| Nix v. Hedden
|
Supreme Court of the United States
Submitted April 24, 1893
| Decided May 10, 1893
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| Full case name:
| John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and Frank W. Nix v. Edward L. Hedden, Collector of the Port of New York
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| Citations:
| 149 U.S. 304; 13 S. Ct. 881; 37 L. Ed. 745; 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2303
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| Prior history:
| Judgment for defendant, 39 F. 109 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1889)
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| Subsequent history:
| None
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| Holding
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| Tomatoes are "vegetables" and not "fruit" within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1883 based on the common meaning of those words.
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| Court membership
|
|
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| Case opinions
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|
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| Majority by: Gray
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| Joined by: unanimous court
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| Laws applied
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| Tariff Act of 1883
|
Nix v. Hedden,
149 U.S. 304 (
1893), was a case in which the
United States Supreme Court addressed whether a
tomato was classified as a
fruit or a
vegetable under the
Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, which required a tax to be paid on imported vegetables, but not fruit. The case was filed as an action by John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and Frank W. Nix against Edward L. Hedden, collector of the port of
New York, to recover back duties paid under protest.
Botanically a tomato is a fruit. However, the court unanimously ruled in favor of the defendant, that the Tariff Act used the ordinary meaning of the words "fruit" and "vegetable"—where a tomato is classified as a vegetable—not the technical botanical meaning.
The case
At the trial the
plaintiff's counsel, after reading in
evidence definitions of the words 'fruit' and 'vegetables' from
Webster's Dictionary,
Worcester's Dictionary, and the
Imperial Dictionary, called two
witnesses, who had been for 30 years in the business of selling fruit and vegetables, and asked them, after hearing these definitions, to say whether these words had "any special meaning in
trade or
commerce, different from those read."
During testimony, one witness testified that in regard to the dictionary definition:
- "dictionary does not classify all things there, but they are correct as far as they go. It does not take all kinds of fruit or vegetables; it takes a portion of them. I think the words 'fruit' and 'vegetable' have the same meaning in trade today that they had on March 1, 1883. I understand that the term 'fruit' is applied in trade only to such plants or parts of plants as contain the seeds. There are more vegetables than those in the enumeration given in Webster's Dictionary under the term 'vegetable,' as 'cabbage, cauliflower, turnips, potatoes, peas, beans, and the like,' probably covered by the words 'and the like.'" Another witness testified that "I don't think the term 'fruit' or the term 'vegetables' had, in March 1883, and prior thereto, any special meaning in trade and commerce in this country different from that which I have read here from the dictionaries."
[149 U.S. at 305.]
Both the plaintiff's counsel and the defendant's counsel made use of the dictionaries. The plaintiff's counsel read in evidence from the same dictionaries the definitions of the word tomato, while the defendant's counsel then read in evidence from Webster's Dictionary the definitions of the words pea, egg plant, cucumber, squash, and pepper. Countering this, the plaintiff then read in evidence from Webster's and Worcester's dictionaries the definitions of potato, turnip, parsnip, cauliflower, cabbage, carrot and bean.
The Court's decision
The court
unanimously decided in favor of the defense and found that the tomato was classified as a vegetable, based on the ways in which it is used, and the popular perception to this end. Justice
Gray in his decision stated that:
"The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word 'fruit' as the seed of plants, or that part of plants which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are 'fruit,' as distinguished from 'vegetables,' in common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act."
Justice Gray cited several different supreme court cases (
Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37,
42, and
Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 216) and stated that when words have acquired any special meaning in trade or commerce the ordinary meaning must be used by the court. In this case dictionaries cannot be admitted as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. Gray acknowledged that,
botanically, tomatoes are classified as a "fruit of the
vine", nevertheless they are seen as vegetables because they were usually eaten as a main course instead of being eaten as a
dessert. In making his decision, Justice Gray mentioned another case where it had been claimed that
beans were
seeds — Justice
Bradley, in
Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414, similarly found that though a bean is botanically a seed, in
common parlance a bean is seen as a vegetable.
Subsequent history
Nix has been cited in three Supreme Court decisions as a precedent for court interpretation of common meanings, especially dictionary definitions. (
Sonn v. Maggone, ;
Saltonstall v. Weibusch & Hilger, ; and
Cadwalder v. Zeh, ). Additionally, in
JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), a case unrelated to
Nix aside from the shared focus on tomatoes, a judge wrote the following paragraph citing the case:
- "In common parlance tomatoes are vegetables, as the Supreme Court observed long ago, see Nix v. Hedden 149 U.S. 304, 307, 13 S.Ct. 881, 882, 37 L.Ed. 745 (1893), although botanically speaking they are actually a fruit. 26 Encyclopedia Americana 832 (Int'l. ed. 1981). Regardless of classification, people have been enjoying tomatoes for centuries, even Mr. Pickwick, as Dickens relates, ate his chops in 'tomata' sauce."
See also
Notes
References
External links
United States Supreme Court cases | 1893 in law
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