Operation Linebacker II was a United States military operation during the Vietnam War. Sometimes referred to as the "Christmas Bombings" (or "The Eleven Day War" by aircrews), the operation in late December, 1972 had the heaviest bomber strikes of the war, ordered by U.S. President Nixon against targets in North Vietnam. Operation Linebacker II was a resumption of the Linebacker bombings conducted from May to October, except that the emphasis would be on massive attacks by B-52s rather than fighter aircraft.

A large force of B-52s each carrying 27 or 42 750-pound bombs (depending on their configuration) unleashed 11 nights of air strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong with devastating results. The North Vietnamese fired most of their SAM missile inventory in defense, damaging 10 B-52s and shooting down 15. Privately, the administration knew that politically the bombings could not continue indefinitely; the operation was intended to convince South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu that the United States was willing to exert maximum pressure on Hanoi to defend the South.

The war was a legacy Nixon had inherited from his three immediate predecessors, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Nixon had previously tried to "end U.S. involvement in Vietnam," but saw the government of South Vietnam as uninterested in peace and taking the US defense forces for granted. The escalated bombing attacks were to serve as a demonstration of the destructiveness of the war, in the hopes of forcing the South Vietnamese government back to peace talks with North Vietnam.

Planning and Organization of B-52 Strikes

The United States had available a force of 207 B-52s deployed for use against North Vietnam, utilizing nearly half of its manned bomber nuclear deterrent in tactical operations. 54 bombers (all B-52D) were based at U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand, while 153 were based on Guam at Anderson Air Force Base (55 B-52D and 98 B-52G). The U-Tapao force had suffered the first loss of a B-52 to a Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) in November, and had had two others damaged by SAM hits.

The campaign was marked by top-down planning from Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters, Omaha, Nebraska. SAC's plan had all B-52s approaching Hanoi in three discrete waves per night, using identical approach paths at the same altitude. The aircraft would fly in loose three-plane formations known as "cells" for more effective electronic warfare (EW) jamming coverage. Once planes had dropped their bombs, they were to execute what SAC termed "post-target turns" (PTT) to the west. These turns had two unfortunate effects for the bombers:

• The B-52s would be turning into a strong headwind, slowing their ground speed by 100 knots (185 km/h) and prolonging their stay in the target area;

• The PTT would point the emitter antennas for the B-52s' EW systems away from the radars they were attempting to jam, degrading the effectiveness of the cells, as well as showing the largest radar cross-section to the missile guidance radars.

Additionally, the aircraft employed had significantly different EW capabilities; the B-52G carried fewer jammers and put out appreciably less power than the B-52Ds. Because of these factors the campaign would be ultimately be conducted in three phases as tactics and plans were altered.

First Phase

The first three missions were flown as planned by SAC on three consecutive nights beginning December 18. On the first night 129 bombers were launched, 87 of them from Guam, and three were lost, two B-52G's from Anderson and a B-52D from U-Tapao, all out of the first wave. 220 SAMs had been fired at the attackers, and only one of the crews had been rescued. On the second night 93 sorties were flown, and although 185 SAMs were fired and a number of bombers damaged, none were lost.

The combination of repetitive tactics, degraded EW systems, and limited jamming capability led to the loss of 6 aircraft on the third night, December 20, when 99 B-52s were sent. 2 B-52Gs and a B-52D were lost by both the first and third waves of the mission, with over 300 SAMs fired. Two crews were rescued. The wing commander at U-Tapao, Thailand sent a message to SAC headquarters sharply criticizing SAC's tactics and control of the operation. SAC turned planning over to Eighth Air Force headquarters on Guam. General Johnson, Eighth Air Force, Guam, then ensured that the U-Tapao commander, Brigider General Glenn R. Sullivan, the hero of the operaton who saved the lives of the of AF pilots of the operation with his moral courage, was not mentioned in the official history of the operation.

Interim Phase

Recognizing that the B-52Gs were vulnerable, SAC scaled down the next four missions to just 30 bombers each, using only D-models, while the overall tactics were reconsidered and additional jammers were installed in the B-52Gs. An immediate change in tactics was made by reducing separation between cells and the time between each reaching the target. Two bombers were shot down the first night of the truncated raids, but subsequent missions saw neither losses nor battle damage, followed by a 36-hour pause in the bombing over the Christmas holiday. 124 Arc light missions were also flown against NVA forces in South Vietnam. 22 crews were transferred from Guam to Thailand to bolster U-Tapao's crew strength.

Final Phase

On December 26, 1972, the revised tactics came into play: instead of multiple waves, all bombers would be in and out of the Hanoi area within 20 minutes, would approach Hanoi from multiple directions and at different altitudes, and would exit by varying routes. The steep post-target turns were eliminated. 10 targets in both the Hanoi and Haiphong areas were attacked with the bombers approaching in seven bomber streams, four of them off the Gulf of Tonkin. 78 bombers took off from Anderson in one time block, the largest single combat launch in SAC history, while 42 came from Thailand. In addition to the changes in tactics, the numbers of supporting fighters was also increased to more than 100 per mission, providing chaff drops, escort fighters, Wild Weasel SAM suppression, and Electronic countermeasures support.

The North Vietnamese air defense system, though still capable, was overwhelmed by the number of aircraft to track in a short period of time and a dense blanket of chaff that was laid down by Seventh Air Force fighter-bombers. Almost 950 SAMs had been fired previously, and the strain on the remaining inventory showed as only 68 were fired against the mission. Two of U-Tapao's B-52s turned back for mechanical reasons but their cells continued the mission. As a consequence a B-52 in each cell was lost, including one that crashlanded at base, killing most of its crew.

On the next night 60 bombers flew the mission, with some attacking SAM sites. One B-52 was destroyed while attacking one of the sites, and a second damaged so heavily that its crew ejected over Laos, where they were rescued. Two further nights of missions were flown, each by 60 bombers, and were virtually unopposed.

Summary and Reactions

A total of 741 B-52s were dispatched to bomb North Vietnam during Linebacker II, with 725 actually bombing. 15,000 tons of bombs were dropped on 18 industrial and 14 military targets (including 8 SAM sites). 212 Arclight missions were flown during the same period. 10 B-52s were shot down over North Vietnam, 4 others crashed in Laos or Thailand, and 1 crashed at base. 26 aircrew were rescued, 33 were killed or missing, and 33 became prisoners of war. 769 sorties were flown by the Air Force and 505 by the Navy and Marine Corps in support of the bombers. Approximately 700 additional attack sorties were flown by fighters of the Seventh Air Force and 228 by Task Force 77. 12 aircraft were lost (two F-111s, three F-4s, two A-7s, two A-6s, an EB-66, an HH-53 rescue helicopter, and an RA-5C), with 10 killed, 8 captured, and 11 aircrew rescued. Damage to North Vietnam's infrastructure was severe.

The bombings also were protested around the world, as people began to pressure their respective governments to officially condemn them. The United Kingdom, Italy and Sweden did so, but other European countries maintained their silence. Some elements in the Western media were alleged to have misreported the extent of damage done in Hanoi and Haiphong; thus, contributing to the anti-war unrest. Civilian casualties were comparatively low, with 1318 claimed by North Vietnamese government ^*.

Nixon claimed that the bombings were successful since the North Vietnamese immediately reopened talks. Hanoi denied that the bombings influenced their peace decision because the United States agreed to let the NVA remained in South Vietnam and occupied the territories they've captured. The Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 27, 1973, ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam and completing the program of Vietnamization of the war.

Other opinions about the effect of the bombings on the government of North Vietnam included:

• A belief that the North Vietnamese were afraid of an even larger air campaign against North Vietnam's dikes or even the use of nuclear weapons, or
• A belief that China would not tolerate either nuclear attacks nor a U.S. ground forces invasion of North Vietnam without entering the war against the United States. Avoiding conflict with China was an important goal of the U.S. government. This belief held that Nixon's nuclear threats were just posturing. He called it the madman theory, saying "I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war."

After the withdrawal of the United States from the war, the peace accords between North and South Vietnam ultimately broke down. The NVA invaded South Vietnam in 1975, subjecting South Vietnam to communist rule.

U.S. Air Order of Battle

• Task Force 77

USS America , Carrier Air Wing 8 (F-4, A-6, A-7)

USS Enterprise , Carrier Air Wing 14 (F-4, A-6, A-7)

USS Midway , Carrier Air Wing 5 (F-4, A-7)

USS Oriskany , Carrier Air Wing 19 (F-8, A-7)

USS Ranger , Carrier Air Wing 2 (F-4, A-6, A-7)

USS Saratoga , Carrier Air Wing 3 (F-4, -6, A-7)

• Seventh Air Force

8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Ubon RTAFB, Thailand (F-4)

+two squadrons from 4th TFW, Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina

+one squadron from 33rd TFW, Eglin AFB, Florida

354th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat RTAFB, Thailand (A-7)

388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat RTAFB, Thailand (F-4, F-105G)

432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udon RTAFB, Thailand (F-4, RF-4)

+two squadrons from 366h TFW after its departure from Danang AB, Vietnam

474th Tactical Fighter Wing, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand (F-111)

43d Strategic Wing, Anderson AFB, Guam (B-52D)

72d Strategic Wing (Provisional), Anderson AFB, Guam (B-52G)

307th Strategic Wing, U Tapao RTAFB, Thailand (B-52D)

References

• Francillon, René J, Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club US Carrier Operations off Vietnam, (1988) ISBN 0-87021-696-1
• Nordeen, Lon, Air Warfare in the Missile Age, (1985) ISBN 158834083X
• McCarthy, Brig.Gen. James R. and Allison, Lt.Col. George B., Linebacker II: View from the Rock (Washington, 1979), Air Force Monograph Series

Battles and operations of the Vietnam War