Gourt Home::Gourt :: Hu Jintao
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Hu has continued the capitalist economic reforms of his predecessors.
Early life
Hu Jintao was born in Jiangyan, Jiangsu, in 1942. His ancestors were from Jixi, in the southeastern part of Anhui province. His branch of the family migrated to Jiangyan in his grandfather's generation. Hu was a talented student in high school, excelling in such activities as singing and dancing. He also became active in the Communist Youth League . In 1964, while still a student at Beijing's Qinghua University, Hu joined the Communist Party of China, just prior to the Cultural Revolution. He graduated with a degree in hydraulic engineering in 1964.
In 1965, Hu was transferred to Gansu and worked for a hydro-power station under Mao Zedong's policy of Youth Going To The Mountains and Rural Areas (上山下乡). From 1969 to 1974, Hu worked for Sinohydro Engineering Bureau No 4, as an engineer. In 1974 Hu was transferred to the Construction Department of Gansu as a secretary. The next year he was promoted to vice senior chief. During this period, Hu met his first mentor, Song Ping, the first secretary of CPC Gansu Committee (thus Gansu's real governor). Song appreciated Hu's talent, and with Song's assistance, Hu was promoted to deputy director of Gansu's Ministry of Construction in 1980. Another protege of Song, Wen Jiabao, also became prominent at the same time. In 1981 Hu, along with Deng Xiaoping's daughter Deng Nan and Hu Yaobang's son Hu Deping, were trained in the Central Party School in Beijing. Hu made a good impression on Deng Nan, who happened to report it to her father. Hu Deping even invited Hu Jintao to his home and met with Hu Yaobang, who was a standing member of the politburo at that time. Hu Jintao's modesty created an impact on Hu Yaobang. In 1982, Hu was promoted to the position of Communist Youth League Gansu Branch Secretary.
Rise to power
His mentor Song Ping was transferred to Beijing as Minister of Organization of the Communist Party of China, and was in charge of senior cadres' recommendation, candidacy and promotion. Together with the support of Hu Yaobang and Deng, Hu seemed to have a bright future ahead of him. In 1982, Hu was transferred to Beijing and appointed as secretariat of the Communist Youth League Central Committee ("CY Central"). Two years later Hu was promoted to First Secretary of CY Central, thus its actual leader. During his term in the Youth League, Hu escorted Hu Yaobang, who was General Secretary of CPC then, in visits around the country. Hu Yaobang himself was a veteran coming from the Youth League, could reminiscence his youth through Hu's company. The profound feeling between Hu Yaobang and Hu led to Hu's insistence of rehabilitation of Hu Yaobang in the years he came to prominence nationally.In 1985, Hu was transferred to Guizhou as the Communist Party of China Guizhou Committee Secretary, which began his time as a provincial governor. In contrast to the members of the "Shanghai clique", Hu spent most of his career in China's poorer hinterland rather than in the economically prosperous coastal regions. Partly because of this, he was relatively not well-known to Western analysts before his ascent to power. In 1987 Hu Jintao handled the local students protest parallel to the Democracy Wall carefully, whereas in Beijing similar protests resulted in Hu Yaobang's forced resignation.
Hu was appointed Party Chief of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1988, during a time of political instability and rising demands from Tibet's people for its independence. Hu was responsible for a political crackdown in early 1989 that lead to the deaths of several Tibetan activists. He also worked towards some liberalisation of cultural activities. Hu's harsh stance in Tibet led to him being regarded as a leader of conviction, and further attracted attention from the Central Government in Beijing.
Candidacy
Before the opening of 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the leaders of the Communist Party of China, including Deng and Chen Yun, chose candidates for the Politburo Standing Committee to ensure the transition of power from the so-called second-generation leaders (Deng, Chen, Hu Yaobang etc.) to third-generation CPC leaders (Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi etc.) went smoothly. Deng also proposed that they should consider another candidate for a further future transition. Song, as the organization chief, recommended Hu as an ideal candidate for the prospect of a future leader. As a result, then in his 50's, Hu Jintao became, by far, the youngest member of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee. It became fairly apparent that Hu would eventually succeed Jiang as the core of fourth-generation CPC leaders. In 1993, Hu took charge of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, which oversaw day-to-day operations of the Central Committee, and the Central Party School, which was convenient for him to bring up his own supporters among senior CPC cadres. Hu was also put in charge of the ideological work of the CPC. Although Hu was destined to succeed Jiang, he shed spotlights on Jiang carefully and always left Jiang in the spotlight. In 1998 Hu became Vice-President of China, and Jiang wanted Hu to play a more active role in foreign affairs. Hu became China's leading voice during the US bombings of China's embassy in Belgrade in 1999.When the transition finally took place in the 16th National Congress of the CPC in 2002, Jiang was reluctant to leave the centre of power. It was widely believed that he staffed the Politburo with many members of the so-called "Shanghai Clique", including Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju and Li Changchun, which could ensure Jiang's control behind the stage. Jiang held on to the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
President
Since taking over as Party General Secretary at the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao has appeared to have a more egalitarian style than his predecessor . Hu and his premier, Wen Jiabao, proposed to set up a Harmonious Society which aims at lessening the inequality and changing the style of the "GDP first and Welfare Second" policies. They focused on sectors of the Chinese population that have been left behind by the economic reform, and have taken a number of high profile trips to the poorer areas of China with the stated goal of understanding these areas better. Hu and Wen Jiabao have also attempted to move China away from a policy of favouring economic growth at all costs and toward a more balanced view of growth that includes factors in social inequality and environmental damage, including the use of the green gross domestic product in personnel decisions. Jiang's clique, however, maintained control in most developing areas, therefore Hu and Wen's measures of macroeconomic regulation faced great resistance.
SARS crisis
The major early crisis of Hu's leadership was the outbreak of SARS in 2003. Following strong criticism of China by the World Health Organization and others for initially covering up and responding slowly to the crisis, he sacked several party and government officials, including the health minister, who was a Jiang supporter, and the Mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, who was Hu's protege. Meng's dismissal was seen as a yielding compromise to the firing of Jiang's supporter. Hu and Wen took steps to increase the transparency of China's reporting to international health organizations, indirectly dealing a blow to Jiang's stance on the issue.Another test of Hu's leadership was Beijing's low key response to protests against the implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law in Hong Kong in 2003. In an unprecedented move, the legislation to implement the Article was withdrawn by the Hong Kong government, after a large popular protest on July 1, 2003. At the same time, Hu gave a public show of support to Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-Hwa after gauging public mood in Hong Kong. Many observers see the Central Government's handling of the situation as characteristic of Hu's quiet style, and unlike Tung Chee-Hwa, Hu remains a popular figure in Hong Kong.
Although Jiang Zemin, then 76, stepped down from the powerful Politburo Standing Committee to make way for a younger fourth generation of leadership led by Hu, there was speculation that Jiang Zemin would retain significant power because Hu is not associated with Jiang's Shanghai clique, to which six out of the nine new members of the all-powerful Standing Committee are linked. However, recently, many of its members have shifted their positions, with Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju and Li Changchun being the only staunch Jiang supporters remaining. In addition, Jiang was reelected to the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, a post from which Deng Xiaoping was able to wield power from behind the scenes as paramount leader.
China has a history of fallen heirs-apparent, which many observers believe explains the caution with which outside observers have long associated Hu Jintao. China has been plagued with succession problems, with elder cadres, such as Deng Xiaoping, wielding behind the scenes power through younger protégés. Deng was able to anoint three party secretaries, and was instrumental in the ousting of two of them, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. His third and final selection, Jiang Zemin, won Deng's ambiguous, although continued backing and was the only party secretary in Communist Chinese history to voluntarily leave his post when his term ended. Even Deng himself fell from grace as party general secretary (not the top communist post during that time) in the 1950s due to his indifferent support for Maoist economic policies.
At the same time, attempts to draw historical parallels need to be carefully considered. Since the early-1980s, the People's Republic of China has been marked by increasing institutionalization and rule has been de-personalized. In reaction to the anarchy of the Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party of China has had as one of its major goals, the creation of an orderly system of succession and mechanism to prevent informal rule and a cult of personality.
However, speculations around the political rivalry between Jiang and Hu largely subsided when Jiang resigned as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in September 2004, his last official post. Hu succeeded Jiang as the Chairman of CMC and thus gained effective control over the state, the party, as well as the army.
Economic inequality
One of the biggest challenges Hu faces is the big inequality between Chinese rich and poor, for which discontent and anger mounted to a degree which wreaked havoc on CPC's reign. Furthermore, the cronyism and corruption plaguing China could drag China into deep crisis, too. In the beginning of 2006 however, Hu launched the "8 Honours and 8 Disgraces" movement* in a bid to promote a more selfless and moral outlook amongst the population. It remains to be seen if Hu is capable of managing the continued peaceful development of China while avoiding international incidents, at the same time presiding over an unprecedented increase in Chinese nationalist sentiment.Positions
Observers indicate that Hu distinguishes himself from his predecessor in both domestic and foreign policy. In domestic policy, he seems to want more openness to the public on governmental functions and meetings. Recently, China's news agency published many Politburo Standing Committee meeting details. He also cancelled many spendthrift events that are traditionally seen as communist extravagances, such as the lavish send-off and welcoming-back ceremonies of Chinese leaders when visiting foreign lands. Furthermore the Chinese leadership under Hu has also focused on such problems as the gap between rich and poor and uneven development between the interior and coastal regions. Both party and state seem to have moved away from a definition of development that focuses solely on GDP growth and toward a more balanced definition which includes social equality and environment effects.
Foreign policy
In 2004, Hu ordered all cadres from the five major power functions to stop going to the Beidaihe retreat for their annual summer meeting which, before, was commonly seen as a gathering of ruling elites from both current and elder cadres to decide China's destiny. In foreign policy, he has differed from his predecessor by actively engaging in the current North Korea nuclear crisis. He has also assured neighbors in the region with the concept of China's peaceful rise.Media
At the same time, Hu has contradicted some initial expectations that he was a closet liberal. Hu was a pragmatist and hard-liner as far as any effort of political reform is concerned. Observers have noted that under Hu, censorship of the news media and harassment of dissidents has become more severe and frequent than his predecessor . Although his son-in-law, Mao Daolin used to be CEO of Sina.com, a well-known internet portal of China, Hu obviously has no taste for the free flow of information on internet. Blocking of websites takes place more frequently, among which include websites such as Nytimes.com, Washingtonpost.com and Wikipedia. Furthermore, while Hu has attempted to make decision-making more transparent and to increase rule of law he has also explicitly stated that his goal is to strengthen and make the party more efficient rather than weaken the party or move toward a pluralistic political system. In December 2004, the Hong Kong magazine Open quoted an alleged instruction by Hu to propaganda officials in September in which he wrote that, when managing ideology, China had to learn from Cuba and North Korea. Although North Korea had encountered temporary economic problems, its political policies were consistently correct. Open also quoted Hu as calling Mikhail Gorbachev, "a betrayer of socialism".Taiwan
While Hu Jintao has given some signs of being more flexible with regard to political relationships with Taiwan as in his May 17 Statement where he offered to address the issue of "international living space" for Taiwan, he appears unwilling to reconsider Chinese reunification as an ultimate goal or to renounce the use of force if Taiwan were to declare independence. During Hu's administration, the government has stopped promoting immediate reunification under one country, two systems in favor of a more gradual approach of increasing economic and cultural integration. The combination of both soft and hard approaches were apparent in the Anti-Secession Law which was passed in March 2005 and in the unprecedented meeting between Hu and Kuomintang leader Lien Chan in April 2005, seen by commentators as an embrace of a status quo.
Eight Do's and Don'ts
In the March of 2006, Hu Jintao released the Eight Do's and Don'ts as the moral codes to be followed by Chinese. It has been widely regarded as one of Hu Jintao's ideological solutions to the moral problems in modern China. However, the codes are somehow different as compared with his predecessors' jobs, namely, Jiang Zemin's Three Represents, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and Mao Zedong Thought, which is generally an informal tradition for each Communist Party of China leader to observe to make theoretical contributions to and further elaborations on socialism.
Trivia
Unlike his predecessors, Hu speaks relatively unaccented Standard Chinese (Mandarin).
References
External links
- Hu Jintao biography @ ChinaVitae, the web's largest online database of China VIPs
- "Who's Who in China's Leadership" biography
- Hu Jintao calls for upholding Marxism (Xinhua)
- "China's leader shows his stripes" – a January 2005 BBC article arguing that Hu is more hardline than he initially appeared
- Hu Jintao's caricature by Chinese-Tools.com
- http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501050131-1019916,00.html
- China's Hu: well liked, little known, from the Christian Science Monitor, by Robert Marquand, April 19, 2006
1942 births | Current national leaders | Leaders of the Communist Party of China | Living people | Chinese politicians
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"Hu Jintao"