The McDonnell Douglas DC-10 is a three-engined medium to long-range airliner, with two engines mounted on underwing pylons and a third engine at the base of the vertical stabilizer. The model was a successor to the company's DC-8 for long-range operations, and competed in the same markets as the Airbus A300, Boeing 747 "jumbo jet", and the physically similar Lockheed L-1011 TriStar. 386 DC-10s were delivered to airlines and 60 were built for the U.S. Air Force as air-to-air refueling tankers, designated the KC-10 Extender. Boeing Corp. Boeing:History - McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (Accessed Feb. 28, 2006) The DC-10 was succeeded by the related McDonnell Douglas MD-11 which entered service in 1990.
The DC-10 first flew on August 29 1970 and entered commercial service in 1971, nearly a year before the Lockheed TriStar (which was built to a similar specification). The launch customers for the DC-10 were United and American Airlines. Both were Series 10s.
The first DC-10 version was the "domestic" series 10 with a range of 3800 statute miles (6,112 km). The series 30 had a typical load range of 6,220 statute miles (10,010 km) or a maximum payload range of 7,410 km. The series 40 (mostly ordered by Northwest Orient and Japan Airlines) had a typical load range of 5750 statute miles (9,265 km) or a maximum payload range of 7,520 km. The series 40 was powered by Pratt & Whitney engines, whereas the series 10 and 30 engines were from General Electric. One of the main visible differences between the models is that the series 10 has three sets of landing gear (one front and two main) while the series 30 and 40 have four (3 mains), as an extra 2-wheel main landing gear (which extends from the center of the fuselage) was added to compensate for the extra weight.
The 446th and final DC-10 rolled off the production line in December 1988 and was delivered to Nigeria Airways in early 1989.
Despite its troubled beginnings, the DC-10 ultimately proved — and continues to be — a reliable aircraft, much loved by engineers and pilots. The original DC-10-10's notorious safety record continually improved as design flaws were ironed out and fleet hours increased. In fact, the DC-10's lifetime safety record as of 2003 is comparable to similar second generation passenger jets. Increased inspections and modifications made the DC-10 one of the safest aircraft to travel on latterly. Nonetheless, because of its poor record in the 1970s and 1980s, the DC-10 acquired an unfavorable reputation [http://www.anchoragepress.com/newarchives/feature1vol12ed43.html.
The DC-10 was designed with cargo doors that opened outward instead of inward, as inward opening "plug-type" doors used on smaller pressurized aircraft are not well-suited to the larger openings into the cargo hold necessitated by the increased baggage load of a jumbo jet. Outward opening doors rely on a heavy locking mechanism to secure the door against the outward force caused by the pressurization of the fuselage. In the event that the door lock malfunctioned, there was potential for catastrophic blow-out of the whole door. This sort of depressurization caused a failure of the rear floor of the passenger cabin because vents were not present to rapidly equalize the pressure between the cargo and passenger compartments. Cables running from the flight deck to the rear control surfaces are embedded in the floor frame and a collapse would lead to a compromise of the flight deck's ability to control the plane.
This problem was first identified in 1972, when American Airlines Flight 96 lost its aft cargo door after takeoff from Detroit, but fortunately the crew were able to perform an emergency landing with no further incident. Before Flight 96 took off, an airport employee had violently forced the door shut, weakening the locking pin and causing the door to subsequently blow-out as the plane reached altitude. McDonnell Douglas attempted to place the blame on the employee, whom they described as "illiterate", and deflected criticism of the aircraft design itself.
Although many carriers voluntarily modified the cargo doors and re-trained their ground crews, there was not yet a mandatory redesign of the system. Severe design problems still persisted with the aircraft's cargo doors, however. Two years after the American Airlines incident, an almost identical cargo door blow-out befell Turkish Airlines Flight 981, which crashed into a forest shortly after leaving Orly Airport in Paris on March 3, 1974. 346 people were killed in one of the worst aviation disasters of the twentieth century. The circumstances surrounding this crash were similar to those surrounding the previous accident; however, a modified seating configuration on the Turkish aircraft exacerbated the effects of decompression which caused the floor of the aircraft to collapse into the cargo bay. Control cables running through the floor of the plane were severed when the floor collapsed and this rendered the aircraft uncontrollable. In the aftermath of this crash, all DC-10s underwent a mandatory door redesign.
In 1979, with the cargo door issues resolved, DC-10s (all series) around the world were grounded following the crash of American Airlines Flight 191, which killed 273 people. Flight 191 lost its number one wing engine after taking off from O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, USA, May 25 1979. The engine loss damaged the aircraft's lift enhancement system on that wing and also damaged warning systems, causing it to lose control. As the engine separated upwards, it ripped through the leading edge of the wing, rupturing hydraulic lines causing the port wing slats to retract. Losing lift on one side, the plane rolled left and crashed before the flight crew could recover.
The United States National Transportation Safety Board officials discovered that a maintenance procedure was the culprit: American Airlines mechanics had removed the engine and its pylon at the same time (rather than removing the engine from the pylon then the pylon from the wing, as recommended by McDonnell Douglas), using a forklift, and the forklift operator had inadvertently cracked the pylon in the process. The short-cut procedure, thought to save several man hours on maintenance, was not approved by McDonnell Douglas, but most major airlines used it. Although McDonnell Douglas was not at fault for the pylon separation, it redesigned the DC-10 to allow more redundancies in the hydraulic systems.
The Chicago incident also highlighted a deficiency in the DC-10 design, due to its lack of locking flap mechanisms that are designed to maintain their position in the event of a hydraulic or pneumatic failure. Other widebody aircraft of the day carried such a feature, but it was omitted from the DC-10.
In 1979, an Air New Zealand DC-10-30 flew into Mount Erebus in Antarctica during a sight-seeing trip. All 257 on board Air New Zealand Flight 901 were killed. The accident was caused by complex factors, centred around an un-announced flight plan change, and not related to the airworthiness of the aircraft.
Perhaps the most infamous instance of a DC-10 crash was the Flight 232 disaster at Sioux City, IA, USA, in 1989. After the #2 engine (tail engine) suffered an uncontained fan disk failure in flight, rupturing critical hydraulic lines, the crew, lead by an unrostered senior pilot flying as a passenger, performed an emergency landing by varying remaining engine power as they had no hydraulic power to the controls. Although the aircraft was completely destroyed and with the loss of many lives, over half of the passengers survived.
The Sioux City crash concerned investigators because the total loss of hydraulic pressure aboard the DC-10 was considered nearly impossible. The design, however, had lines from all three independent and redundant hydraulic systems in close proximity, directly beneath the #2 (tail) engine. Debris from the #2 fan disk separation failure penetrated all three lines resulting in total loss of control to the elevators, ailerons and the rudder.
Eventually, years later, the MD-11, a successor of the DC-10, built on a similar design, incorporated hydraulic fuses to prevent such catastrophic loss of control in event of a hydraulic failure.
The Air France Concorde crash of 2000 was attributed to a fragment of titanium metal that fell from a DC-10 that had taken off some four minutes earlier. Continental Airlines, the operator of the DC-10 in question, quickly retired its entire fleet of DC-10s immediately afterward.
McDonnell Douglas later produced a larger variant called the MD-11. The MD-11 used newer engines, plus a glass cockpit, which eliminated the need for the flight engineer position. The MD-11 entered service in 1991. In addition, some DC-10s have been upgraded by Boeing to the so-called MD-10. The MD-10 has an upgraded cockpit giving it certain benefits of the more modern MD-11 cockpit, and more importantly, a common type rating. This allows companies such as Federal Express, which operate both the MD-10 and MD-11, to have a common pilot pool for both aircraft.
The Royal Netherlands Air Force has converted the aircraft to KDC-10 flying tankers. The Orbis International use a DC-10 as flying eye hospital.
"The DC10 is a reliable airplane, fun to fly, roomy and quiet, kind of like flying an old Cadillac Fleetwood. We're sad to see an old friend go. When we landed them in Europe, guys from other airlines would come over and look at them. You don't see them much anymore. They're kind of antiques."
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