The California electricity crisis (also known as the Western Energy Crisis) of 2000 and 2001 followed a failed partial-deregulation, in 1996, of the electricity market in the state. The energy crisis was characterised by a combination of extremely high prices and rolling blackouts. Price instability and spikes lasted from May 2000 to September 2001. Rolling blackouts began in June 2000 and recurred several times in the following 12 months.
| Chronology | |
| 1996 | California begins to loosen controls on its energy market and takes measures to increase competition. |
| April 1998 | Spot market for energy begins operation. |
| May 2000 | Significant energy price rises. |
| June 14, 2000 | Blackouts affect 97,000 customers in San Francisco Bay area. |
| August 2000 | San Diego Gas & Electric Company files a complaint alleging manipulation of the markets. |
| January 17-18, 2001 | Blackouts affect several hundred thousand customers. |
| January 17, 2001 | Governor Davis declares a state of emergency. |
| March 19-20, 2001 | Blackouts affect 1.5 million customers. |
| April 2001 | Pacific Gas & Electric Co. files for bankruptcy. |
| May 7-8, 2001 | Blackouts affect upwards of 167,000 customers. |
| September 2001 | Energy prices normalize. |
| December 2001 | Following the bankruptcy of Enron, it is alleged that energy prices were manipulated by Enron. |
| February 2002 | Federal Energy Regulatory Commission begins investigation of Enron's involvement. |
| Winter 2002 | The Enron Tapes scandal begins to surface. |
| November 13, 2003 | Governor Davis ends the state of emergency. |
On one side of the debate, Susan Pope writes of the cause as "a perfect storm, in which a number of unfavorable demand/supply events improbably coincided, leading to increases in electricity prices". The Enron Tapes, while shocking, show that companies were attempting to manipulate the market during this "perfect storm", but only a detailed investigation could show that these attempts succeeded. Even then, the issue remains as to what proportion of the crisis can be attributed to the "perfect storm" and what proportion to market manipulation.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission concluded in 2003:
Part of California's deregulation process, which was promoted as a means of increasing competition, involved the partial divestiture in March 1998 of electricity generation stations by the incumbent utilities, who were still responsible for electricity distribution and were competing with independents in the retail market. A total of 40% of installed capacity - 20,164 megawatts - was sold to what were called "independent power producers." These included Mirant, Reliant, Williams, Dynegy, and AES.
Then, in 2000, wholesale prices were deregulated, but retail prices were regulated for the incumbents as part of a deal with the regulator, allowing the new power producers to recover the cost of assets that would be stranded as a result of greater competition.
When electricity wholesale prices exceeded retail prices, end user demand was unaffected, but the incumbent utility companies still had to purchase power, albeit at a loss. This allowed independent producers to manipulate prices in the electricity market by withholding electricity generation, arbitraging the price between internal generation and imported (interstate) power, and causing artificial transmission constraints. This was a procedure referred to as "gaming the market." In economic terms, the incumbents who were still subject to retail price caps were faced with inelastic demand. They were unable to pass the higher prices on to consumers without approval from the public utilities commission. The affected incumbents were Southern California Edison (SCE) and Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E). Pro-privatization advocates insist the cause of the problem was that the regulator still held too much control over the market, and true market processes were stymied — whereas opponents of deregulation simply assert that the fully regulated system had worked perfectly well for 40 years, and that deregulation created an opportunity for unscrupulous speculators to wreck a viable system.
Prior to deregulation, the electricity market in California was largely in private hands. The main players were PG&E, SCE, and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E). The problems arose from an inefficient deregulation of the market. Ownership of certain power stations was transferred in order to increase competition in the wholesale market. In return for divesting some of their power stations the major utilities negotiated a deal to protect them from their assets being stranded. Part of this deal involved price caps for retail customers.
Megawatt laundering is the term, analogous to money laundering, coined to describe the process of obscuring the true origins of specific quantities of electricity being sold on the energy market. The California energy market allowed for price distinctions between electricity produced in-state and out-of-state. It was therefore advantageous to make it appear that electricity was being generated somewhere other than its true origin.
Overscheduling is a term used in describing the manipulation of transporting electricity along power lines. Power lines have a defined maximum load. Lines must be booked (or scheduled) in advance for transporting bought-and-sold quantities of electricity. "Overscheduling" means a deliberate reservation of more line usage than is actually required and can create the appearance that the power lines are congested. Overscheduling was one of the building blocks of a number of scams. For example, the Death Star group of scams played on the market rules which required the state to pay "congestion fees" to alleviate congestion on major power lines. "Congestion fees" were a variety of financial incentives aimed at ensuring power providers solved the congestion problem. But in the Death Star scenario, the congestion was entirely illusory and the congestion fees would therefore simply increase profits.
In a letter sent from David Fabian to Senator Boxer in 2002, it was alleged that:
Between 2000 and 2001, the combined California utilities laid off 1,300 workers, from 56,000 to 54,700, in an effort to remain solvent. San Diego had worked through the stranded asset provision and was in a position to increase prices to reflect the spot market. Small businesses were badly affected.
S. David Freeman, who was appointed Chair of the California Power Authority in the midst of the crisis, made the following statements about Enron's involvement in testimony submitted before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on May 15, 2002:
Enron eventually went bankrupt, and signed a $1.52 billion settlement with a group of California agencies and private utilities on July 16, 2005. However, due to its other bankruptcy obligations, only $202 million of this was expected to be paid. Ken Lay was convicted of multiple criminal charges unrelated to the California energy crisis on May 25, 2006, but passed away in July of that year before he could be sentenced.
In a speech at UCLA on August 19, 2003, Davis apologized for being slow to act during the energy crisis, but then forcefully attacked the Houston-based energy suppliers: "I inherited the energy deregulation scheme which put us all at the mercy of the big energy producers. We got no help from the Federal government. In fact, when I was fighting Enron and the other energy companies, these same companies were sitting down with Vice President Cheney to draft a national energy strategy."
Signs of trouble first cropped up in the spring of 2000 when electricity bills skyrocketed for customers in San Diego, the first area of the state to deregulate. Experts warned of an impending energy crisis, but Governor Davis did little to respond until the crisis became statewide that summer. Davis would issue a state of emergency on January 17, 2001, when wholesale electricity prices hit new highs and the state began issuing rolling blackouts.
Some critics on the left, such as Arianna Huffington, alleged that Davis was lulled to inaction by campaign contributions from energy producers. Meanwhile, conservatives argued that Davis signed overpriced energy contracts, employed incompetent negotiators, and refused to allow prices to rise for residences statewide much like they did in San Diego, which they argue could have given Davis more leverage against the energy traders and encouraged more conservation. [http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200308/ai_n9286114
The crisis, and the subsequent government intervention, have had political ramifications, and is regarded as one of the major contributing factors to the 2003 recall election of Governor Davis.
On November 13, 2003, shortly before leaving office, Davis officially brought the energy crisis to an end by issuing a proclamation ending the state of emergency he declared on January 17, 2001. The state of emergency allowed the state to buy electricity for the financially strapped utility companies. The emergency authority allowed Davis to order the California Energy Commission to streamline the application process for new power plants. During that time, California issued licenses to 38 new power plants, amounting to 14,365 megawatts of electricity production when completed.
In September 2003, Schwarzenegger was elected Governor of California to replace Governor Davis.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was intimately involved with the handling of the crisis from the summer of 2000. There were in fact three separate FERC investigations.
As of January 2006, the refund case is ongoing.
Energy crises | History of California | Market failure | Scandals
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