Morgenthau Plan

The Morgenthau Plan was a plan for the occupation of Germany after the Second World War that advocated harsh measures that would ensure that Germany could never wage war again. This was to be achieved in three steps.

Germany was to be partitioned into two independent states.
Germany's main centres of mining and industry, including the Saar area, the Ruhr area and Upper Silesia were to be Internationalised or annexed by neighbouring nations.
All heavy industry was to be dismantled or otherwise destroyed.

The plan was proposed by American Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

A version of the plan, focused on turning Germany into "a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character" was signed by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference.

President Roosevelt then gradually pulled back from this extreme position, but had at the time of his death not made up his mind as to the future of Germany. With the death of the president the plan itself never took effect, but as its ideas permeated much of American thinking, especially in secretary Morgenthau's Treasury and the War Department, it did lead to a number of offshoots.

Most notable amongst these offshoots are the Potsdam Conference, Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (April 1945 - July 1947) , and the industrial plans for Germany.

The first of the latter, signed in 1946, stated that German heavy industry was to be lowered to 50% of its 1938 levels by the destruction of 1,500 manufacturing plantsHenry C. Wallich. Mainsprings of the German Revival (1955) pg. 348.

The problems brought on by these types of policies were soon apparent. Germany had long been the industrial giant of Europe, and its poverty held back the general European recovery. The continued scarcity in Germany also led to considerable expenses for the occupying powers, which were obligated to try and make up the most important shortfalls. In view of the continued poverty and famine in Europe, and with the Cold War starting, it was by 1947 apparent that a change of policy was required.

The most notable example of this change was a plan established by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, the "European Recovery Program", better known as the Marshall Plan, which in a slightly less generous form eventually was extended to also include the newly formed West Germany.

Text of the Morgenthau Plan

At a conference between the President and Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar.

The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical, and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighbouring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under some body under the world organization which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primary agricultural and pastoral in its character.

Source: United States Government Printing Office, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, (Washington, 1967) volume 1, pp. 620-621.''

Prime Minister Winston Churchill cabled news of the agreement to Clement Attlee, his deputy in London, and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt advised the Secretaries of State and War of his approval in a memo dated September 15, 1944.

Roosevelt's support for the plan

Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau Jr. convinced Roosevelt to write to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson saying that a U.S. occupation policy which anticipated that "Germany is to be restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium" was excessively lenient. A better policy would have the Germans "fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens" so "they will remember that experience the rest of their lives." Cordell Hull, Memories, (New York: 1948) volume II, pp. 1602 - 1603. Morgenthau was the only Cabinet member invited to participate in the second Quebec Conference during which the Plan was agreed to.

Roosevelt's motivations for agreeing to Morgenthau's proposal may be attributed to his desire to be on good terms with Stalin and to a personal conviction that Germany must be treated harshly. In an August 26, 1944 letter to Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, Roosevelt wrote that "There are two schools of thought, those who would be altruistic in regard to the Germans, hoping by loving kindness to make them Christians again - and those who would adopt a much 'tougher' attitude. Most decidedly I belong to the latter school, for though I am not bloodthirsty, I want the Germans to know that this time at least they have definitely lost the war." The Roosevelt Letters, volume III: 1928 - 1945, London, 1952. Roosevelt is also quoted as saying to Morgenthau that "We have got to be tough with the Germany and I mean the German people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past" Blum, p. 342. At the Tehran Conference in late 1943 Stalin had proposed that at least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000 German officers should be murdered. Roosevelt's son, Elliot, enthusiastically agreed. The President remarked that perhaps 49,000 should be enoughUS Department of State, The Conference at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington: 1961) p. 602. When Churchill became enraged at these comments, Stalin quickly assured him that they were joking Michael Beschloss, "The Conquerors". Roosevelt was presumably joking, but at the Yalta Conference the President said that he was feeling "very much more bloodthirsty towards Germany" than earlier and indicated that he hoped Stalin would again "propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German army"US Department of State, The Yalta Conference, 1945 (Washington: 1961), Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, Feb 4 1945, Bohlen Minutes, pp. 566-573.

The Morgenthau plan did face at least some mild level of opposition in Roosevelt's government, as evidenced by this excerpt of a note to the president from Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War. dated September 5, 1944. ^*

We contemplate the transfer from Germany of ownership of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Alsace' and Lorraine (each of them except the first containing raw materials of importance) together with the imposition of general economic controls. We also are considering the wisdom of a possible partition of Germany into north and south sections, as well as the creation of an internationalized State in the Ruhr. With such precautions, or indeed with only some of them, it certainly should not be necessary for us to obliterate all industrial productivity in the Ruhr area, in order to preclude its future misuse.

Nor can I agree that it should be one of our purposes to hold the German population "to a subsistence level" if this means the edge of poverty.

Churchill's support for the plan

Churchill was not inclined to support the proposal, saying "England would be chained to a dead body". Roosevelt reminded Churchill of Stalin's comments at the Tehran Conference, and asked "Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned in the manufacture of armament." Memorandum by Harry Dexter White for the Secretary of the Treasury, Sept 25 1944, Memorandum by the Deputy Directory of the Office of European Affairs for the Secretary of State, Sept 20 1944. The meeting broke up on Churchill's disagreement but Roosevelt suggested that Morgenthau and White continue to discuss with Lord Cherwell, Churchill's personal assistant.

Lord Cherwell has been described as having "an almost pathological hatred for Nazi Germany, and an almost medieval desire for revenge was a part of his character" John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, "The Semblance of Peace" (London: 1972), p. 179. Morgenthau is quoted as saying to his staff that "I can't overemphasize how helpful Lord Cherwell was because he could advise how to handle Churchill"Blum, p. 373. In any case, Cherwell was able to persuade Churchill to change his mind. Churchill later said that "At first I was violently opposed to the idea. But the President and Mr Morgenthau - from whom we had much to ask - were so insistent that in the end we agreed to consider it"Churchill, "The Tide of Victory", (London: 1954), pp. 138-139.

Some have read into the clause "from whom we had much to ask" that Churchill was bought off, and note a September 15 memo from Roosevelt to Hull stating that "Morgenthau has presented at Quebec, in conjunction with his plan for Germany, a proposal of credits to Britain totalling six and half billion dollars." Hull's comment on this was that "this might suggest to some the quid pro quo with which the Secretary of the Treasury was able to get Mr Churchill's adherence to his cataclysmic plan for Germany" Hull, "Memoirs", pp. 1613-1614.

At Quebec White made sure that Lord Cherwell understood that economic aid to Britain was dependent on British approval of the plan. During the signing of the plan, which coincided with the signing of a loan agreement, President Roosevelt proposed that they sign the plan first. This prompted Churchil to exclaim: "What do you want me to do? Get on my hind legs and beg like Fala?"Time Magazine, Nov. 23, 1953 INVESTIGATIONS One Man's Greed

An excerpt from the minutes of the Quebec meeting, taken down by George M. Elsey Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve, and duty officer, White House Map Room, 1941-46, reads as follows: ^*

"And the President and the Prime Minister agreed on a policy towards Germany."

"This program for eliminating the warmaking industries in the Ruhr and the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character. The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement on this program."

Rejection of the plan

Anthony Eden expressed his strong opposition to the plan and, with the support of some others, was able to get the Morgenthau Plan set aside in Britain. In the US, Hull argued that nothing would be left to Germany but land and only 60% of the Germans could live off the land, meaning 40% of the population would die. Stimson expressed his opposition even more forcefully to Roosevelt. According to Stimson, the President grinned and "looked naughty", before finally saying that he just wanted to help Britain get a share of the Ruhr and denied that he intended to deindustrialize Germany. Stimson replied, "Mr President, I don't like you to dissemble to me" and read back to Roosevelt what he had signed. Struck by this, Roosevelt said he had "no idea how he could have initialled this" Elting E. Morrison quoting Stimson's October 3 1944 diary, "Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson" (Boston, 1960) p. 609.

Wartime Consequences

Drew Pearson publicized the plan on September 21, although Pearson himself was sympathetic to it. More critical stories in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal quickly followed. Joseph Goebbels' propaganda machine made extensive use of the Morgenthau Plan, and General George Marshall complained to Morgenthau that German resistance had strengthened. Lt Col John Boettiger said the Morgenthau Plan was "worth thirty divisions to the Germans"Report on the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 41ff. On December 11, 1944 President Roosevelt was given a translated synopsis of a recent article in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

So far, the Allies have not offered the opposition any serious encouragement. On the contrary, they have again and again welded together the people and the Nazis by statements published, either out of indifference or with a purpose. To take a recent example, the Morgenthau plan gave Dr. Goebbels the best possible chance. He was able to prove to his countrymen, in black and white, that the enemy planned the enslavement of Germany.

The conviction that Germany had nothing to expect from defeat but oppresion and exploitation still prevails, and that accounts for the fact that the Germans continue to fight. It is not a question of a regime, but of the homeland itself, and to save that, every German is bound to obey the call, whether he be Nazi or member of the opposition. ^*

JCS 1067

Although the Morgenthau Plan per se was effectively shelved, Morgenthau was nonetheless able to wield considerable influence over Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067. JCS 1067 was a basis for US Occupation policy until July 1947, and like the Morgenthau Plan, was intended to reduce German living standards. The production of oil, rubber, merchant ships, and aircraft were prohibited. Occupation forces were not to assist with economic development apart from the agricultural sector. Lewis Douglas, chief advisor to General Lucius Clay, US High Commissioner, denounced the directive saying, "This thing was assembled by economic idiots. It makes no sense to forbid the most skilled workers in Europe from producing as much as they can in a continent that is desperately short of everything"Robert Murphy, "Diplomat Among Warriors", (London: 1964) p. 251. In his 1950 book "Decision in Germany" Clay said that "It seemed obvious to us even then that Germany would starve unless it could produce for export and that immediate steps would have to be taken to revive industrial production" Clay Decision in Germany 1950 p. 18. Douglas went to Washington in the hopes of having the directive revised but was unable to do so.

On March 20, 1945 President Roosevelt was warned that the JCS 1067 was not workable, it would let the Germans "stew in their own juice". Roosevelts response was "Let them have soup kitchens! Let their economy sink!". Asked if he wanted the German people to starve he replied; "Why not?".Michael R. Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945, pg. 196.

On May 10, 1945 Truman signed the JCS 1067. Morgenthau told his staff that it was a big day for the Treasury, and that he hoped that someone doesn’t recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan.Michael R. Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945, pg. 233.

E. Allan Lightner, Jr. Assistant Chief, 1945-47, and Associate Chief, 1947-48, of the Central European Affairs Division, Department of State summed it up as follows: ^*

As early as the Quebec Conference he President had bought Secretary J. Morgenthau's ideas: The Morgenthau Plan -- to do everything possible to prevent the Germans from regaining the strength ever again to wage war, by requiring them to exist on an agrarian economy. Then gradually the President pulled back from that extreme position. Yet those ideas permeated much of American thinking, especially in the War Department, right up to the time of Secretary F. Byrnes' important Stuttgart speech in of 1946. They were reflected in the basic directive for the occupation of Germany, which was a kind of Bible for all that was done during the early days of the occupation, the paper known as JSC-1067. They also affected Roosevelt's thinking on the question of whether to split up Germany.

During the first two years of Allied occupation the Trasury program of industrial dismantlement of Germany was vigorously pursued by american officials John Backer, Priming the German economy- American occupation policies 1945-1948 p.200 . As a consequence of these policies the economic reconstruction of Europe was delayed by several years. Vladimir Petrov, Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II.1967 p. 164.

Implementation

Some of the Morgenthau Plan was implemented, and some came very close to being implemented. The Morgenthau Plan spawned the JCS-1067which contained the ideas of making Germany a "Pastoral State". This concept's name was later changed to become "level of industry", where Germany's production was to be severely limited but not completely eliminated. No new locomotives were to be built until 1949, most industries were to have their production halved. Automobile production was to be set at 10% of its ^*

On February 2, 1946, a dispatch from Berlin reported:

'Some progress has been made in converting Germany to an agricultural and light industry economy, said Brigadier General William H. Draper, Jr., chief of the American Economics Division, who emphasized that there was general agreement on that plan.
He explained that Germany’s future industrial and economic pattern was being drawn for a population of 66,500,000. On that basis, he said, the nation will need large imports of food and raw materials to maintain a minimum standard of living.
General agreement, he continued, had been reached on the types of German exports-coal, coke, electrical equipment, leather goods, beer, wines, spirits, toys, musical instruments, textiles and apparel-to take the place of the heavy industrial products which formed most of Germany’s pre-war exports.' James Stewart Martin. All Honorable Men (1950) pg. 191.

Morgenthau had written a book outlining the full Morgenthau Plan, Germany is Our Problem. General Eisenhower, then U.S. Military Governor in occupied Germany, supported the plan and in November 1945 he approved the distribution of one thousand free copies of the book to American military officials in Germany.Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, p.422. By February 28, 1947 it was estimated that 4,160,000 German former prisoners of war, by General Eisenhower relabeled as Disarmed Enemy Forces in order to negate the Geneva convention, were used as forced labor in work camps outside Germany: 3,000,000 in Russia, 750,000 in France, 400,000 in Britain and 10,000 in Belgium. ^* Meanwhile in Germany large parts of the population were starving at a time when the "nutritional condition in those countries is nearly pre-war normal".[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=11&documentid=24&documentdate=1947-02-28&studycollectionid=mp&nav=OK All armaments plants, included some that could have been converted to civilian operation, were dismantled or destroyed. A large proportion of operational civilian plants were dismantled and transported to the victorious nations, mainly France and Russia.

'In addition to the above courses of action, there have been general policies of destruction or limitation of possible peaceful productivity under the headings of "pastoral state" and "war potential." The original of these policies apparently expressed on September 15, 1944, at Quebec, aimed at:
"converting Germany into a country principally agricultural and pastoral,"
and included,
"the industries of the Ruhr and the Saar would therefore be put out of action, closed down...."'

Draft, The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria, Report 3, March, 1947; OF 950B: Economic Mission as to Food…; Truman Papers.

As late as March 1947 there were still active plans to let France annex the Ruhr just as eastern Prussia and Silesia had been annexed by Russia and Poland, or at a minimum remove it from Germany.

"The Ruhr - The Times' article and editorial on the breach in the US ranks on the subject of the Ruhr were accurate, and the latter excellent. I have been disturbed over the arena in which the debate has been carried out. Clay and Draper claim that Germany will go communist shortly after any proposal to infringe on its sovereignty over the Ruhr is carried out;".

Ruhr Delegation of the United States of America, Council of Foreign Ministers American Embassy Moscow, March 24, 1947

The Saar, another important source of coal and industry for Germany, was likewise to be lost by the Germans. It was cut out from Germany and its resources put under French control. In 1955, the French, under pressure from West Germany and her newfound allies, held a plebiscite in the Saar Protectorate on the question of reunification or independence. Reunification won overwhelmingly, and on January 1, 1957, Saarland rejoined West Germany.

As Germany was allowed no airplane production nor any shipbuilding capacity to supply a merchant navy, all facilities of this type were destroyed over a period of several years. A typical example of this activity by the allies was the Bloehm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg, where explosive demolition was still taking place as late as 1949. Everything that could not be dismantled was blown up or otherwise destroyed. A small-scale attempt to revive the company in 1948 ended with the owners and a number of employees being thrown in jail by the British. It was not until 1953 that the situation gradually started to improve for the Bloehm & Voss, thanks in part to repeated pleas by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to the Allied High Commissioners. B&V Chronology B&V official history

Over a period of years American policy eventually started to change away from this policy of industrial destruction. The main turning point was the speech[http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga4-460906.htm held in Stuttgart by the United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on September 6, 1946.

Reports such as this, dated March 3, 1947, also argued for a change of policy, among other things through speaking frankly of the expected consequences.

'There are several illusions in all this "war potential" attitude.
a. There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a "pastoral state". It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it. This would approximately reduce Germany to the density of the population of France.
...' ^*

By 1949, when the Marshall Plan was extended to cover the western half of Germany, the Morgenthau Plan and its effects had started to be deliberately forgotten and suppressed, especially by its former proponents.

Morgenthau's 'top secret' plan

The Plan signed by Roosevelt and Churchill was rather milder than what Morgenthau had devised. In his 'Top Secret' labelled "Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III", Morgenthau called for a variety of measures besides the dismantling of infrastructure and a 20 year supression of industrial activity, such as forced labour and university closures. Germany was to be divided into two separate states: a northern and a southern state. The whole of western Germany, except the south, would have been made into an international zone which would have included areas on the coast of the Baltic Sea and the financially important regions along the Rhine and Ruhr rivers. The Saar was to go to France.

Notes

External links

Document Collections

Roosevelt Presidential Library collection relating to Germany (Jan. 1944 - Sept. 1944), (Oct. 1944 - Oct. 1945)
Marshal Plan Truman Presidential Library scans of documents dated 1946 onwards, most with relevance to the situation in the German zones of occupation.
European Union online collection of historical documents (requires Flash Player)
History of German-American Relations U.S. Embassy in Germany, collection.
Small collection at TeachingAmericanHistory.org, Ashland University.

Documents

The original Morgenthau Plan from 1944 The plan signed by Roosevelt and Churchill was a modified version of this.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 JCS 1067
United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes Stuttgart speech, September 6, 1946 The speech was according to General Clay based on the letter Clay had sent Byrner urging him to come to Stuttgart.
Former U.S. President Herbert Hoover's 1947 factfinding mission to Germany. (Report No.1), (Report No.3)
Dismantling list for the western Allied forces (17 October 1947, Part of the second Industrial Plan, "level of industry agreement") (requires Flash Player)
Letter from Konrad Adenauer to Robert Schuman (26 July 1949) Warning him of the consequences of the dismantling policy. (requires Flash Player)
Letter from Ernest Bevin to Robert Schuman (30 October 1949) British and French foreign ministers. Bevin argues that they need to reconsider the Allies' dismantling policy in the occupied zones (requires Flash Player)
French proposal regarding the detachment of German industrial regions September 8, 1945 (requires Flash Player)
Closing The Ring Winston Churchill; Excerpt on the Teheran conference, from his memoirs. (requires Flash Player)
Speaking Frankly James F. Byrnes; Excerpt on the Yalta conference, from his memoirs. (requires Flash Player)
Triumph and Tragedy Winston Churchill; Excerpt on the Yalta conference, from his memoirs. (requires Flash Player)

Images

Morgenthau Plan Map Good quality but German text
Morgenthau Plan Map Poor quality but probably a scan of the original
Picture of demonstration against dismantling (7 June 1949) Workers in the Ruhr demonstrate against the dismantling of their factories by the Allied forces of occupation. (requires Flash Player)
Picture: dismantling the Iron and Steel Industry ‘We want to work, we will help you to rebuild Europe' Workers at dismantled plant protest. (requires Flash Player)
Picture: 12,000 factory workers demonstrate against the dismantling of German industry (19 August 1949) (requires Flash Player)

Interviews

General Lucius D. Clay Deputy to General Eisenhower, 1945; deputy military governor, Germany (U.S.) 1946; commander in chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and military governor, U.S. Zone, Germany, 1947-49; retired 1949.
General William H. Draper Jr. Chief, Economics Division, Control Council for Germany, 1945-46; Military Government Adviser to the Secretary of State, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1947; Under Secretary of War, 1947; Under Secretary of the Army, 1947-49;
James W. Riddleberger (Part 1), (Part 2) Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, 1944-47; counsellor of embassy, and chief, political section, American Military Government, Berlin, Germany, 1947-50
E. Allan Lightner, Jr. Assistant Chief, 1945-47, and Associate Chief, 1947-48, of the Central European Affairs Division, Department of State
Charles P. Kindleberger Chief, Division German and Austrian Economic Affairs, Department of State, Washington, 1945-48
Gunther Harkort Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), 1949-52.
Geoffrey W. Lewis With Department of State, 1946-70
J. Burke Knapp Adviser on German economic affairs, U.S. Department of State and German Military Government, 1944-45
John D. Hickerson Director for European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1947-49
Joseph D. Coppock Economic adviser, International Trade Policy, Department of State, 1945-53
Stanley Andrews 1943-46; advisor to Secretary of Agriculture, 1947; Chief of Food, Agriculture and Forestry Division of the American-British Control Group in Germany

Time Magazine articles

Dismember or Dismantle Feb. 21, 1944
The Policy of Hate Oct. 2, 1944
The Battle for Peace Terms Oct. 9, 1944
The Price to Pay Apr. 2, 1945
Housekeeping in Hell May 14, 1945
Take It Away Jul. 30, 1945
Morgenthau's Hope Oct. 15, 1945
Journey to Stuttgart Sep. 16, 1946
Peace This Winter Dec. 2, 1946
Pas de Pagaille! Jul. 28, 1947
Firing Commences Aug. 11, 1947
Faceless Crisis Apr. 4, 1949
Topside Teammates Jan. 28, 1952
A Spy in the Treasury Nov. 16, 1953
The Peace Was Lost By Ignoring Justice And the Facts of Life Mar. 28, 1955
Toward a Lost Peace Jan. 9, 1956
Vengeance v. Vision Sep. 22, 1967

Se also

World War II | World War II politics | Aftermath of World War II | History of Germany | Economic history

Plan Morgenthau | Morgenthau-Plan | Piano Morgenthau | תוכנית מורגנטאו

Text of the Morgenthau Plan

Roosevelt's support for the plan

Churchill's support for the plan

Rejection of the plan

Wartime Consequences

Suggested 1944 post-surrender program for Germany

JCS 1067

Implementation

Morgenthau's 'top secret' plan

Notes

Further reading

Primary sources

External links

Document Collections

Documents

Images

Interviews

Time Magazine articles

Se also

Gourt Home::Gourt :: Morgenthau Plan

Text of the Morgenthau Plan

Roosevelt's support for the plan

Churchill's support for the plan

Rejection of the plan

Wartime Consequences

Suggested 1944 post-surrender program for Germany

JCS 1067

Implementation

Morgenthau's 'top secret' plan

Notes

Further reading

Primary sources

External links

Document Collections

Documents

Images

Interviews

Time Magazine articles

Se also