In set theory, a field of mathematics, the Burali-Forti paradox demonstrates that naïvely constructing "the set of all ordinal numbers" leads to a contradiction and therefore shows an antinomy in a system that allows its construction.

Stated in terms of von Neumann ordinals

The reason is that the set of all ordinal numbers $\backslash Omega$ carries all properties of an ordinal number and would have to be considered an ordinal number itself. Then, we can construct its successor $\backslash Omega\; +\; 1$, which is strictly greater than $\backslash Omega$. However, this ordinal number must be an element of $\backslash Omega$ since $\backslash Omega$ contains all ordinal numbers, and we arrive at

Stated more generally

The version of the paradox above is anachronistic, because it presupposes the definition of the ordinals due to von Neumann under which each ordinal is the set of all preceding ordinals, which was not known at the time the paradox was framed by Burali-Forti. Here is an account with fewer presuppositions: suppose that we associate with each well-ordering an object called its "order type" in an unspecified way (the order types are the ordinal numbers). The "order types" (ordinal numbers) themselves are well-ordered in a natural way, and this well-ordering must have an order type $\backslash Omega$. It is easily shown in naïve set theory (and remains true in ZFC but not in New Foundations) that the order type of all ordinal numbers less than a fixed $\backslash alpha$ is $\backslash alpha$ itself. So the order type of all ordinal numbers less than $\backslash Omega$ is $\backslash Omega$ itself. But this means that $\backslash Omega$, being the order type of a proper initial segment of the ordinals, is strictly less than the order type of all the ordinals, but the latter is $\backslash Omega$ itself by definition. This is absurd!

Notice that if we use the von Neumann definition under which each ordinal is identified as the set of all preceding ordinals, the paradox is unavoidable: the offending proposition that the order type of all ordinal numbers less than a fixed $\backslash alpha$ is $\backslash alpha$ itself must be true. The collection of von Neumann ordinals, like the collection in the Russell paradox, cannot be a set in any set theory with classical logic. But the collection of order types in New Foundations (defined as equivalence classes of well-orderings under similarity) is actually a set, and the paradox is avoided because the order type of the ordinals less than $\backslash Omega$ turns out not to be $\backslash Omega$.

Resolution of the paradox in ZFC

Modern axiomatic set theory circumvents this antinomy by simply not allowing construction of sets with unrestricted comprehension terms like "all sets which have property $P$", as it was for example possible in Gottlob Frege's axiom system. In New Foundations there is a rather different resolution, which is described in that article.

History

The Burali-Forti paradox is named after Cesare Burali-Forti, who discovered it in 1897.

Set theory | Infinity paradoxes

Paradosso di Burali-Forti