David Malet Armstrong

David Malet Armstrong (born July 8, 1926), often D. M. Armstrong, is an Australian philosopher. He is well-known for his work on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and for his defence of a factualist ontology, a functionalist theory of the mind, and a necessitarian conception of the laws of nature.

Berkeley's Theory of Vision: A Critical Examination of Bishop Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1960.
Bodily Sensations. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1962.
Perception and the Physical World. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1961. 0710036035
A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1968.
Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 0521087066
Universals and Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. 0521217415
The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980. 0802215287
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 0521253438
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 0521374278
Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. 0813307724
A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 0521580641
The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. 0813390567
Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 0521838320

"Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?" Philosophical Review 72 (1963), 417-32.
"Meaning and Communication". Philosophical Review 80 (1971), 427-47.
(with Peter Forrest) "An Argument against David Lewis' Theory of Possible Worlds". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984), 164-8.
"Classes are States of Affairs". Mind 100 (1991), 189-200.

"Interview". In Lee Jobling and Catherine Runcie (eds.), Matters of the Mind: Poems, Essays and Interviews in Honour of Leonie Kramer. Sydney: University of Sydney, 2001, 322-332.

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