Lincoln, as well as many other leaders and citizens of the northern states, became increasingly impatient with McClellan's slowness to attack the Confederate forces still massed near Washington. The Union defeat at the minor Battle of Ball's Bluff near Leesburg in October added to the frustration and indirectly damaged McClellan. In December, the Congress formed a Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which became a thorn in the side of many generals throughout the war, accusing them of incompetence and, in some cases, treason. McClellan was called as the first witness on December 23, but he contracted typhoid fever and could not attend. Instead, his subordinate officers testified, and their candid admissions that they had no knowledge of specific strategies for advancing against the Confederates raised many calls for McClellan's dismissal.Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 136-37.

McClellan further damaged his reputation by his insulting insubordination to his commander-in-chief. He privately referred to Lincoln, whom he had known before the war as a lawyer for the Illinois Central, as "nothing more than a well-meaning baboon", a "gorilla", and "ever unworthy of ... his high position."McPherson, p. 364. On November 13, he snubbed the president, visiting at McClellan's house, by making him wait for 30 minutes, only to be told that the general had gone to bed and could not see him.Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 132-33.

On January 12, 1862, McClellan was summoned to the White House, where the Cabinet demanded to hear his war plans. For the first time, he revealed his intentions to transport the Army of the Potomac by ship to Urbanna, Virginia, on the Rappahannock River, outflanking the Confederate forces near Washington, and proceeding 50 miles overland to capture Richmond. He refused to give any specific details of the proposed campaign, even to his friend, newly appointed War Secretary Edwin M. Stanton. On January 27, Lincoln issued an order that required all of his armies to begin offensive operations by February 22, Washington's birthday. On January 31, he issued a supplementary order that directed the Army of the Potomac to move overland to attack the Confederates at Manassas Junction and Centreville. McClellan immediately replied with a 22-page letter objecting in detail to the president's plan and advocating instead his Urbanna plan, which was the first written instance of the details presented to the president. Although Lincoln believed that his plan was superior, he was relieved that McClellan finally agreed to begin movement and reluctantly approved. On March 8, doubting McClellan's resolve, Lincoln again interfered with the army commander's prerogatives. He called a council of war at the White House in which McClellan's subordinates were asked about their confidence in the Urbanna plan. They expressed their confidence to varying degrees. After the meeting, Lincoln issued another order, naming specific officers as corps commanders to report to McClellan (who had been reluctant to do so prior to assessing his division commanders' effectiveness in combat, even though this would have meant his direct supervision of twelve divisions in the field).Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 140-41, 149, 160.

Two more crises would hit McClellan before he could implement his plans. The Confederate forces under General Joseph E. Johnston withdrew from their positions before Washington, assuming new positions south of the Rappahannock, which completely nullified the Urbanna strategy. McClellan retooled his plan so that his troops would disembark at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and advance up the Virginia Peninsula to Richmond, an operation that would be known as the Peninsula Campaign. However, McClellan came under extreme criticism from the press and the Congress when it was found that Johnston's forces had not only slipped away unnoticed, but that they had for months fooled the Union Army through the use of Quaker Guns. The Congress's joint committee visited the abandoned Confederate lines and radical Republicans introduced a resolution demanding the dismissal of McClellan, but it was narrowly defeated by a parliamentary maneuver.Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 168-69. The second crisis was the emergence of the Confederate ironclad CSS Virginia, which threw Washington into a panic and made naval support operations on the James River seem problematic.

On March 11, 1862, Lincoln removed McClellan as general-in-chief, leaving him in command of only the Army of the Potomac, ostensibly so that McClellan would be free to devote all his attention to the move on Richmond. Lincoln's order was ambiguous as to whether McClellan might be restored following a successful campaign. In fact, his position was not filled by another officer. Lincoln, Stanton, and a group of officers called the "War Board" directed the strategic actions of the Union armies that spring. Although McClellan was assuaged by supportive comments Lincoln made to him, in time he saw the change of command very differently, describing it as a part of an intrigue "to secure the failure of the approaching campaign."Sears, Young Napoleon, pp. 164-65.

Peninsula Campaign

Early in the campaign, Confederate General John B. "Prince John" Magruder defended the Peninsula against McClellan's advance with a vastly smaller force. Magruder used a system of primitive but effective fortifications that took advantage of waterways such as the meandering and swampy Warwick River to establish the Warwick Line across the Peninsula, anchored by Mulberry Island on the James River on the south and Yorktown on the York River on the north. Then, using the troops he did have, Magruder created a false impression of many troops behind the lines and of even more troops arriving. He accomplished this by marching small groups of men repeatedly past places where they could be observed at a distance or were just out of sight, accompanied by great noise and fanfare. Partially as result of these ruse tactics, McClellan spent much time and resources laying siege to Yorktown and getting large guns in place to overcome a force he miscalculated to be much larger than his own. During this time, General Johnston was able to provide Magruder with reinforcements that were, even then, still far fewer troops than McClellan had miscalculated were opposite him.

Just before he was to launch his offensive against Yorktown, it was learned that the enemy had retreated up the Peninsula towards Williamsburg. McClellan was thus required to give chase without any benefit of the heavy artillery so carefully amassed in front of Yorktown. The Battle of Williamsburg on May 5 is considered inconclusive by historians, but the bulk of the Confederate troops were successfully moved past Williamsburg and behind Richmond's outer defenses while it was waged, and in the next several days.

McClellan had also placed hopes on a simultaneous naval approach to Richmond via the James River. That approach failed following the Union Navy's defeat at the Battle of Drewry's Bluff about 7 miles downstream from the Confederate capital on May 15 1862. Utilizing a strategic bluff high above the water at a bend in the river to base artillery, and sunken craft to create an impassable series of obstacles in the river itself, the Confederates had effectively blocked this potential approach to Richmond.

McClellan's land forces, supported by control of the York and Pamunkey Rivers, and in control of the eastern portion of the Richmond and York River Railroad, came within a few miles of Richmond and, on June 1, his army repelled an attack at Seven Pines. Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston was wounded in this battle, and Jefferson Davis named Robert E. Lee commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. With his line astride the flood-swollen Chickahominy River, McClellan spent the next three weeks repositioning his troops and waiting for promised reinforcements, losing valuable time while the Confederates strengthened Richmond's defenses.

At the end of June, Lee began a series of attacks that became known as the Seven Days Battles. While these attacks failed to attain Lee's goal of crushing McClellan's army, the first of these combined with the appearance of Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson's troops before him (when they had last been reported to be many miles away in the Shenandoah Valley) destroyed McClellan's nerve and convinced him to withdraw his army to a safer base, well below Richmond, on a portion of the James River that was under control of the Union Navy. In doing so, McClellan tacitly acknowledged that he would no longer be able to invest Richmond, the object of his campaign; the heavy siege artillery required would be almost impossible to transport without the railroad connections available from his original supply base on the York River. In a telegram to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, reporting on these events, McClellan blamed the Lincoln administration for his reversals. "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."Beagle, p. 1275. Fortunately for McClellan's immediate career, Lincoln never saw the wire (at least at that time) because it was censored by the War Department telegrapher.

McClellan was also fortunate that the failure of the campaign left his army mostly intact. Military historian Stephen W. Sears wrote, "When he deserted his army on the Glendale and Malvern Hill battlefields during the Seven Days, he was guilty of dereliction of duty. Had the Army of the Potomac been wrecked on either of these fields (at Glendale the possibility had been real), that charge under the Articles of War would likely have been brought against him."Sears, Controversies, p. 16. (During Glendale, McClellan was five miles away behind Malvern Hill, without telegraph communications and too distant to command the army. During the battle of Malvern Hill, he was on a gunboat, the U.S.S. Galena, which at one point was ten miles away down the James River.Sears, Gates, pp. 280, 309.)

Urged to remove McClellan from command, Lincoln compromised by taking some of McClellan's men and some newly organized units to create the Army of Virginia under John Pope, who was to advance towards Richmond from the northeast. Pope was beaten decisively by Lee at Second Bull Run in August. McClellan, who was accused by some of dragging his feet in supplying units to Pope, whom he considered a rival, wrote to his wife before the battle, "Pope will be thrashed ... & be disposed of Lee. ... Such a villain as he is ought to bring defeat upon any cause that employs him."McPherson, p. 525.

Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Antietam

Northern fears of a continued offensive by Robert E. Lee were realized when he launched his Maryland Campaign on September 4, hoping to arouse pro-Southern sympathy in the slave state of Maryland. McClellan's pursuit began on September 5. He marched toward Maryland with six of his reorganized corps, about 84,000 men, while leaving two corps behind to defend Washington. Lee divided his forces into multiple columns, spread apart widely as he moved into Maryland and also maneuvered to capture the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry. This was a risky move for a smaller army, but Lee was counting on his knowledge of McClellan's temperament. He told one of his generals, "He is an able general but a very cautious one. His army is in a very demoralized and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offensive operations—or he will not think it so—for three or four weeks. Before that time I hope to be on the Susquehanna."Bailey, p. 21. This was not a completely accurate assessment, but McClellan's army was moving lethargically, averaging only 6 miles a day.Bailey, p. 23.

However, Little Mac soon received a miraculous break of fortune. Union soldiers accidentally found a copy of Lee's orders that divided his army and delivered them to McClellan's headquarters in Frederick, Maryland, on September 13. Upon realizing the intelligence value of this discovery, McClellan threw up his arms and exclaimed, "Now I know what to do!" He waved the order at his old Army friend, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, and said, "Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip Bobbie Lee, I will be willing to go home." He telegraphed President Lincoln: "I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but I am confident, and no time shall be lost. I think Lee has made a gross mistake, and that he will be severely punished for it. I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. ... Will send you trophies.".Sears, Landscape, p. 113.

Despite this show of bravado, McClellan continued his cautious line. After telegraphing to the president at noon on September 13, he ordered his units to set out for the South Mountain passes the following morning. The 18 hours of delay allowed Lee time to react, because he received intelligence from a Confederate sympathizer that McClellan knew of his plans. (The delay also doomed the federal garrison at Harpers Ferry because the relief column McClellan sent could not reach them before they surrendered to Stonewall Jackson.)Sears, Landscape, pp. 120-21. In the Battle of South Mountain, McClellan's army was able to punch through the defended passes that separated them from Lee, but also gave Lee time enough to concentrate many of his men at Sharpsburg, Maryland. The Union army reached Antietam Creek, to the east of Sharpsburg, on the evening of September 15. A planned attack on September 16 was put off due to early morning fog, allowing Lee to prepare his defenses with an army less than half the size of McClellan's.

The Battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862, was the single bloodiest day in American military history. The outnumbered Confederate forces fought desperately and well. Despite significant advantages in manpower, McClellan was unable to concentrate his forces effectively, which meant that Lee was able to shift his defenders to parry each of three Union thrusts, launched separately and sequentially against the Confederate left, center, and finally the right. And McClellan was unwilling to employ his ample reserve forces to capitalize on localized successes. Historian James M. McPherson has pointed out that the two corps McClellan kept in reserve were in fact larger than Lee's entire force. The reason for McClellan's reluctance was that he was, as with previous battles, convinced he was outnumbered.McPherson, Crossroads, pp. 129-30.

The battle was tactically inconclusive, although Lee technically was defeated because he withdrew first from the battlefield and retreated back to Virginia. McClellan wired to Washington, "Our victory was complete. The enemy is driven back into Virginia." Yet there was obvious disappointment that McClellan had not crushed Lee, who was fighting with a smaller army with its back to the Potomac River. Although McClellan's subordinates can claim their share of responsibility for delays (such as Ambrose Burnside's misadventures at Burnside Bridge) and blunders (Edwin V. Sumner's attack without reconnaissance), these were localized problems from which the full army could have recovered. As with the decisive battles in the Seven Days, McClellan's headquarters were too far to the rear to allow his personal control over the battle. He made no use of his cavalry forces for reconnaissance. He did not share his overall battle plans with his corps commanders, which prevented them from using initiative outside of their sectors. And he was far too willing to accept cautious advice about saving his reserves, such as when a significant breakthrough in the center of the Confederate line could have been exploited, but Fitz John Porter is said to have told McClellan, "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic."Bailey, p. 141.

Despite being a tactical draw, Antietam is considered a turning point of the war and a victory for the Union because it ended Lee's strategic campaign (his first invasion of the North) and it allowed President Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, taking effect on January 1, 1863. Although Lincoln had intended to do so earlier, he was advised by his Cabinet to make this announcement after a Union victory to avoid the perception that it was issued out of desperation. The Union victory and Lincoln's proclamation played a considerable role in dissuading the governments of France and Britain from recognizing the Confederacy; some suspected they were planning to do so in the aftermath of another Union defeat.McPherson, Crossroads, p. 155. McClellan had no prior knowledge that the plans for emancipation rested on his battle performance.

When McClellan failed to pursue Lee aggressively after Antietam, Lincoln removed him from command on November 5 and replaced him with Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside on November 9. McClellan wrote to his wife, "Those in whose judgment I rely tell me that I fought the battle splendidly and that it was a masterpiece of art. ... I feel I have done all that can be asked in twice saving the country. ... I feel some little pride in having, with a beaten & demoralized army, defeated Lee so utterly. ... Well, one of these days history will I trust do me justice."McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 545. He was never given another command.

Resumption of civilian career

He supported continuation of the war, but the party convention wrote an anti-war platform that he repudiated. The deep division in the party, the unity of the Republicans (running under the label "National Union Party"), and the military successes by Union forces in the fall of 1864 doomed McClellan's candidacy. Lincoln won the election handily, with 212 Electoral College votes to 21 and a popular vote margin of half a million.McPherson, p. 805. While McClellan was highly popular among the troops when he was commander, they voted for Lincoln over him by margins of 3-1 or higher.

After the war, McClellan was appointed chief engineer of the New York City Department of Docks. In 1872, he was named the president of the Atlantic & Great Western Railroad, and became involved with the Pennsylvania Railroad's South Improvement Company rate-rebate scheme intended to secretly benefit John D. Rockefeller Jr. who was developing Standard Oil.

Also in 1872, McClellan was among the many investors who were deceived by Philip Arnold in a famous diamond and gemstone hoax.

In 1877, McClellan was elected Governor of New Jersey as a Democrat, serving from 1878 to 1881. His final years were devoted to traveling and writing. He justified his military career in McClellan’s Own Story, published posthumously in 1887.

He died in 1885 at Orange, New Jersey, and is buried at Riverview Cemetery in Trenton.

McClellan's son, George B. McClellan, Jr. (1865 – 1940), was also a politician, and served as a United States Representative from New York State and as Mayor of New York City from 1904 to 1909. His daughter, Mary ("May") (1861 – 1945), married a French diplomat and spent much of her life abroad. His wife Ellen died in Nice, France, while visiting May at "Villa Antietam." Neither Max nor May gave the McClellans any grandchildren.Sears, Young Napoleon, p. 404.

Controversial legacy

McClellan's reluctance to press his enemy aggressively was probably not a matter of personal courage, which he demonstrated well enough by his bravery under fire in the Mexican War. Stephen Sears wrote, "There is indeed ample evidence that the terrible stresses of commanding men in battle, especially the beloved men of his beloved Army of the Potomac, left his moral courage in tatters. Under the pressure of his ultimate soldier's responsibility, the will to command deserted him. Glendale and Malvern Hill found him at the peak of his anguish during the Seven Days, and he fled those fields to escape the responsibility. At Antietam, where there was nowhere for him to flee to, he fell into a paralysis of indecision. Seen from a longer perspective, General McClellan could be both comfortable and successful performing as executive officer, and also, if somewhat less successfully, as grand strategist; as battlefield commander, however, he was simply in the wrong profession."Sears, Controversies, pp. 19-20.

One of the reasons that McClellan's reputation has suffered is because of his own memoirs. His original draft was completed in 1881, but the only copy was destroyed by fire. He began to write another draft of what would be published posthumously, in 1887, as McClellan's Own Story. However, he died before it was half completed and his literary executor, William C. Prime, editor of the pro-McClellan New York Journal of Commerce, included excerpts from some 250 of McClellan's wartime letters to his wife, in which it had been his habit to reveal his innermost feelings and opinions in unbridled fashion.Sears, Controversies, p. 6. Historians who have studied this material have generally ended up with negative opinions of the man.

While McClellan's reputation has suffered over time, especially over the last 75 years, there is a small but intense cadre of American Civil War historians who believe that the general has been poorly served on at least three levels.McClellan Society website In the first instance, McClellan proponents say that because the general was a conservative Democrat with great natural charisma, radical Republicans fearing his political potential deliberately undermined his field operations. Second, that as the radical Republicans were the true winners coming out of the American Civil War, they were able to write its history, placing their principal political rival of the time, McClellan, in the worst possible light. And lastly, that latter historians eager to jump on the bandwagon of Lincoln as America's greatest political icon worked to outdo one another in shifting blame for early military failures from Lincoln and his micro-managing Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to McClellan. In a similar vein, some feel that Lincoln and Stanton deliberately undermined McClellan because of his conciliatory stance towards the South, which would have resulted in a less destructive end to the war had Richmond fallen as a result of the Peninsula Campaign. Others think that McClellan is criticized mostly for his supposedly repellent and egotistical personality more than his actual field performance.

In memoriam

Selected works

• The Mexican War Diary of George B. McClellan (William Starr Myers, editor), published posthumously, 1917.
• Bayonet Exercise, or School of the Infantry Soldier, in the Use of the Musket in Hand-To-Hand Conflicts (translated from the French of Gomard), 1852. Reissued as Manual of Bayonet Exercise: Prepared for the Use of the Army of United States, 1862.
• The Report of Captain George B. McClellan, One of the Officers Sent to the Seat of War in Europe, in 1855 and 1856, 1857. Reissued as The Armies of Europe, 1861.
• European Cavalry, Including Details of the Organization of the Cavalry Service Among the Principal Nations of Europe, 1861.
• Regulations and Instructions for the Field Service of the United States Cavalry in Time of War, 1861. Reissued as Regulations for the Field Service of Cavalry in Time of War, 1862.
• McClellan's Own Story (William C. Prime, editor), 1887.

References

• Bailey, Ronald H., and the Editors of Time-Life Books, The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam, Time-Life Books, 1984, ISBN 0-8094-4740-1.
• Beagle, Jonathan M., "George Brinton McClellan", Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, Heidler, David S., and Heidler, Jeanne T., eds., W. W. Norton & Company, 2000, ISBN 0-393-04758-X.
• Beatie, Russel H., Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, November 1860 – September 1861, Da Capo Press, 2002, ISBN 0-306-81141-3.
• Eicher, John H., & Eicher, David J., Civil War High Commands, Stanford University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-8047-3641-3.
• McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the nitted States), Oxford University Press, 1988, ISBN 0-195-03863-0.
• McPherson, James M., Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War, Oxford University Press, 2002, ISBN 0-19-513521-0.
• Rowland, Thomas J., George B. McClellan and Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman, Kent State University Press, 1998, ISBN 0873386035.
• Sears, Stephen W., Controversies and Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999, ISBN 0-395-86760-6.
• Sears, Stephen W., George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, Da Capo Press, 1988, ISBN 0-306-80913-3.
• Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, Houghton Mifflin, 1983, ISBN 0-89919-172-X.
• Sears, Stephen W., To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, Ticknor and Fields, 1992, ISBN 0-89919-760-6.

Notes

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Further reading

• Ridgway, James M., Jr., Little Mac: Demise of an American Hero, Xlibris, 2000, ISBN 0-7388-0579-3.

External links

• McClellan Society
• Georgia's Blue and Gray Trail McClellan timeline
• Lincoln and Lee at Antietam
• Mr. Lincoln and New York: George B. McClellan
• National Park Service biography
• Marcy, Randolph B, assisted by McClellan, George B., Exploration of the Red River of Louisiana, in the year 1852 hosted by the Portal to Texas History
• New Jersey State Library biography for George B. McClellan (PDF)

1826 births | 1885 deaths | Union Army generals | Democratic Party (United States) presidential nominees | George Armstrong Custer | Governors of New Jersey | People from Philadelphia | United States Army generals

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