Maryland Campaign

The Maryland Campaign, or the Antietam Campaign, of September 1862 is widely considered one of the major turning points of the American Civil War. Confederate General Robert E. Lee's first invasion of the North was repulsed by Major General George B. McClellan and the Army of the Potomac, who moved to intercept Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia and eventually attacked it near Sharpsburg, Maryland. The resulting Battle of Antietam was the bloodiest single-day battle in American history.

Background and initial movements

The year of 1862 started out well for Union forces in the Eastern Theater. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac had invaded the Virginia Peninsula during the Peninsula Campaign and, by June, stood only a few miles outside the Confederate capital at Richmond. But, when Robert E. Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862, fortunes reversed. Lee fought McClellan aggressively in the Seven Days Battles, as "Little Mac" lost his nerve and his army retreated down the Peninsula. Lee then conducted the Northern Virginia Campaign, in which he outmaneuvered and defeated John Pope and his Army of Virginia, most significantly at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Lee's Maryland Campaign can be considered the concluding part of a logically connected, three-campaign, summer offensive blitz against Federal forces in the Eastern Theater.

The Confederates had suffered significant manpower losses in the wake of the summer campaigns. Nevertheless, Lee decided his army was ready for a great challenge: an invasion of the North. His goal was to reach the major Northern states of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and cut off the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad line that supplied Washington, D.C. His movements would threaten Washington and Baltimore, so as to "annoy and harass the enemy."Sears, p. 66.

Several motives led to Lee's decision to launch an invasion. First, he needed to supply his army and knew the farms of the North had been untouched by war, unlike those in Virginia. Moving the war northward would relieve pressure on Virginia. Second was the issue of Northern morale. Lee knew the Confederacy did not have to win the war by defeating the North militarily; it merely needed to make the Northern populace and government unwilling to continue the fight. With the Congressional elections of 1862 approaching in November, Lee believed that an invading army playing havoc inside the North could tip the balance of Congress to the Democratic Party, which might force Abraham Lincoln to negotiate an end to the war. He told Confederate President Jefferson Davis in a letter of September 3 that the enemy was "much weakened and demoralized."McPherson, p. 89.

There were secondary reasons as well. The Confederate invasion might be able to incite an uprising in Maryland, especially given that it was a slave-holding state and a number of its citizens held a sympathetic stance toward the South. Some Confederate politicians, including Jefferson Davis, believed the prospect of foreign recognition for the Confederacy would be made stronger by a military victory on Northern soil, but there is no evidence that Lee thought the South should base its military plans on this possibility. Nevertheless, the news of the victory at Second Bull Run and the start of Lee's invasion caused considerable diplomatic activity between the Confederate States and France and England.McPherson, pp. 93-94.

Maryland Campaign.png|thumb|400px|Maryland Campaign, actions September 3 to September 15, 1862

]] On September 3, just two days after the Battle of Chantilly, Lee wrote to President Davis that he had decided to cross into Maryland unless the president objected and on that same day began shifting his army north and west from Chantilly towards Leesburg, Virginia. On September 4, advance elements of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River over two fords near Leesburg. The main body of the army advanced into Frederick, Maryland, on September 7. The 55,000-man army Detailed organization of Lee's army. had been reinforced by troops who had been defending Richmond—the divisions of Maj. Gens. D.H. Hill and Lafayette McLaws and two brigades under Brig. Gen. John G. Walker—but they merely made up for the 9,000 men lost at Bull Run and Chantilly.Sears, p. 69.

Lee's invasion coincided with another strategic offensive by the Confederacy. Generals Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith had simultaneously launched invasions of Kentucky.The word invasion has been used historically for these operations and in the case of Kentucky it is completely valid. The Confederacy was attempting to regain territory it believed was its own. In the case of Maryland, however, Lee had no plans to seize and hold Union territory, and therefore his actions would more properly be described as a strategic raid or an incursion. Jefferson Davis sent to all three generals a draft public proclamation, with blank spaces available for them to insert the name of whatever state their invading forces might reach. Davis wrote to explain to the public (and, indirectly, the European Powers) why the South seemed to be changing its strategy. Until this point, the Confederacy had claimed it was the victim of aggression and was merely defending itself against "foreign invasion." Davis explained that the Confederacy was still waging a war of self-defense. There was "no design of conquest" and that the invasions were only an aggressive effort to force the Lincoln government to let the South go in peace. "We are driven to protect our own country by transferring the seat of war to that of an enemy who pursues us with a relentless and apparently aimless hostility."

Davis's draft proclamation did not reach his generals until after they had issued proclamations of their own. They stressed that they had come as liberators, not conquerors, to these border states, but they did not address the larger issue of the Confederate strategy shift as Davis had desired.Sears, pp. 68-69. Lee's proclamation announced to the people of Maryland that his army had come "with the deepest sympathy ^* the wrongs that have been inflicted upon the citizens of the commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties ... to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen."McPherson, p. 91.

News of the invasion caused panic in the North, and Lincoln was forced to take quick action. George B. McClellan had been in military limbo since returning from the Peninsula, but Lincoln restored him to command of all forces around Washington and directed him to deal with Lee.

Dividing Lee's army

Lee divided his army as it moved into Maryland. After receiving intelligence of militia activity in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, Lee sent Maj. Gen. James Longstreet to Boonsboro and then to Hagerstown. (The intelligence overstated the threat, as only 20 militiamen were in Chambersburg at the time.)Eicher, p. 339 Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson was ordered to seize the Union arsenal at Harpers Ferry. This left only the thinly spread cavalry of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart and the division of Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill to guard the Army's rear at South Mountain.

The specific reason Lee chose this risky strategy of splitting his army to capture Harpers Ferry is lost to history. One possibility is that he knew it commanded his supply lines through the Shenandoah Valley. Before he entered Maryland he had assumed that the Federal garrisons at Winchester, Martinsburg, and Harpers Ferry would be cut off and abandoned without firing a shot (and, in fact, both Winchester and Martinsburg were evacuated).Sears, p. 83. Another possibility is that it was simply a tempting target, with many vital supplies, but virtually indefensible. McClellan requested permission from Washington to evacuate Harpers Ferry and attach its garrison to his army, but his request was refused.

Reactions to invasion

Lee's invasion was fraught with difficulties from the beginning. The Confederate army's numerical strength suffered in the wake of straggling and desertion. Although he started from Chantilly with 55,000 men, within 10 days this number had diminished to 45,000.McPherson, p. 100. Some troops refused to cross the Potomac River because an invasion of Union territory violated their beliefs that they were fighting only to defend their states from Northern aggression. Countless others became ill with diarrhea after eating unripe "green corn" from the Maryland fields or fell out because their shoeless feet were bloodied on hard-surfaced Northern roads.Sears, p. 83. Lee ordered his commanders to deal harshly with stragglers, whom he considered cowards "who desert their comrades in peril" and were therefore "unworthy members of an army that has immortalized itself" in its recent campaigns.

Far from finding support, the Confederates, once they entered Maryland, were met with reactions that ranged from mere curiosity or a cool lack of enthusiasm to hostility. Robert E. Lee was disappointed at the state's resistance, a condition that he had not anticipated. He should have realized that although Maryland was a slaveholding state, Confederate sympathies were centered primarily in the eastern portions of the state, around Baltimore, and Lee's invasion began in the west. Furthermore, many of the fiercely pro-Southern Marylanders had already traveled south at the beginning of the war to join the Confederate Army in Virginia. Only a "few score" of men joined Lee's columns in Maryland.McPherson, p. 98.

Maryland and Pennsylvania rose to arms. Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin called for 50,000 militia to turn out and nominated Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, a native Pennsylvanian, to command them. (This caused considerable frustration to McClellan and Reynolds's corps commander, Joe Hooker, but Henry Halleck ordered Reynolds to serve under Curtin and told Hooker to find a new division commander.) As far north as Wilkes-Barre, church and courthouse bells rang out, calling men to drill.McPherson, p. 101. Baltimore had been regarded from the early days of the war is a hotbed of secession, waiting only the appearance of the Confederate army to revolt. But the reaction to Lee's invasion was considerable alarm. Crowds milled in the street outside newspaper offices waiting for the latest bulletins and the sale of liquor was halted to restrain the excitable. The public stocked up on food and other essentials, fearing a siege. Philadelphia was also panicked, despite being over 150 miles from Hagerstown and in no immediate danger.Sears, pp. 100-101.

McClellan's pursuit

McClellan moved out of Washington with his 87,000-man army Detailed organization of McClellan's army. in a lethargic pursuit. He was a naturally cautious general and was convinced he would be facing over 120,000 Confederates. He also was maintaining running arguments with the government in Washington, demanding that the forces defending the capital city report to him.Eicher, p. 340. The Army of the Potomac reached Frederick on September 13. There, he received a miraculous break: Union soldiers discovered a mislaid copy of the detailed campaign plans of Lee's army—Special Order 191—wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically, thus making each subject to isolation and defeat in detail. McClellan waited 18 hours before deciding to take advantage of this intelligence. His delay almost squandered a golden opportunity to destroy Lee's army.

On the night of September 13, the Army of the Potomac moved toward South Mountain, with Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside's wing of the army (the I Corps and IX Corps) directed to Turner's Gap, and Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin's (V Corps and Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch's division of the IV Corps) to Crampton's Gap. South Mountain is the name given to the continuation of the Blue Ridge Mountains after they enter Maryland. It is a natural obstacle that separates the Shenandoah Valley and Cumberland Valley from the eastern part of Maryland. Crossing the passes of South Mountain was the only way to reach Lee's army.

Lee, seeing McClellan's uncharacteristic aggressive actions, and learning through a Confederate sympathizer that his order had been compromised, quickly moved to concentrate his army. He chose not to abandon his invasion and return to Virginia yet, because Jackson had not completed the capture of Harpers Ferry. Instead, he chose to make a stand at the little western Maryland town of Sharpsburg. In the meantime, elements of the Army of Northern Virginia waited in defense of the passes of South Mountain.

Battles

There were four significant battles fought during the Maryland Campaign:

Battle of Harpers Ferry (September 12 – September 15, 1862): Learning that the garrison of the Federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry had not retreated after his incursion into Maryland, Lee decided to surround the force and capture it, removing a threat to his supply lines. He divided his army into four columns, three of which, under Jackson's command, converged upon and invested Harpers Ferry. On September 15, Confederate artillery was placed on the heights overlooking the town, which had not been properly fortified by the Union commander, Colonel Dixon S. Miles. The Confederates bombarded the garrison from all sides and were preparing an infantry assault when Miles surrendered the garrison of more than 12,000 men. Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last salvos fired. Jackson took possession of Harpers Ferry, then led most of his soldiers to join Lee at Sharpsburg, leaving Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's division to complete the occupation of the town.

Battle of South Mountain (September 14, 1862): Pitched battles were fought for possession of the South Mountain passes: Crampton's, Turner's, and Fox's Gaps. Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill defended Turner's and Fox's Gaps against Burnside. To the south, Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws defended Crampton's Gap against Franklin. Franklin was able to break through at Crampton's gap, but the Confederates were able to hold Turner's and Fox's, if only precariously. Lee realize the futility of his position against the numerically superior Union forces, and ordered his troops to Sharpsburg. McClellan was then theoretically in a position to destroy Lee's army before it could concentrate. McClellan's limited activity on September 15 after his victory at South Mountain, however, condemned the garrison at Harpers Ferry to capture and gave Lee time to unite his scattered divisions at Sharpsburg.

Battle of Antietam (September 17, 1862): On September 16, McClellan confronted Lee near Sharpsburg, defending a line to the west of Antietam Creek. At dawn on September 17, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's I Corps mounted a powerful assault on Lee's left flank that began the bloody battle. Attacks and counterattacks swept across the Miller Cornfield and the woods near the Dunker Church as Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield's XII Corps joined to reinforce Hooker. Union assaults against the Sunken Road ("Bloody Lane") by Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner's II Corps eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not pressed. In the afternoon, Burnside's IX Corps crossed a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and rolled up the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and counterattacked, driving back Burnside's men and saving Lee's army from destruction. Although outnumbered two to one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in only four of his six available corps. This enabled Lee to shift brigades across the battlefield and counter each individual Union assault. During the night, both armies consolidated their lines. In spite of crippling casualties—Union 12,401, or 25 percent; Confederate 10,318, 31 percent—Lee continued to skirmish with McClellan throughout September 18, while transporting his wounded men south of the Potomac. McClellan did not renew the offensive. After dark, Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley.

Battle of Shepherdstown (September 19 – September 20, 1862): On September 19, a detachment of Fitz John Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rear guard commanded by Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, and captured four guns. Early on September 20, Porter pushed elements of two divisions across the Potomac to establish a bridgehead. A.P. Hill's division counterattacked while many of the Federals were crossing and nearly annihilated the 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment), inflicting 269 casualties. This rearguard action discouraged further Federal pursuit.

Aftermath and diplomatic implications

Lee successfully withdrew across the Potomac, ending the Maryland Campaign and summer campaigning altogether. President Lincoln was disappointed in McClellan's performance. He believed that the general's cautious and poorly coordinated actions in the field had forced the battle to a draw rather than a crippling Confederate defeat. He was even more astonished that from September 17 to October 26, despite repeated entreaties from the War Department and the president himself, McClellan declined to pursue Lee across the Potomac, citing shortages of equipment and the fear of overextending his forces. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck wrote in his official report, "The long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most favorable season for rapid movements and a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disappointment and regret."Bailey, p. 67. Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command of the Army of the Potomac on November 7, effectively ending the general's military career. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside rose to command the Army of the Potomac. The Eastern Theater was relatively quiet until December, when the Lee faced Burnside at the Battle of Fredericksburg.

Although a tactical draw, the Battle of Antietam was a strategic victory for the Union. It forced the end of Lee's strategic invasion of the North and gave Abraham Lincoln the victory he was awaiting before announcing the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, taking effect on January 1, 1863. Although Lincoln had intended to do so earlier, he was advised by his Cabinet to make this announcement after a Union victory to avoid the perception that it was issued out of desperation. The Confederate reversal at Antietam also dissuaded the governments of France and Great Britain from recognizing the Confederacy. And, with the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, it became less likely that future battlefield victories would induce foreign recognition. Lincoln had effectively highlighted slavery as a tenet of the Confederate States of America, and the abhorrence of slavery in France and Great Britain would not allow for intervention on behalf of the South.

References

Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books, The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam, Time-Life Books, 1984, ISBN 0-8094-4740-1.
Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
Esposito, Vincent J., West Point Atlas of American Wars, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
McPherson, James M., Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War, Oxford University Press, 2002, ISBN 0-19-513521-0.
Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, Houghton Mifflin, 1983, ISBN 0-89919-172-X.
Wolff, Robert S., "The Antietam Campaign", Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, Heidler, David S., and Heidler, Jeanne T., eds., W. W. Norton & Company, 2000, ISBN 0-393-04758-X.
National Park Service battle descriptions

Notes

External links

Antietam on the Web

Battles of the Maryland Campaign of the American Civil War | History of Maryland

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