Behavioral finance and behavioral economics are closely related fields which apply scientific research on human and social cognitive and emotional biases to better understand economic decisions and how they affect market prices, returns and the allocation of resources. The fields are primarily concerned with the rationality, or lack thereof, of economic agents. Behavioral models typically integrate insights from psychology with neo-classical economic theory.
Behavioral analyses are mostly concerned with the effects of market decisions, but also those of public choice, another source of economic decisions with some similar biases.
Psychology had largely disappeared from economic discussions by the mid 20th century. A number of factors contributed to the resurgence of its use and the development of behavioral economics. Expected utility and discounted utility models began to gain wide acceptance which generated testable hypotheses about decision making under uncertainty and intertemporal consumption respectively, and a number of observed and repeatable anomalies challenged these hypotheses. Furthermore, during the 1960s cognitive psychology began to describe the brain as an information processing device (in contrast to behaviorist models). Psychologists in this field such as Ward Edwards, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman began to benchmark their cognitive models of decision making under risk and uncertainty against economic models of rational behavior.
Perhaps the most important paper in the development of the behavioral finance and economics fields was written by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. This paper, 'Prospect theory: Decision Making Under Risk', used cognitive psychological techniques to explain a number of documented anomalies in rational economic decision making. Further milestones in the development of the field include a well attended and diverse conference at the University of Chicago (see Hogarth & Reder, 1987), a special 1997 edition of the respected Quarterly Journal of Economics ('In Memory of Amos Tversky') devoted to the topic of behavioral economics and the award of the Nobel prize to Daniel Kahneman in 2002 'for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty.
Prospect theory is an example of generalized expected utility theory. Although not commonly included in discussions of the field of behavioral economics, generalized expected utility theory is similarly motivated by concerns about the descriptive inaccuracy of expected utility theory.
Behavioral economics has also been applied to problems of intertemporal choice. The most prominent idea is that of hyperbolic discounting, in which a high rate of discount is used between the present and the near future, and a lower rate between the near future and the far future. This pattern of discounting is dynamically inconsistent (or time-inconsistent), and therefore inconsistent with standard models of rational choice, since the rate of discount between time t and t+1 will be low at time t-1, when t is the near future, but high at time t when t is the present and time t+1 the near future.
Market wide anomalies cannot generally be explained by individuals suffering from cognitive biases, as individual biases often do not have a large enough effect to change market prices and returns. In addition, individual biases could potentially cancel each other out. Cognitive biases have real anomalous effects only if there is a social contamination with a strong emotional content (collective greed or fear), leading to more widespread phenomena such as herding and groupthink. Behavioral finance and economics rests as much on social psychology as on individual psychology.
There are two exceptions to this general statement. First, it might be the case that enough individuals exhibit biased (ie. different from rational expectations) behavior that such behavior is the norm and this behavior would, then, have market wide effects. Further, some behavioral models explicitly demonstrate that a small but significant anomalous group can have market-wide effects (eg. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Applying a version of prospect theory, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) claim to have solved the equity premium puzzle, something conventional finance models have been unable to do.
Presently, some researchers in Experimental finance use experimental method, e.g. creating an artificial market by some kind of simulation software to study people's decision-making process and behavior in financial markets.
A specific example of this criticism is found in some attempted explanations of the equity premium puzzle. It is argued that the puzzle simply arises due to entry barriers (both practical and psychological) which have traditionally impeded entry by individuals into the stock market, and that returns between stocks and bonds should stabilize as electronic resources open up the stock market to a greater number of traders (See Freeman, 2004 for a review). In reply, others contend that most personal investment funds are managed through superannuation funds, so the effect of these putative barriers to entry would be minimal. In addition, professional investors and fund managers seem to hold more bonds than one would expect given return differentials.
Heuristics
Prospect theory - Loss aversion - Status quo bias - Gambler's fallacy - Self-serving bias
Framing
Cognitive framing - Mental accounting - Reference utility - Anchoring
Anomalies
Disposition effect - Endowment effect - Equity premium puzzle - Money illusion - Dividend puzzle -Fairness (Inequity aversion) - Efficiency wage hypothesis - Reciprocity - Intertemporal consumption - Present biased preferences - Behavioral life cycle hypothesis - Wage stickiness - Price stickiness - Visceral influences - Earle's Curve of Predictive Reliability - Limits to Arbitrage - Income and happiness - momentum investing
Traditional economists are also skeptical of the experimental and survey based techniques which are used extensively in behavioral economics. Economists typically stress revealed preferences, over stated preferences (from surveys) in the determination of economic value. Experiments and surveys must be designed carefully to avoid systemic biases, strategic behavior and lack of incentive compatibility and many economists are distrustful of results obtained in this manner due to the difficulty of eliminating these problems. Rabin (1998) dismisses these criticisms, claiming that results are typically reproduced in various situations and countries and can lead to good theoretical insight.
Other proponents of behavioral economics note that neoclassical models often fail to predict outcomes in real world contexts. Behavioral insights can be used to update neoclassical equations, and behavioral economists note that these revised models not only reach the same correct predictions as the traditional models, but also correctly predict outcomes where the traditional models failed.
applied psychology | social psychology | Branches of sociology | Economics | Finance | Market trends
Verhaltensökonomie | Οικονομικά της συμπεριφοράς | Finanzas conductuales | Finance comportementale | Finanza comportamentale
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