Chinese nationalism

Chinese nationalism refers to cultural, historiographical, and political theories, movements and beliefs that assert the idea of a cohesive, unified Chinese people and culture under a unified state that is known as China. One difficulty in this definition is the wide variation and ambiguities in the definition of the term Chinese.

Ideological basis

Chinese nationalism has drawn from extremely diverse ideological sources including traditional Chinese thinking, American progressivism, Marxism, and Russian ethnological thought. The ideology also presents itself in many different and often conflicting manifestations. These manifestations have included the Three Principles of the People, Chinese communism, the anti-government views of students in the Tiananmen protests of 1989, Fascist blueshirts, and Japanese collaborationism under Wang Jingwei.

Although Chinese nationalists have agreed on the desirability of a centralized Chinese state, almost every other question has been the subject of intense and sometime bitter debate. Among the questions on which Chinese nationalists have disagreed is what policies would lead to a strong China, what is the structure of the state and its goal, what the relationship should be between China and foreign powers, and what should be the relationships between the majority Han Chinese, minority groups, and overseas Chinese.

The vast variation in how Chinese nationalism has been expressed has been noted by many commentators including Lucian Pye who argues that this reveals a lack of content in the Chinese identity. However, others have argued that the ability of Chinese nationalism to manifest itself in many forms is a positive trait in that it allows the ideology to transform itself in response to internal crises and external events.

Although the variations among conceptions of Chinese nationalism are great, Chinese nationalist groups maintain some similarities. Chinese nationalistic ideologies all regard Sun Yat-Sen very highly, and tend to claim to be ideological heirs of the Three Principles of the People. In addition, Chinese nationalistic ideologies tend to regard both democracy and science as positive forces, although they often have radically different notions of what democracy means.

Chinese self-consciousness

There has been a self-consciously Chinese state for two thousand years, since the Han Dynasty, hence the term Han Chinese, before then loyalty and identity was largely due to each kingdom or clan. The Chinese concept of the world was largely a division between the civilized world and the barbarian world and there was little concept of the belief that Chinese interests were served by a powerful Chinese state. Some authors such as Lucian Pye have argued that the modern "nation state" is fundamentally different from a traditional empire, although some have controversially argued that dynamics of the current People's Republic of China (PRC) share an essential similarity with the Ming and Qing Empires. There were only a few periods in Chinese history when China fought total wars against foreigners (most notably the Mongols, Manchus, and Japanese), whereas all other conflicts were mainly civil wars that led to dynastic changes, although attacks and sinicization of foreigners ("barbarians") who wanted to maintain separate cultural identity had been going on for millennia, groups such as the Thais, Ryukyuans, Tibetans, Vietnamese, and Koreans. This particular property of Chinese history was not conducive to realize a Chinese nation-state until contact with Western countries in the 19th century.

Chinese nationalism and ethnicity

Defining the relationship between ethnicity and the Chinese identity has been a very complex issue throughout Chinese history. In the 17th century, the Manchus invaded the Chinese heartland and set up the Qing dynasty. Over the next centuries they would incorporate groups such as the Tibetans, the Mongols, and the Uyghurs into territories which they controlled. The Manchus were faced with the issue of maintaining loyalty among the people they ruled while at the same time maintaining a distinctive identity. The main method by which they accomplished this was by portraying themselves as enlightened Confucian sages part of whose goal was to preserve and maintain Chinese civilization. Over the course of centuries the Manchus were gradually assimilated into the Chinese culture and eventually many Manchus identified themselves as a distinct Manchurian ethnic minority.

The complexity of the relationship between ethnicity and the Chinese identity can be seen during the Taiping rebellion in which the rebels fought fiercely against the Manchus on the ground that they were barbarian foreigners while at the same time people fought just as fierce on behalf of the Manchus on the grounds that they were the preservers of traditional Chinese values. It was during this time that the concept of Han Chinese came into existence as a means of describing the majority Chinese.

In the late 19th century, Chinese nationalism identified Han with Chinese and argued for the overthrow of the Manchus who were considered outside the realm of the Chinese nation. This led to many rebellions by Han Chinese. Sun Yat-sen once declared: "In order to restore our national independence, we must first restore the Chinese nation. In order to restore the Chinese nation, we must drive the barbarian Manchus back to the Changbai Mountains. In order to get rid of the barbarians, we must first overthrow the present tyrannical, dictatorial, ugly, and corrupt Qing government. Fellow countrymen, a revolution is the only means to overthrow the Qing government!"

After the 1911 Revolution, the official definition of "Chinese" was expanded to include non-Han ethnicities as part of a comprehensive Zhonghua Minzu, although some historians argue that this was due mainly to the realization that a narrow definition of "Chinese" would result in a loss of Chinese territory, and that the Manchus were too sinicized to be considered an outside group.

The official Chinese nationalistic view in the 1920s and 1930s was heavily influenced by modernism and social darwinism, and included advocacy of the cultural assimilation of ethnic groups dominated by the Han state into the "culturally advanced" Han state, to become in name as well as in fact members of the Zhonghua Minzu (Chinese nationality). Furthermore, it was also influenced by the fate of multi-ethnic states such as Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire versus officially monocultural states such as Germany.

Over the next decades Chinese nationalism was influenced strongly by Russian ethnographic thinking, and the official ideology of the PRC asserts that Han Chinese are one of many ethnic groups, each of whose culture and language should be respected. However, many critics argue that despite this official view, assimilationist attitudes remain deeply entrenched, and popular views and actual power relationships create a situation in which Chinese nationalism has in practice meant Han dominance of minority areas and peoples and assimilation of those groups.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese nationalism within Mainland China became mixed with the rhetoric of Marxism, and nationalistic rhetoric become in large part subsumed into internationalist rhetoric. On the other hand, Chinese nationalism in Taiwan was primarily about preserving the ideals and lineage of Sun Yat-sen, the party he founded, the Kuomintang, and anti-Communism. While the definition of Chinese nationalism differed in ROC and PRC, both were adamant in claiming Chinese territories such as Diaoyutai Islands.

In the 1990s, rising economic standards, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the lack of any other legitimizing ideology has led to what most observers see as a resurgence of nationalism within China.

Chinese nationalism and overseas Chinese

Chinese nationalism has had mutable relationships with Chinese living outside of Mainland China and Taiwan. Overseas Chinese were strong supporters of the 1911 revolution.

After decolonization, overseas Chinese were encouraged to regard themselves as citizens of their own nations rather than as part of a Chinese nationalistic project. As a result ethnic Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia have sharply divided the concept of "ethnic Chinese" from the concept of "political Chinese" and have explicitly rejected being part of the Chinese nationalist project.

During the 1960s the People's Republic of China and Republic of China (ROC) maintained different attitudes toward overseas Chinese. In the eyes of the PRC government overseas Chinese were considered capitalist agents, and maintaining good relations with southeast Asian governments was more important than maintaining the support of overseas Chinese. By contrast, the ROC desired good relations with overseas Chinese as part of an overall strategy to avoid diplomatic isolation and maintain its claim to be the sole legitimate government of China.

With the reforms under Deng Xiaoping the attitude of the PRC toward overseas Chinese became much more favorable, and overseas Chinese were seen as a source of capital and expertise. In the 1990s, the PRC's efforts toward overseas Chinese became mostly focused on maintaining the loyalty of "newly departed overseas Chinese", which consisted of mostly graduate students having emigrated, mostly to the United States.

Chinese nationalism and Taiwan

One common goal of current Chinese nationalists is the reunification of Mainland China and Taiwan. While this was the common stated goal of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China before 1991, both sides differed sharply on the form of Chinese reunification.

After 1991, the ROC unofficially moved away from supporting eventual unification to a more ambiguous position. One reason for the ambiguity is the stated threat that the PRC will take military action if a "Republic of Taiwan" is declared. Another reason is that the ROC itself remains split between supporters of Chinese nationalism, who support eventual reunification, and supporters of Taiwan independence, who believe the ROC should be an independent republic separate from the PRC.

Much of the dispute in Taiwan on whether or how to reunify Taiwan and Mainland China has been muted because there is a general consensus on both sides in Taiwan to at least temporarily support the status quo, that is, to continue the current situation. Despite a consensus on status quo, the relationship between Chinese nationalism and Taiwan remains very controversial, with much of the controversy focused on symbolic issues such as the use of the Republic of China for the official name of the government on Taiwan. Broadly speaking, there is little support on Taiwan for immediate reunification and the argument is over issues of culture and how Taiwanese should see themselves. Supporters of the pan-blue coalition tend to see mainland China as an economic and cultural opportunity and believe in greater links between Taiwan and the Mainland China as well as a common Chinese identity, while supporters of the pan-green coalition see Taiwan as an independent nation whose independence should be preserved.

Counter-nationalism and opposition

In addition to the Taiwan independence movement, there are a number of ideologies which exist in opposition to Chinese nationalism.

Some opponents have asserted that Chinese nationalism is inherently backward and dictatorial and incompatible with a modern state. Others have asserted that Chinese nationalism is fundamentally an imperialist and racist ideology which in practice has led to oppression of minority groups such as Tibetans and Uyghurs. On the other hand, Chinese nationalists support Chinese nationalism because it arose in an era of imperialism, and is fundamental to the founding of the modern Chinese state that is free from foreign domination.

Controversial division in northern and southern Chinese nationalism

Edward Friedman has controversially argued that there is a northern governmental, political, bureaucratic Chinese nationalism that is at odds with a southern, commercial Chinese nationalism. This division is rejected by most Chinese and many non-Chinese scholars, who believe that Friedman has overstated the differences between the north and the south, and point out that the divisions within Chinese society do not fall neatly in "north-south" divisions.

Chinese populist nationalism

During the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals have vigorously debated the political meaning and significance of the rising nationalism in China. From their debates has emerged a multifarious populist nationalism which argues that anti-imperialist nationalism in China has provided a valuable public space for popular participation outside the country's political institutions and that nationalist sentiments under the postcolonial condition represent a democratic form of civic activity. Advocates of this theory promote nationalism as an ideal of populist politics and as an embodiment of the democratic legitimacy that resides in the will of the people.

Detractors, however, disparage populist nationalism in China today, especially that expressed on the Internet, as a "hooligan culture" in which "Internet Red Guards" hurl obscenities not only against foreign "devils," but also against moderates and liberals who warn of the excesses and dangers that nationalism could pose to China's modernization. Chinese nationalism has recently found an outlet in anti-Japanese sentiment.

Populist nationalism is a comparatively late development in Chinese nationalism of the 1990s. It began to take recognizable shape after 1996, as a joint result of the evolving nationalist thinking of the early 1990s and the ongoing debates on modernity, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and their political implications -- debates that have engaged many Chinese intellectuals since early 1995.

Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and China Can Say No

The end of the Cold War has seen the revival throughout the world of nationalist sentiments and aspirations. In China, the rapid decay of communist ideology had led the CPC to emphasize its role as the paramount patriotic force and the guardian of the national pride in order to find a new basis to sustain its role. However, nationalist sentiment is not the sole province of the CPC. One truly remarkable phenomenon in the post-Cold War upsurge of Chinese nationalism is that Chinese intellectuals became one of the driving forces. Many well-educated people--social scientists, humanities scholars, writers and other professionals -- have given voice to and even become articulators for rising nationalistic discourse in the 1990s.

As an indication of the popular, or market origins of recent Chinese nationalist sentiment, all coauthors of China Can Say No, the first in a string of defiant rebuttals to "American imperialism," are college educated, and most are self-employed (a freelancer, a fruit-stand owner, a poet, and two journalists working in the partly market-driven field of Chinese newspapers, periodicals, and television stations).

Ideological basis

Chinese self-consciousness

Chinese nationalism and ethnicity

Chinese nationalism and overseas Chinese

Chinese nationalism and Taiwan

Counter-nationalism and opposition

Controversial division in northern and southern Chinese nationalism

Chinese populist nationalism

Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and China Can Say No

Further reading

See also

Gourt Home::Gourt :: Chinese nationalism

Ideological basis

Chinese self-consciousness

Chinese nationalism and ethnicity

Chinese nationalism and overseas Chinese

Chinese nationalism and Taiwan

Counter-nationalism and opposition

Controversial division in northern and southern Chinese nationalism

Chinese populist nationalism

Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and China Can Say No

Further reading

See also