The Greco-Persian Wars or Persian Wars were a series of conflicts between the Greek city-states and the Persian Empire that started about 500 BC and lasted until 448 BC. The expression "Persian Wars" usually refers to either or both of the two Persian invasions of the Greek mainland in 490 BC and in 480-479 BC; in both cases, the Greeks united successfully to defeat the invasions.
Thucydides the Athenian intended to write a book from where Herodotus ends until the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC. Unlike Herodotus that he mocks he cross-checked his sources and gives rather accurate information on his book Ξυγγραφη (known in English as The Pelopennesian War). Unfortunately he died before he could complete his work, and only gives a full account of the first twenty years of the Peloponnesian War and little information on what happened before.
Among later writers Ephorus wrote in the 4th century BC a universal history book which includes the events of these wars. Diodorus Siculus wrote in the 1st century AD a book of history since the beginning of time that also includes the history of this war. The closest thing to a Persian source in Greek literature is Ctesias of Cnedus who was Artaxerxes Mnemon's personal physician wrote a history of Persia according to Persian sources in the 4th century BC. In his work he also mocks Herodotus and claims that his information is correct since he heard from the Persians. Unfortunately the works of the last these writers have not survived complete. Since fragments of them are given in the Myriobiblon which was compiled by Photius that later became Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople in the 9th century AD,in the book Eklogai by the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos (913-919 AD) and the Suda dictionary 10th century AD it is believed that they were lost with the destruction of the imperial library of the Holy Palace of Constantinople by the crusaders of the Fourth Crusade in 1204.
Thus historians are forced to supplement Herodotus's and Thucydide's information with works of later writers intended for other uses like 2nd century AD Plutarch's biographies and the tour guide of southern Greece compiled at the same time by the geographer and traveller Pausanias, who is not to be confused with the Spartan general of the same name mentioned later. Some Roman historians in their works give account of this conflict. Justinus who epitomized Pompeius includes information, as are in Cornelius Nepos's Biographies. However since they are most probably based on Greek sources they can not be considered a third party view.
In 513 BC Darius, for the first time, ordered a campaign into the Balkans. He conquered Thrace and Macedon. Macedonian king Amyntas I became a tributary ally. However at that time his state was very small, composed of Pieria and Bottaia (see map below). Darius forces also crossed the Danube into Scythia as a show of force. In this campaign Miltiades, commander of the Athenian forces in the Thracian peninsula was forced to follow the Persians. While Darius was across the Danube he suggested to the other Greeks to burn the bridges and trap Darius across, Herodotus IV,137 thus earning Persian ire. This plan was not followed.
In 499 BC, instigated by Aristagoras in Miletus, the Ionian Revolt broke out when a force of 200 triremes manned by Ionian crew that Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis, had sent to Naxos under Aristagoras's command failed to overturn the democrats and restore the oligarchs. The Ionian cities threw out the "tyrants" that the Persians had set over them, formed a league, and applied for help from the other Greeks. Athens sent twenty ships because, as Herodotus said, it is easier to deceive many than one. Herodotus V,97 Eretria sent five because Miletos had helped her in the Lelantine War (8th century BC). These ships joined the Ionian fleet and helped spread rebellion all along the coast and to Cyprus. They managed to defeat the Phoenician fleet in Pamphylia. The revolt did not have greater political aims, lacked unified leadership and, save for the Carians, non-Greeks did not rebel. In 498 BC the Greeks captured and burnt Sardis with ease, thereby provoking the Persian response.
The Persians raised 3 armies and mobilized their fleet. One army was sent to Cyprus. The fleet supporting it was defeated by the Ionian fleet but the army succeeded in subjugating Cyprus. The other army was sent to the Propontis and forced the revolted cities into submission. The third army first went to Caria, and after a series of battles negotiated Caria's submission. After that Ionia was isolated. All three armies converged in Ionia and so did the new fleet. Initially unable to defeat the Ionian fleet at sea, the Persian land forces worked towards denying the Ionian fleet any safe harbors, leaving the fleet unable to repair, refit, or restock its supplies. The Greek fleet was finally crushed at the Battle of Lade in 494 BC, and the Ionian cities were sacked.
Darius's conciliatory policies were used as a type of propaganda campaign against the mainland Greeks, so that in 491 BC, when Darius sent heralds throughout Greece demanding submission (earth and water), initially all city-states except Athens and Sparta accepted the offer.
Whether or not this campaign should be included as an attempted invasion of Greece is a matter of debate. Some modern historians have argued that Mardonius's original intention of the campaign was to subdue Athens, and this was Herodotus's opinion as well. However, as both Thrace and Macedonia had been completely cut off by the Ionian rebellion, a reconquest of the area was necessary with or without a further campaign into Greece. Whatever the true intention of the campaign was we will most likely never know for certain, however the end result of the campaign was the reassertion of Persian power within the Balkan region. In any case, because in this campaign the borders of the modern-day Hellenic Republic were crossed it is included in all Greek history books.
The Persian force sailed from Samos to Naxos, where the inhabitants fled to the mountains, spread across the Cyclades, which submitted to the Great King, and then to Eretria. Eretria was besieged and surrendered after only a week; the city was razed, temples and shrines were looted, and most of the population taken prisoner and held in Euboea off the coast of Attica.
The Persian fleet had brought Hippias, son of the former tyrant of Athens Peisistratus, perhaps in the hope of establishing a pro-Persian tyrranny wihin Athens. Most ancient authors agree that it was upon the advice of Hippias that the army landed in Attica near Marathon. Pheidippides, a professional messenger was sent to Sparta for aid, but a religious festival (the Karneia) prevented the Spartans from leaving the city, or alternatively due to the helot revolt mentioned by Plato. Laws III 6923 D, 698 E In the end the Athenians and Plataeans alone defeated the Persians in the Battle of Marathon.
The Greek army was made of about 10,000 Athenian hoplites and 1,000 Plateans, 2 of the 10 Athenian tribes were in the center in four ranks (thus showing a front of 2 x 250 = 500 people) and the rest on the flanks in 8 ranks (9 x 125 = 1125), meaning the total front had about 1625 men. They were probably facing takabara light archers. If the Persians had a 2000 men front and fought in 30 ranks as mentioned by Xenophon in the Cyropaedia (though they fought even on 110 men ranks) they numbered 60,000 troops. Most modern Greek historians accept numbers in the 50-60,000 range*, Η Μάχη του Μαραθώνα, το λυκαυγές της κλασσικής Ελλάδος = The battle of Marathon, the dawn of classical Greece, Πόλεμος και ιστορία = War and History magazine, issue 26 January 2000, Communications editions, Athens Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους = History of the Greek nation volume Β', Athens 1971 while some Western historians, like Bengtson Bengtson H., Grieschise Geschichte Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft III, 4. Munchen 1969 prefer numbers in the 20,000 range.
Legend has it that a runner, after the battle, was sent as a messenger back to the city to tell them the Athenians had been victorious and to resist the Persians. He probably ran the 32 km from the northern route rather than the 40,8 kilometers of the southern, from Marathon the Athens, cried "Νενικήκαμεν!" (We have been victorious!), and collapsed and died on the spot. Herodotus records no such event, and the story itself does not appear until the writings of Plutarch (46-127 AD) who gives him the name Thersipus or Eucles. Lucian gives his the name of Philippides (not Pheidippides). Regardless, his legend was the inspiration for the modern day Olympic event, the marathon.
After the battle the Persian commanders had been given a signal of a raised shield and, hoping to catch Athens undefended, sailed with their fleet around Cape Sounion and tried to land at Phaleron. Athenian leaders had also seen the signal and, after leaving to tribes to guard the battlefield quickly moved the remaining forces into Athens. When the Persian came to Phaleron they found the Athenian army waiting for them. After this, the Persian fleet picked up the Eretrian prisoners and sailed back to Asia in defeat.
The effects of the battle of Marathon were dramatic for both sides of the conflict. The Athenians had proven their ability to fight and win against the Persian forces, which was indeed no small feat if Herodotus's words are to be accepted. The Greeks saw that they had the option to stand and fight, and soon after Marathon a number of city-states renounced their submission to Persia and joined with the Athenians and Spartans.
Perhaps more important was the impact Marathon had upon the Persians. Marathon was the first defeat of regular (Iranian) Persian infantry forces since before the reign of Cyrus, over two generations before. While the Ionian rebellion, the Persian inadequacy at sea, and the burning of Sardis all constituted a threat to Persian holdings in the region, Marathon signalled a threat to the whole of the Western part of the empire. While the Persians had been unable to beat the Ionians at sea, the conflict had been settled by the superior Persian ground forces. Now, with the defeat of the regular Persian infantry, the Persians had found themselves bested on land and sea by the relatively small city-state of Athens.
The Persians had the sympathy of a number of Greek city-states, including Argos, which had pledged to defect when the Persians reached their borders. The Alevades family that ruled Larissa in Thessaly saw the invasion as an opportunity to extend their power. Thebes was willing to pass to the Persian side when the Xerxes's army reached their borders, and did so immediately following Thermopylae, though Herodotus hints that at Thermopylae it was already well known that Thebes had capitulated.
In autumn of 481 BC Sparta, in cooperation with Athens, called a congress in the temple of Poseidon on the isthmus of Corinth. Every Greek city-state that had not then fallen to the Persians was called except Massalia and her colonies, and Cyrene. General reconciliation was preached. Athens and Aegina were publicly reconciled. Messengers were sent to the cities that had not sent emissaries. The colonies of Sicily and Southern Italy were called, but reportedly refused unless the Syracusan king, Gelon, was given command, a right the Spartans refused to part with. Additionally, Herodotus reports that the Persians and Carthaginians had signed a treaty to coordinate invasions, keeping the sizeable Sicilian and Italian reinforcements in check. The only help received one ship from Crotone which fought in the battle of Salamis. Argos and Crete refused to send emissaries, and the oracle of Delphi did not take part. It continued, as it had since the beginning of the century, to issue oracles that the flood of the Persian Army would drown Greece. Corcyra promised assistance, but then rescinded the offer. They sent a fleet off the Peloponnese that simply monitored the situation. For the most part, the alliance was made up of the Peloponnesian city-states and Attica.
| Fleet crew: | 517,610 |
| Infantry: | 1,700,000 |
| Cavalry: | 80,000 |
| Arabs and Libyans: | 20,000 |
| Greek allies | 324,000 |
| Total | 2,641,610 |
This number needs to be at least doubled in order to account for support troops giving thus at least 5,283,220 men, which has been rejected by all modern historians. Other ancient sources give other numbers. The poet Simonides who was a near-contemporary talks of four million. Ctesias of Cnedus who, as mentioned earlier, was Artaxerxes Mnemon's personal physician wrote a history of Persia according to Persian sources that unfortunately has not survived, and gives 800,000 as the total number of the original army that met in Doriskos. Modern scholars have proposed different numbers for the invasion force, estimations based on knowledge of the Persian military systems, their logistical capabilities, the Greek countryside, and supplies available along the army's route, especially water.
There are two schools of thought over the size of the Persian Army. The critical school assumes that the figures given in ancient texts are exaggerations on the part of the victors, and a critical analysis of the resources available to the armies of the ancient era. According to this school of thought, the Persian force was between 60,000 and 120,000 combatants, plus a collection of non-combatants (especially large because of the presence of the Persian king and high-ranking nobility). More recent scholarship generally accepts these numbers, agreeing that the Persian force had an upper limit of around 250,000 total land forces. The main reason most often given for these values is cited as a lack of water; Sir Frederick Maurice Maurice F., The size of the army of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece 480 B.C., Journal of Hellenic studies 50 (1930) p.115-128 who was a British general in World War I was among the first to claim that the army could not have surpassed 175,000 due to lack of water. This school of thought dominates today Western Universities and secondary sources regarding the Greco-Persian wars.
The other school of thought, prevalent in the 19th and early 20th centuries, contends that ancient sources might be exaggerating in some aspects, but do give realistic numbers. Calculating the size of the two forces by relying on the surviving ancient texts yields the following analysis: The Greeks managed at the end of the campaign in the battle of Plataea to muster a force of 110,000 troops (according to Herodotus) or 100,000 (according to Pompeius). These were 38,700 hoplites and 71,300 light troops according to Herodotus (or 61,300 according to Pompelus, the difference being 10,000 helots, see table below). On that battle they reportedly faced 300,000 Persians and 50,000 Greek allies, according to Herodotus. This gives a 3 to 1 ratio for the two armies which proponents of the school consider a realistic proportion since individually the Persian archers were no match for the heavily armed Greek hoplites. Furthermore Historians Munro and Macan. J.A.R. Munro, Cambridge ancient history vol IV 1929 argued for this point of view based on Herodotus giving the names of 6 major commanders and 29 μυρίαρχοι (muriarxoi), that is leaders of the baivabaram, the basic unit of the Persian infantry, which numbered about 10,000 strong Papademetriou Konstantinos Περσικό Πεζικό: Η δύναμη που κατέκτησε τη νοτιοδυτική Ασία (Persian Infantry: The force that conquered southwest Asia), Panzer magazine, issue 22 September-October 2005, Periscopio editions Athens Nicholas Sekunda, Simon Chew, The Persian Army (560-330BC), Elite series, Osprey 1992, Oxford If there was loss of troops due to attrition the Persians preferred to dissolve baivabarams and fill the ranks of others. Η Μάχη του Μαραθώνα, το λυκαυγές της κλασσικής Ελλάδος = The battle of Marathon, the dawn of classical Greece, Πόλεμος και ιστορία = War and History magazine, issue 26 January 2000, Communications editions, Athens It is likely that that the units were at full strength, since Xerxes, upon leaving Greece after the battle of Salamis, had taken with him a large part of the army, 60,000 according to Ctesias, and the remaining troops would have been folded together into full-sized units. Adding casualties of the battles and attrition due to the need to guard cities and strategic passes a force of 400,000 seems like a minimum, based on analysis of the surviving texts. Nicholas Hammond accepts 300,000 Persians at the battle of Plataea, though he claims that the numbers at Doriskos were smaller, without explaining how the change in numbers happened. The metrologist Livio Catullo Stecchini (who was a controversial figure) argues that the Persian army numbered 800,000 [http://www.metrum.org/perwars/persize.htm. This school of thought is still prevailent in Greece. It dominates Greek Universities and secondary sources published in Greece by scholars from most of the political spectrum like Ioannis Kakridis,Maronitis and Gedeon.
Xerxes had ordered the construction of two bridges made of boats in the Hellespont made of Egyptian and Phoenician ships, but they were destroyed by storm. Thus two news bridges were constructed, one made of 314 triremes, the other of 360. The army took seven days and seven nights to cross them. One of the bridges was used by foot soldiers and the other by cavalry. Five major food depots had been set up along the path: at Lefki Akti on the Thracian side of the Hellespont, at Tyrozis on lake Bistonis, at Doriskos at the Evros river estuary where the Asian army was linked up with the Balkan allies, at Eion on the Strymon river and at Therme, modern-day Thessaloniki. There, food had been sent from Asia for several years in preparation for the campaign. Animals had been bought and fattened, while the local populations had been ordered for several months to grind the grains into flour.
The Persian army took 3 1/2 months to travel unopposed from the Hellespont to Therme, a journey of about 600 kilometers or 360 miles. The largest delay was due to the reorganisation of the troop at Doriskos, when tactical units replaced the national formations used earlier for the march.
| Phoenicians and Syrians from Palestine: | 300 |
| Egyptians: | 200 |
| Cypriots: | 150 |
| Cilicians: | 100 |
| Pamphylians: | 30 |
| Lycians: | 50 |
| Dorians of Asia Minor: | 30 |
| Carians: | 70 |
| Ionians: | 100 |
| Cycladian Islanders: | 17 |
| Aeolians: | 60 |
| Hellespontians (except Abydos): | 30 |
| From Pontus: | 100 |
| Total | 1,207 |
| Phoenicians: | 300 |
| Egyptians: | 200 |
| Cypriots: | 150 |
| Cilicians: | 80 |
| Pamphylians: | 40 |
| Lycians: | 40 |
| Dorians of Asia Minor: | 40 |
| Carians: | 80 |
| Ionians: | 100 |
| Cycladian Islanders: | 50 |
| Aeolians: | 40 |
| Hellespontians and Pontians: | 80 |
| Total | 1,200 |
At Doriskos the fleet first met the army, and Xerxes set up the chain of command. A channel had been dug over the isthmus of the Athos peninsula, large enough to fit through two ships at a time with which the fleet avoided the perilous journey across Cape Athos. The fleet then rejoined the army again at Therme. From there, the Persian fleet travelled down the coast, capturing a few Greek ships that were sent to monitor its movements. It fell into a storm off Mt. Pelion, between Casthanaia and Cape Sepias, which caused the loss of one third of the fleet. This was seen as divine retribution by the Greeks, reportedly lifting the morale of the allied force. Battered from the storm, the Persian fleet rested at Aphetes.
A force of 10,000 Athenians and Spartans led by Euenetus and Themistocles was dispatched to the vale of Tempe between Thessaly and Macedon after a call by Thessalian cities that disliked the Alevades. It arrived there travelling by ship to Phthiotis and from there by land. There they blocked the pass, but were joined by few Thessalian horsemen. Xerxes upon hearing about the opposition sidestepped the force by passing through the Sarantaporo straight. The allied force, warned by Alexander I of Macedon, left the way they came.Herodotus VII,173 All of Thessaly then defected to the Persians, as did many cities north of Thermopylae when they saw that help was not to come. It took Xerxes 13 days to reach from Therme to Thermopylae.
At Thermopylae, a force was assembled led by King Leonidas of Sparta who was only accompanied by 300 Spartan soldiers. The Greek army included according to Herodotus VII, 202 the following forces
| Spartiats: | 300 |
| Mantineans: | 500 |
| Tegeans: | 500 |
| Arcadian Orchomenos: | 120 |
| Other Arcadians: | 1000 |
| Corinthians: | 400 |
| Floians: | 200 |
| Mycenaeans: | 80 |
| Thespians: | 700 |
| Thebans: | 400 |
| Phocians and Opuntan Locrians: | 1000 |
| Total forces: | 5200 |
On the third day, a local man named Ephialtes betrayed the existence of a mountain path that led behind Greek positions. Leonidas and the 300 Spartans, as well as Demophilus and his contingent of 700 Thespians, proved their bravery by staying back to allow the rest of the army to escape.
In the mean time a Greek naval force of 271 triremes attacked the Persian fleet off battle of Artemisium, with a fleet of 75 triremes guarding against a Persian encirclement at Chalkis. The Persians had indeed sent out a strong contigent to encircle the Greek fleet, but it fell in a storm off Euboea and was damaged. Herodotus makes a direct parallel between the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium, even placing them on the same day. While not a "fight to the death" as Thermopylae had become, Herodotus records that roughly half of the Athenian fleet had been destroyed or damaged beyond repair, in addition to other losses to the allied fleet overall, while at the same time the small Greek fleet had done immense damage to the larger, bulkier Persian fleet which, as would be seen again at Salamis, became trapped in the narrow strait and unable to maneuver. When news of the withdrawal from Thermopylae arrived, the Greek fleet secretly abandoned its position.
Soon afterwards Athens was evacuated, and the Greek fleet withdrew to Salamis to aid in the transfer of the population of Attica to the island. The Peloponnesians proposed a defensive line at the Isthmus of Corinth, relying on the ground forces and using the fleet to keep the Isthmus supplied. Themistocles instead forced a confrontation with the Persian fleet at the Battle of Salamis and routed the Persian fleet, forcing it to withdraw to the Ionian coast. According to a story related by Herodotus, before the battle, Xerxes had set up a throne on Mt. Aegaleo, so he could watch his great victory over the smaller Greek fleet. However, once gain the narrow gulf provided little room for his heavy triremes to maneuver, allowing the lighter Greek ships to flank and destroy them. Herodotus claims there were 378 ships on the Greek fleet and gives the following numbers:
| Athens: | 180 |
| Corinth: | 40 |
| Aegina: | 30 |
| Chalcis: | 20 |
| Megara: | 20 |
| Sparta: | 16 |
| Sicyon: | 15 |
| Epidaurus: | 10 |
| Eretria: | 7 |
| Ambracia: | 7 |
| Troizen: | 5 |
| Naxos: | 4 |
| Leucas: | 3 |
| Hermione: | 3 |
| Styra: | 2 |
| Cythnus: | 2 |
| Ceos: | 2 |
| Melos: | 2 |
| Siphnus: | 1 |
| Seriphus: | 1 |
| Croton: | 1 |
| Total | 366 |
After Salamis Xerxes, according to Herodotus, at first attempted to build a causeway across the channel to attack the Athenian evacuees on Salamis. Strabo, who had access to works by other authors disagrees. Describing the coast between Eleusis and Piraeus notes:
| Sparta: | 10,000 |
| Athens: | 8,000 |
| Plataea: | 600 |
| Megara: | 3,000 |
| Corinth: | 5,000 |
| Tegea: | 1,500 |
| Potidaea: | 300 |
| Arcadian Orchomenus: | 600 |
| Sicyon: | 3,000 |
| Epidaurus: | 800 |
| Troezen: | 1,000 |
| Leprea: | 200 |
| Mycene and Tiryns: | 400 |
| Floia: | 1,000 |
| Hermion: | 300 |
| Eretria and Styra: | 600 |
| Chalkis: | 400 |
| Ambrakia: | 500 |
| Lefkas and Anactorium: | 800 |
| Cephalonia: | 200 |
| Aegina: | 500 |
| Total | 38,700 |
Also 71,300 light troops were sent. Of these 35,000 were helots of Sparta, 1,800 were Thespians and the other 34,500 are simply said to be from the other cities, about one per hoplite. This is a very large number for a Greek army. The Byzantine Empire rarely fielded armies larger than 100,000 while the modern Greek state raised an army of this size in the Greek-Turkish War of 1897 and the First Balkan War in 1912. Unlike the last two mentioned conflicts when only soldiers from 7 or 8 years were drafted what was fielded in Plataea was probably every able bodied man between the ages of 20 and 50 that owned weapons.
Among modern scholars others have accepted these numbers and have used them as a population census of Greece at the time, others have claimed the light troop numbers bloated especially since they imply 7 helots for every Spartiat and others have claimed there were no light troops in Plataea, only hoplites.
Reportedly, on the same day as the battle of Plataea a 110 ship Greek fleet commanded by the Spartan king Leotychides routed a repaired and refitted 300 ship Persian fleet guarded by 60,000 troops in the Battle of Mycale. Then they advanced towards the Hellespont intending to break the bridges. They found the bridges destroyed. The Spartans left after that. When Ionians had asked for more assistance, the Spartans suggested that they migrate to the cities in the Greek peninsula that supported the Persians.Herodotus IX,106 The Athenians under Xanthippus continued the campaign and sieged Sestus. The Athenians continued the siege alone until the city fell a few months later..Herodotus IX,120 This is where Herodotus ends his book.
The city of Byzantium fell after a siege on the city.Thucydides 1.94 Many Persians including nobility fell prisoners to the Greek forces. Pausanias, who was of the royal house of Agis, was greatly impressed by the new way of life he witnesed it and adopted it. He started wearing Persian dress and offering Persian-style banquets. He also mistreated the Ionian delegates. His Persian-style behaviour scandalised both the Ionians and the Peloponnesians and Pausanias was recalled to Sparta. There he faced charges that he was plotting with the Persian king to become tyrant of Greece, that he was in secret communication with him and that he had asked his daughter as his wife. He was acquitted of those charges, found guilty only of mistreating individuals in their private affairs and sentenced not to lead another campaign outside Sparta.Thucydides 1.95 Being impatient he took a warship from Hermion and travelled back to Byzantium. No longer welcome there, he crossed the Propontis to the Troas region where he stayed for some time. What he did there is completely unknown. He was recalled to Sparta by special envoy where he was to be brought against charges that he was again plotting with the King of Kings and that he was planning a helot revolution. On his way back, while he was inside the Spartan state limits, he saw the ephoroi, the elected council of five that ruled Sparta, approaching and one of them signalled to him that he was doomed. He took refuge in a nearby temple, where he died of starvation several days later. Some modern historians,Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους = History of the Greek nation volume Γ1, Athens 1972 based on that he was never condemned and that had he been in league with the Persians he would have sought refuge there and not return, claim this was all a fabrication by his political enemies in Sparta.
In the mean time, in 477 BC the Spartans had sent Dokis as general in Byzantium with a small force. The Ionians, with the memories of Pausanias' mistreatment of them fresh, asked them to leave. Relieved, the Spartans who no longer wished to continue fighting the Persians withdrew. Athens gladly filled the vacuum, forming the First Athenian Alliance, better known as the Delian League.
Themistocles was marginalised politically when the leadership of the aristocratic party passed from Aristides to Kimon, son of Miltiades. Themistocles was later exiled and eventually charged of conspiring with Pausanias against Greece. After a long journey he eventually presented himself to the Persians and, following an old Persian tradition of giving sanctuary to prominent Greek politicians, he was given three cities in Asia Minor to rule. He died there a few years later.
In 468 BC Kimon had gathered a force of 200 improved Athenian triremes in Knidos and 100 allied triremes with 5,000 Athenian hoplites and campaigned in Phaselis in Pamphylia. With mediation from Chios (a League member), Phasilis joined the league. The Persian forces that had been gathered at the mouth of the Eurymedon river were defeated and the cities of Ionia officially joined the alliance.
In 465 BC Athens founded the colony of Amphipolis in the Strymon river. Thassos, a member of the League, saw her interests in the mines of Mt. Paggaion threatened and defected from the League. She called to Sparta for assistance but was denied, as Sparta was facing the largest helot revolution in its history (see Third Messenian War). After a three year siege, Thassos was recaptured and forced back into the League. The siege of Thassos marks the transformation of the Delian league from an alliance into, in the words of Thucydides, a hegemony.
In the mean time Athens was engaged in war in the Greek peninsula. While the helot revolution was in its final stages and Kimon in Athens, Argos rose against Sparta. The small force that was sent to quell this was defeated by a joint Athenian and Argos force in Oenoe in 460 BC. The war was generalised, and the allies of Plataea found themselves 19 years later at each other's throat. Several battles followed, the most important of which was in Tanagra. Using the insecurity of the Aegean as a pretext Athens moved the Joint Treasury and the seat of the alliance to Athens in 454 BC/453 BC. The war in Greece was halted in 453 BC when Kimon was recalled from exile and negotiated a five year peace with the Spartans.
Kimon after his recall and the five year peace was sent in Cyprus and Cilicia to fight the Persians. The Persians had helped several cities in Ionia that had tried to defect from the league. With Kimon in Cyprus was sent a force of 200 (according to Thucydides) or 300 (according to Plutarch) triremes. They were facing a force of 300 Persian ships in Cyprus led by Artabazus and 300,000 soldiers in Cilicia led by Megabyzus. Kimon conquered Marion and seized Cition in Cyprus. He sent 60 ships to Egypt. During that siege of Kition he died of a wound or disease. On his deathbed he ordered his army to lift the siege and retreat towards Salamis. His death was kept a secret from the Athenian army and their allies, until 30 days later the Athenians defeated both at land and sea the Persians. According to Thucydides both battles took place in Salamis. According to Diodorus though the land battle took place in Cilicia where the defeated fleet had fled. Thus Kimon, even after his death, defeated the Persians.
The Persians and Greeks continued to meddle in each others affairs. The Persians entered the Peloponnesian War in 411 BC forming a mutual-defence pact with Sparta and combining their naval resources against Athens (see Tissaphernes) in exchange for sole Persian control of Ionia. In 404 BC when Cyrus the Younger attempted to seize the Persian throne, he recruited 13,000 Greek mercenaries from all over the Greek world of which Sparta sent 700-800, believing they were following the terms of the treaty and unaware of the army's true purpose. After the failure of Cyrus, Persia tried to regain control of the Ionian city-states. The Ionians refused to capitulate and called upon Sparta for assistance, which she provided. Athens sided with the Persians, setting off the Corinthian War (see Artaxerxes II). Sparta was eventually forced to abandon Ionia and Persian authority was restored with the peace of Antalcidas. No other Greek force challenged Persia until Phillip II of Macedon, who, in 338 BC formed an alliance called οι Ελληνες (the Greeks), modelled after the alliance of 481 BC, and set in motion an invasion of the western part of Asia Minor. He was murdered before he could carry out his plan. His son, Alexander III of Macedon, known as Alexander the Great, set out in 334 BC with 38,000 soldiers, 30 days provisions, 70 talents of gold, and a debt of 200 talents. Within three years his army had conquered the Persian Empire, brought the Achaemenid dynasty to an end and Greek culture until the banks of the Indus river.
Herodotus, Ιστορίης Απόδειξη (The Histories)
Thucydides, Ξυγκραφη (The Peloponnesian War or History of the Peloponnesian War)
Xenophon, Κυρου Ανάβασις (Anabasis)
Plutarch, Βίοι Παράλληλοι (Parallel lives), Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles
Diodorus Siculus, Ιστορικη Βιβλιοθήκη (Library)
Bengston, Hermann, ed., The Greeks and the Persians: From the Sixth to the Fourth Centuries. New York: Delacorte Press. 1965
Briant, Pierre, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, Peter Daniels, trans. Indiana: Eisenbrauns. 2002
Burn, A.R., "Persia and the Greeks" in The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 2: The Median and Achaemenid Periods, Ilya Gershevitch, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1985.
Cook, J.M., The Persian Empire. New York: Shocken Books. 1983.
Green, Peter, The Greco-Persian Wars. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1996
Hignett, C., Xerxes' Invasion of Greece. Oxford: The Calrendon Press. 1963.
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Pomeroy, Sarah B., Stanley Burstein, Walter Donlan, and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, Ancient Greece: A Political, Social, and Cultural History'. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999.
Wars of Ancient Greece | Wars of Persia | Wars of Cyprus | Wars of Egypt
Гръко-персийски войни | Řecko-perské války | Perserkrigene | Perserkriege | Guerras Médicas | Guerres médiques | Guerras médicas | Grčko-perzijski ratovi | Guerre persiane | מלחמת פרס-יוון | Persicum bellum | Perserkricher | Perzische oorlogen | ペルシア戦争 | Perserkrigene | Guerras Médicas | Războaiele medice | Греко-персидские войны | Grécko-perzské vojny | Грчко-персијски ратови | Grčko-perzijski ratovi | Persialaissodat | Persiska krigen | 波希战争
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It uses material from the
"Greco-Persian Wars".
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