The Greco–Turkish War of 1919–1922, also called the War in Asia Minor, and in Turkey considered a part of the Turkish War of Independence, was a war between Greece and Turkey fought in the wake of World War I.
In return for the contribution of the Greek army in the war effort, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which ended the First World War in Asia Minor and in parallel determined the future of the Ottoman Empire, assigned eastern Thrace and the millet of Smyrna to Greece.
Around that time Mustafa Kemal, the leader of a group of Turkish revolutionaries, was forming the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia. The revolutionaries repudiated the Treaty of Sèvres and prepared for defense of what they believed was their national land given up by the weak Ottoman government to the enemy.
During the summer of 1920, the Greek army launched a series of successful offensives in the directions of Maiandros Valley, Peramos and Philadelphia. The overall strategic objective of these operations, which were met by increasingly stiff Turkish resistance, was to provide strategic depth to the defence of Smyrna. To that end, the Greek zone of occupation was extended over all of Western and most of North Western Asia Minor.
The Greek advance was halted for the first time at the First Battle of Inonu on January 11, 1921. This development led to Allied proposals to amend the Treaty of Sevrès at a conference in London where both the Turkish Revolutionary and Ottoman governments were represented.
Although some agreements were reached with Italy, France and Britain, the decisions were not agreed by the Greek government, who believed that they still retained the strategic advantage and could negotiate from a stronger point. The Greeks initiated another attack on March 27th (Second Battle of Inonu, to be resisted fiercely and finally defeated by the Kemalist troops on March 30th. The British favoured a Greek territorial expansion but refused to offer any military assistance in order to avoid provoking the French . The Turkish forces however received significant assistance from the Soviet Union.
In June 1921, a reinforced Greek army advanced afresh to the River Sakarya (Sangarios in Greek), less than 100 km (62 miles) west of Ankara. It was envisaged that the Turkish Revolutionaries, who had consistently avoided encirclement would be drawn into battle in defence of their capital and destroyed in a battle of attrition. Meanwhile, the new Turkish government at Ankara appointed Mustafa Kemal as the commander in chief. The advance of the Greek Army faced fierce resistance which culminated in the 21-day Battle of the Sakarya (or Sangarios in Greek) (August 23 – September 13, 1921). The ferocity of the battle exhausted both sides to such an extent that they were both contemplating a withdrawal, but the Greeks were the first to withdraw to their previous lines.
That was the furthest in Anatolia the Greeks would advance, and within few weeks they withdrew orderly back to the lines they held in June, intending at least to protect the Smyrna area.
The Greek defeat can be largely attributed to a lack of whole-hearted Allied support, as King Constantine was reviled by the British for his pro-German policies during WWI (in contrast to former prime minister Venizelos). By contrast, the Kemalist Turks enjoyed significant Soviet support. A telegraph sent on August 4th Turkey's representative in Moscow, Riza Nur, sent a telegram saying that soon 60 Krupp artillery pieces, 30,000 sells, 700,000 grenades, 10,000 mines, 60,000 Romanian swords, 1.5 million captured Ottoman rifles from WWI, 1 million Russian rifles, 1 million Manlicher rifles, as well as some more modern Martini-Henry rifles and 25,000 bayonets would be delivered to the Kemalist forces. Kapur, H Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927 The Turks also received significant military assistance from Italy and France, who threw in their lot with the Kemalist against Greece which was seen as a British client . The Italians used their base in Antalya to arm and train Turkish troops to assist the Kemalists against the Greeks. Antalya City Website History, http://www.antalya-ws.com
However, the main reason for the Greek defeat was the poor strategic and operational planning of this ill-conceived advance in-depth. Although the Greek Army was not lacking in men, courage or enthusiasm, it was lacking in nearly everything else due to the poor Greek economy, which could not sustain long-term mobilisation and had been stretched beyond its limits. Very soon, the Greek Army exceeded the limits of its logistic structure and had no way of retaining such a large territory under constant attacks by regular and irregular Turkish troops fighting in their homeland.
In March 1922 the Allies proposed an armistice, but Kemal feeling that now he has the strategic advantage, declined any settlement while the Greeks remained in Anatolia and intensified his efforts to re-organise the Turkish military for the final offensive against the Greeks. At the same time, the Greeks strengthened their defensive positions, but were increasingly demoralised by the inactivity of remaining on the defensive and the prolongation of the war. The Turkish offensive was launched on August 26th, defeating the Greeks at the Battle of Dumlupınar near Afyon (August 30th, 1922, celebrated as the Victory Day and a national holiday in Turkey).
Having breached the Greek defences, the Turks advanced very rapidly to Smyrna (İzmir), which they captured after the withdrawal of the Greek troops. During the confusion and anarchy that followed, a great proportion of the city was set ablaze, and the properties of the Greeks were pillaged. A massacre of a significant part of the Christian population (including the lynching and brutal murder of the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Smyrna) by the Turkish Army occurred during the days remembered by the Greeks as "the Catastrophe of Smyrna". However, the majority of the Greeks managed to seek refuge on Greek and Allied ships at the harbor of Izmir and other coastal towns.
It has been suggested that the Greek retreat involved a scorched earth policy, which left large tracts of land and property ruined or destroyed. The adherents of this view claim that the burning of crops left the remaining inhabitants of Smyrna close to starvation. However, the validity of this interpretation is questionable considering the haste of the Greek retreat (which was concluded in fewer than 2 weeks), and the lack of any documented evidence of Greek orders to destroy property during the retreat. In any case, most historians today agree that the fire in the city expanded from the burning of Greek and Armenian Quarters of Smyrna by the Turkish Army .
These orders were largely ignored, and Nasruddin Pasha, the commander of Turkish forces in the Smyrna district gave orders contradicting Ataturk's. Nasruddin Pasha's orders were largely followed, and the Greek and Armenian civilian population of Smyrna suffered heavily at the hands of the Turkish army.Dobkin, Marjorie Smyrna: The Destruction of a City
Turkish War of Independence | History of Greece | Aftermath of World War I | Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
Гръцко-турска война (1919-1922) | Griechisch-Türkischer Krieg | Greka-turka milito (1919-1922) | Guerre gréco-turque | מלחמת יוון-תורכיה | Grieks-Turkse Oorlog | 希土戦争 (1919年-1922年) | Grško-turška vojna | Türk-Yunan Cephesi
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