automatically deleted.
Unlike many other services, Prodigy started out with flat-rate pricing. In a reversal of the trend seen with most other services at the time, Prodigy went from flat-rate pricing to hourly rates in June 1993, causing a large exodus from the service.
Prodigy was also one of the first to offer a user-friendly GUI when competing services, such as CompuServe and GEnie, were still text-based. Prodigy used this graphical capability to deploy heavy advertising, which it hoped would bring additional revenue.
Prodigy was also forerunner in caching data at the local sites to minimize its long distance expenses.
Prodigy's legacy architecture was novel at the time and anticipated much of current web browser technology. It leveraged the power of the subscriber's PC to maintain session state, handle the user interface, and process applications formed from data and interpretative program objects which were largely pulled from the network when needed. At a time when in the state of the art, distributed objects were handled by RPC equivalents (essentially remote function calls to well known servers in which final results were returned to the caller), Prodigy pioneered the concept of actually returning interpretable, "platform independent" objects to the caller for subsequent processing. This approach anticipated such things as Java applets and Javascript. A strong argument can be made that Prodigy pioneered true distributed object-oriented client-server implementations as well as incidental innovations such as the equivalent of HTML Frames, pre-fetch, etc. Prodigy patented its implementation (US 5,347,632 et al.) and these patents are, as of this entry, among the most highly cited of all software patents.
While the strategic partnership with SBC provided a significant infusion of cash and customers, the intended migration of SBC Internet Services customers to Prodigy took longer than expected.
In 1999 the company, now led by a cadre of ex-MCI executives with the goal of turning the brand around, became Prodigy Internet, marketing a full range of services, applications and content, including dial-up and DSL for consumers and small businesses, instant messaging, e-mail and communities.
In 2000, with subscriber growth exploding and brand attributes at an all time high, Prodigy explored a number of partnership deals including what would have been an unprecdented three-way merger between Earthlink, Mindspring and the company. Ultimately, SBC bought a 43 percent interest in the company, and Prodigy became the exclusive provider to SBC's 77 million high-speed Internet customers. More than a year later after the launch of Prodigy Broadband, SBC bought controlling interest for $465 million when Prodigy was the fourth-largest Internet service provider behind America Online, Microsoft's MSN and EarthLink. Prodigy in 2000 was reported to have 3.1 million subscribers of its own, of which 1.3 were DSL customers.
AT&T no longer actively markets Prodigy services. However, a fair number of customers still use the Prodigy services that were available at the time of the acquisition. Employees from the former Prodigy remain active in AT&T's Internet operations.
Attempts by SBC to sell the Prodigy brand became public knowledge on December 9, 2005, via CNET News: Prodigy up for Sale.
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