Contra (guerrillas)

The Contras (from the Spanish term La Contra, short for 'movement of the contrarrevolucionarios') were the armed opponents of Nicaragua's Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction following the July 1979 overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle (which ended the Somoza dynasty), and continuing throughout the following decade. The label was commonly used by the United States press to cover a range of groups opposed to the Sandinistas, who had little or no ideological unity and many of whom supported the revolution against Somoza. Some references use the uncapitalized form, contra, which means 'against' or 'counter' in Spanish.

History

The Contras initially received financial and military support from the Argentine government and the US through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Contras would later receive aid through clandestine initiatives by figures in the administration of President Ronald Reagan. They received some support from Nicaraguans opposed to the Sandinistas' nationalization of their land, formation of large farming cooperatives, and mistreatment of dissenters. They were opposed by some Nicaraguans as well as foreign human rights organizations who viewed their tactics, which included the targeting of cooperatives, as brutal and indiscriminate.

The earliest group of contras were MILPAS, peasant militias led by former Sandinista supporters. These militias were the majority of the first Contra groups formed in 1980-1981 in Honduras, Nicaragua's northern neighbour, allying in August 1981 as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, FDN) under the command of former National Guard (army) colonel Enrique Bermúdez and Jaime Irving Steidel, a Honduran-born Field Commander, later replaced by Oscar Sobalvarro. A joint political directorate was created in February 1983 under businessman and anti-Sandinista politician Adolfo Calero.

The creation of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) and its armed wing, the Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS), in April 1982 saw a second front open in the war. The group was founded in neighboring Costa Rica by Edén Pastora (Comandante Cero), a former Sandinista and participant in the August 1978 seizure of Somoza's palace. ARDE consisted largely of Sandinista dissidents and veterans of the anti-Somoza campaign who opposed the increased influence of Cuban officials in the Managua junta. Proclaiming his ideological distance from the FDN, Pastora nevertheless styled his force the "southern front" in a common campaign.

A third force, Misurasata, appeared among the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Amerindian peoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following what the government later called an "ill-judged modernisation drive," and what the Miskitos themselves believed to be a genocidal attempt to force the tribes to participate in the revolution. They had a number of grievances against the Sandinistas, including:

Unilateral natural resource exploitation policies which denied Indians access to much of their traditional land base and severely restricted their subsistence activities.
The arrest, imprisonment and subsequent execution of the majority of the Misurasata leadership.
The military occupation, bombing, or deliberate destruction of over half of all Miskito and Sumu villages in the region, and the forced conscription of Indian youth into the Nicaraguan military.
Forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians from their traditional lands to relocation and re-education centers in the interior of the country, and subsequent burning of their villages.
Economic embargoes and blockades against native villages not sympathetic to the government.

In 1983 the Misurasata movement, led by Brooklyn Rivera, split, with the breakaway Misura group of Stedman Fagoth allying itself more closely with the FDN. A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance.

US officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups. In June 1985, they reorganized as the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), under the leadership of Calero, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, all former members of the original Sandinista cadre; after its dissolution early in 1987, the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) was organized along similar lines in May. Splits within the rebel movement emerged with Pastora's defection in May 1984 and Misurasata's April 1985 accommodation with the Sandinista government.

Mediation by other Central American governments under Costa Rican leadership led to the Sapoa ceasefire agreement of March 23, 1988, which, along with additional agreements in February and August of 1989, provided for the Contras' disarmament and reintegration into Nicaraguan society and politics. The agreements also called for internationally-monitored elections which were subsequently held on February 25, 1990. Violeta Chamorro, former Sandinista and widow of anti-Somoza journalist Pedro Chamorro, defeated Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega and became President with the backing of the center-right UNO. Some Contra elements and disaffected Sandinistas would return briefly to armed opposition in the 1990s, sometimes styled as recontras or revueltos, but these groups were subsequently persuaded to disarm.

US military and financial assistance

See also the Iran-Contra affair

A key role in the development of the Contra alliance was played by the United States following Ronald Reagan's assumption of the presidency in January 1981. Reagan accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style socialism and aiding leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. On November 23 of that year, Reagan signed the top secret National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17), giving the CIA the authority to recruit and support the Contras with $19 million in military aid. The effort to support the Contras was one component of the Reagan Doctrine, which called for providing military support to movements opposing Soviet-supported, communist governments.

In 1984, Nicaragua filed a suit in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States (Nicaragua vs. United States), which resulted in a 1986 judgment against the US, calling on it to "cease and to refrain" from the "unlawful use of force" against Nicaragua, through such actions as the placement of underwater mines by CIA operatives and training, funding and support for the guerrilla forces. ^* The court, whose jurisdiction the Reagan administration did not accept, ruled that the US was "in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against another state" and was ordered to pay reparations.

The US, which did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings, maintained that the ICJ's power did not supersede the Constitution of the United States and argued that the court did not seriously consider the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador, whose intervention the court would not accept. The latter argument was affirmed by the primary dissenting justices, including Judge Schwebel of the US who determined that "Nicaragua does not come before the Court with clean hands." ^*

Direct military aid was interrupted by the Boland Amendment, passed by the United States Congress in December 1982, and subsequently extended in October 1984 to forbid action by not only the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency but all US government agencies. Administration officials sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third-parties, culminating in the Iran-Contra Affair of 1986-1987. On February 3, 1988 the United States House of Representatives rejected President Reagan]]'s request for $36.25 million to aid the Contras.

The issue of drug money and its importance in funding the Nicaraguan conflict was the subject of various reports and publications. The 1989 book, Kings of Cocaine, details charges of Sandinista involvement in cocaine smuggling. Barry Seal, a Medellin cartel pilot took photos of a high ranking Sandinista official unloading cocaine shipments at a Sandinista military airport. Senator John Kerry's 1988 Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems." ^* According to the National Security Archive, Oliver North, an important official in the affair, had been in contact with Manuel Noriega, the military leader of Panama later convicted on drug charges, whom he personally met. Critics of the report pointed out that there was no tangible evidence whatsoever, that many of the witnesses (such as Karol Prado) were ever Sandinistas, and as a result, no charges were filed in any country.

The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996, San Jose Mercury News reporter Gary Webb published a series titled Dark Alliance, alleging that the origins of crack cocaine in California was the responsibility of the Contras. [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm Webb's controversial and highly damaging revelations were disputed at the time, but later revelations confirmed some of his findings. Freedom of Information Act inquiries by the National Security Archive and other investigators unearthed a number of documents showing that White House officials, including Oliver North, knew about and supported using money raised via drug trafficking to fund the Contras. The Justice Department denied the allegations.

External links

"Nicaragua 1981-1990: Destabilization in slow motion, by William Blum.
"Dark Alliance", by Gary Webb, San Jose Mercury News, August 1996.
"The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations" - National Security Archive.

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History

US military and financial assistance

Further reading

See also

External links