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The Battle of Shanghai was the first of the twenty-two major engagements between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War. It was one of the largest and bloodiest battles of the entire war. The Battle of Shanghai escalated the regional, localized war in North China into a full-scale war that would eventually engulf much of China. Before the Battle of Shanghai, China and Japan had been embroiled in incessant, smaller conflicts, often known as "incidents," that saw China lose territorial integrity piece by piece. In the August following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek decided to lead China into total war with Japan, and this decision was based on several reasons, including strategic, domestic, and diplomatic concerns. Staunch Chinese resistance at Shanghai was aimed to stall Japanese advance to help the Chinese government move its vital industries to the interior, while at the same time to attempt to bring the Western Powers to China's side for a foreign intervention in the war. In the fierce three-month battle, the Chinese and Japanese troops fought in downtown Shanghai, in the outlying towns, and on the beaches of the Jiangsu coast where the Japanese made amphibious landings. The Battle of Shanghai was essentially the story of undaunted Chinese soldiers, relying on their small-caliber weapons, defending Shanghai against the overwhelming onslaught of air, naval, and armored striking power of Japan. In the end, Shanghai fell, and China lost a significant portion of its best troops and also failed to elicit any international intervention to check Japanese aggression. However, the battle only signaled the beginning of the eight years of total war against Japan and China's determination to fight to the bitter end.
In Chinese, the Battle of Shanghai is known as Battle of Songhu (). Song (淞) comes from Wusong (吳凇), an alternate name of Suzhou Creek, which runs through Shanghai. Hu (滬) is the abbreviation for the city itself. In Chinese literature, the battle is also referred to as 813, denoting August 13, the date when battle began. In some Japanese sources, the battle is known as the "Second Shanghai Incident" (Japanese: 第二次上海事変), alluding to the First Shanghai Incident of 1932. However, the 1937 Battle of Shanghai was a full-scale battle signifying the beginning of an all-out war between the two countries. The term "incident" traditionally has been used to downplay Japanese invasions of China. The battle itself lasted three months and eventually involved nearly one million troops, and is divided into three stages. The first stage lasted from August 13 to August 22, during which the Chinese army attempted to eradicate Japanese troop presence in downtown Shanghai; The second stage lasted from August 23 to October 26, during which the Japanese began amphibious landings and the two armies fought in a bloody house-to-house battle in an attempt to gain control of the city and the surrounding regions; and the last stage, lasting from October 27 to end of November, involved the retreat of the Chinese army from the flanking Japanese and the resulting combat on the road to China's capital, Nanjing.
Background
The Battle of Shanghai was the first major battle of the Second Sino-Japanese War and escalated the skirmish of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the resulting localized war in North China into a full-scale war that would involve most major regions of China. There were several underlying causes for this.
Strategic reasons
Since the outbreak of war triggered by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937 major combat had occurred in and around North China in military operations collectively known as the Battle of Beiping-Tianjin. Originally, neither China nor Japan expected the skirmish at Marco Polo Bridge to escalate into a full-scale war. Japan had expected a quick ceasefire and further gains of Chinese territory, similar to what had happened in the earlier conflicts of Mukden Incident (1931), January 28 Incident (1932), and the Great Wall Incident (1933). But Chiang Kai-shek saw the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as the boldest attempt yet by Japan to completely separate Hebei, Chahar, Suiyuan, and other northern provinces from Chinese control and incorporate them into Manchukuo. This broke the "Final Point" (最後關頭) of Chiang's tolerance of Japanese aggression in his policy of "internal pacification before external resistance." Chiang was left with no option but to fight a full-scale war with Japan.Chiang Kai-shek and his military advisors believed that the next logical step for the Japanese army was to march from the north, along the Peiping-Hankow and Peiping-Pukow railways, and cut right into Wuhan and areas of Central and East China. The Japanese strategy of advancing from the north to the south would have put the Chinese army in a situation where they had to set up a horizontal defense line, in an attempt to encircle the enemy with pincer movement. However, Chinese military strength in North China was weak and that without an adequate number of trucks and tracked vehicles, the army was not capable of such maneuvers. On the other hand, the Japanese army had total superiority in North China and the mobility of its armor and artillery pieces was unmatched. Furthermore, North China had been under effective Japanese control since the mid-1930s as a result of a series of settlements that "specialized" North China. Chinese military presence in North China was minimal, and the Kuomintang itself was banned from conducting party activity in the Hebei province. In addition, most of the more robust Chinese defense works were built in East China, around the lower Yangtze Delta, instead of in North China. Also as important, Japanese troops could be reinforced from Japan, through Korea and Manchukuo, and finally to North China easily through an efficient system of sea transport and railroads. Chinese troop movement was severely handicapped by the lack of sufficient motorized vehicles and adequate railway lines. The vast majority of Chinese troops must reach the frontline simply by marching. It would have taken the Chinese longer to transport troops from South China to North China than for the Japanese to reinforce from the Japanese home islands. Thus it would have been less strategically sound to transport and redeploy Chinese troops in North China.
In addition, if the Japanese army had made a southward advance from North China and invaded Wuhan and then turned eastward with a push toward East and Central China and encircled the Shanghai-Nanjing region, the Chinese defenders would have been chased to the sea in a scenario similar to the future Battle of Dunkirk. The Japanese navy had total supremacy in Chinese seas and the retreating Chinese forces would have been totally decimated by the enemy as they had nowhere to retreat. Therefore, Chiang decided to establish a second front in Shanghai, to draw enemy troops to the East and Central China Theater. His plan was to force the Japanese to change the north-to-south direction of advance into east-to-west. This way, the Chinese troops would have room in the southwest for them to retreat and regroup should Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan fall to Japan. The Chinese plan was to fight as much as possible to delay the Japanese advance, while time was bought to move the government and vital industries into the Chinese interior. This was the basis of the strategy of trading "space for time."
Political causes
Public opinion and patriotism were very strong factors in Chiang's decision to make a full-scale war with Japan. Chiang's National Government had lost considerable public support with the Chinese populace because it was preoccupied with the pacification of communist insurrections before fighting Japan. Chiang and his military advisers believed that they needed at least several years of internal peace to build up the national army to fight Japan on the same footing, thus it would be wasteful to risk his growing divisions by challenging Japan face to face. On the other hand, if Chiang decided to put up a great resistance, he risked losing his nascent German-trained divisions that were barely ready to meet the enemy head-on. Thus for Chiang, fighting a full-scale war would bolster his public image among the Chinese, but would undermine his political power, which was based on military strength. However, stepping down and making more concessions would make him appear unpatriotic and lose public support, but would maintain his political power. The Battle of Shanghai would prove to be a great gamble for Chiang.In addition, Chiang could not risk losing Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces to Japanese hands. Both Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China at the time, and Shanghai are situated in Jiangsu. Zhejiang and Jiangsu were the economic powerhouse of the lower Yangtze Delta region and much of the industrial progress and political foundation of the "Nanjing Decade" were developed in these two provinces. This region was also the only place in China where the National Government under Chiang Kai-shek had unopposed political authority, since North China was already under Japanese influence, and other provinces were subject to the control of remnant warlords or other Kuomintang militarist factions. Thus, Chiang had to defend Shanghai at all costs since it was situated at the core of his administration.
Diplomatic concerns
Shanghai was a cosmopolitan city and had investments and assets from most major foreign powers, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Traditionally, Western Powers had been unwilling to condemn Japanese aggression because of their preoccupation with the situation in Europe and Japan's anti-Soviet Union political agenda. Thus, to Chiang Kai-shek, the Japanese attack on the city would provide an impetus for the United States and the United Kingdom to enter the war on the side of China. Chiang was confident the war would drastically undercut their commercial investments and would force them to propose a quick settlement on terms acceptable to China. In addition, Japan could not possibly sustain a war against the United States, the greatest economic power, and the United Kingdom, the greatest colonial power.However, appeasement and isolationism permeated the international community and past experience from the 1930s had made it clear that Japanese excursions would not be acted upon by the foreign powers, other than some ineffective censures by the League of Nations. Already in 1935, Chiang's German advisor, General Alexander von Falkenhausen, told him that the Nine-Power Treaty was basically a sheet of scrap paper and that he should place no hope that the international community would come to intervene. Chiang was advised that China must be prepared to fight alone for at least two years of the war, regardless of any changes in the international situation.
Past experience and preparation
Chiang and his advisers were also somewhat confident in raising the stakes of the battle, since the Chinese army had fought the Japanese to a standstill in the January 28 Incident, a short war that occurred in Shanghai in 1932. After that incident, the Chinese government began implementing a series of measures to increase its preparedness for a possible showdown in the lower Yangtze Delta. Because the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement of 1932, brokered after the January 28 Incident, forbade the Chinese from deploying any troops within Shanghai, the Chinese trained its police garrison, whose presence was allowed in the city, in various military tactics unusual for a police force. The planning of the defense of Shanghai was overseen by Zhang Zhizhong, a veteran of the 1932 Shanghai War. Since China did not possess adequate artillery and armor, Zhang Zhizhong believed that the Chinese army should use their numerical superiority and take the initiative, and push the Japanese into the sea before they had a chance to reinforce.In 1933, three military zones, Nanjing, Nanjing-Hangzhou, and Nanjing-Shanghai, were established to coordinate defenses in the Yangtze Delta region. In 1934, with German assistance, the construction of the so-called "Chinese Hindenburg Line" began, with a series of fortifications to facilitate defense in depth. Two such lines, the Wufu Line (吳福線) between Suzhou and Fushan, and the Xicheng Line (錫澄線) between Wuxi and Jiangyin, were in position to protect the road to Nanjing, in case Shanghai should fall into enemy hands. In spring 1937, just barely months before the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the lines were finally completed. However, the necessary training of personnel to man these positions and coordinate the defense had not yet been completed when the war broke out.
Japanese position
Since the outbreak of war on July 7, Japan had focused on conducting military operations primarily in North China, which included provinces such as Hebei, Shanxi, and Chahar. The Japanese invasion caused incessant anti-Japanese protests to break out, and boycotts of Japanese goods had serious repercussions upon Japanese trade in China. The effect was strongly felt in Shanghai because there were many Japanese commercial interests in the city.The Japanese Naval Command had insisted on escalating troop presence to protect both Japanese factories and citizens from a possible confrontation with the Chinese, but the Army Command consistently refused to do so until early August. One reason for this was that the Japanese Army did not wish to deploy in East and Central China, for fear that such action would create a vacuum in North China and Manchukuo, which were regions bordering the Soviet Union. Japan saw the Soviet Union as the primary military threat on the Chinese mainland and did not want to divert attention away from North China. The Japanese Army Command also did not wish to devote troops into Central China, because doing so might steer Japan into confrontations with other foreign powers. In addition, the Japanese Army Command had very low opinion on Chinese fighting capability, and believed that since China had almost always been mired in the civil wars, Chiang Kai-shek would focus on national unification first and would not risk his troops against the vastly superior Japanese.
Thus, Japan wished to defeat China and conclude the war as soon as possible, to avoid disrupting its plans against the Soviet Union. However, the Japanese Naval Command insisted on deploying troops in Central China to destroy any Chinese troops that might be dispatched to North China, where the war was localized. Following the Oyama Incident of August 9, a conflict in Shanghai seemed inevitable. On August 10, naval commander-in-chief Mitsumasa Yonai voiced his demand in the cabinet meeting and faced opposition from army generals Ishiwara Kanji and Umezu Yoshijiro. The two generals insisted that the Shanghai front would be the responsibility solely of the Imperial Navy. After some negotiation, the Army Command acceded to the navy's demand and began deploying troops to the Shanghai region on August 10.
The Japanese military was confident to overcome Chinese forces in Central China in only three days and end the entire war in three months. The Japanese had military garrisons within the city while Chinese military presence, aside from a small Peace Preservation Corps (保安隊) and some fortifications, was strictly forbidden under the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement. The Japanese had many factories and warehouses in the city, and most of them were reinforced for military purposes. The Japanese marines headquarters was near a textile mill and there were more than eighty emplacements and bunkers of various types in the city. The Japanese Third Fleet also had ships patrolling the rivers that ran through Shanghai, and the city was well within the firing range of their guns. In sum, the Japanese army was well prepared to meet the numerically superior, but comparatively under-trained and under-equipped Chinese army.
Prelude to the battle
Oyama Incident
On August 9, First Lieutenant Isao Oyama (大山勇夫) of the Japanese Marines attempted an illegal entry into the Hungchiao Airport (虹橋機場) of Shanghai, and was shot to death by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps stationed near the military airport. It is still not known whether Oyama initiated the intrusion on his own or acted on higher orders. Regardless, the Oyama Incident certainly heightened the tension and saber-rattling in Shanghai. On August 10, the Japanese consul general in Shanghai apologized for Oyama's action, because it was a clear intrusion of Chinese territory. Nevertheless, the Japanese consul general remained firm and demanded that the Chinese withdraw the Peace Preservation Corps and dismantle their defense works around the city. The Japanese consul also made it clear that the shooting of a Japanese officer was a humiliation to the Imperial Army, and the situation was likely to explode at anytime. The shooting incident also caused Japan to send in reinforcements into the Shanghai area on August 10. To Chinese eyes the Oyama Incident was yet another pretext for Japanese military action, similar to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 1937 and the Mukden Incident of September 1931. In response to Japanese troop movements, Chiang Kai-shek began deploying Chinese troops into the Shanghai area on August 11, in direct violation of the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement of 1932.Final efforts at negotiation
On August 12, representatives of the major powers convened and Japan demanded the powers enforce the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Shanghai, but mayor Yu Hung-chun protested that Japan had already violated the agreement through its invasion of China on July 7. The major powers did not wish to see another January 28 Incident, which greatly disrupted foreign commercial dealings in the city. On the other hand, Chinese citizens feverishly welcomed the presence of Chinese troops in Shanghai. In Nanjing, Chinese and Japanese representatives met for the last time for final efforts at negotiation. The Japanese demanded that the Chinese withdraw all Peace Preservation Corps from Shanghai and all regular troops from the vicinities of the city. The Chinese insisted that the Japanese demand of a unilateral Chinese withdrawal was unacceptable since the two countries were already fighting a war in North China. At last mayor Yu made it clear that at most the Chinese government would concede that the Chinese troops would not fire unless fired upon. Japan on the other hand placed all responsibility on China because of Chinese deployment of troops around Shanghai. Negotiation was impossible and there was no alternative other than the spread of war into Central China.Order of battle
See Order of battle at Shanghai.
First phase (August 13 - 22)
Urban fighting
Around 9am on August 13, the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps exchanged small arms fire with Japanese troops in Zhabei, Wusong, and Jiangwan districts of Shanghai. Around 3pm the Japanese army also crossed over the Bazi Bridge (八字橋) in Zhabei district and attacked various centers in the city. The Chinese 88th Division retaliated with mortar attacks. Sporadic shootings continued through the day until 4pm, when the Japanese headquarters ordered the naval ships of the Third Fleet, stationed in the Yangtze and the Huangpu River to open fire on Chinese positions in the city. In the late night of August 13, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Zhang Zhizhong to begin the Chinese offensive the next day. In the morning August 14, the Chinese air force began bombing various Japanese targets and the Chinese ground force began its offensive at 3pm. On the same day the Chinese government issued the Proclamation of Self-Defense and War of Resistance (自衛抗戰聲明書), explaining the government's resolve against Japanese aggression. The Battle of Shanghai officially began.Zhang Zhizhong's initial plan was to have the numerically superior Chinese forces attack the Japanese by surprise and push them right into Huangpu River, and then blockade the coast to deny the Japanese the opportunity to land reinforcements in the Huangpu wharves between Yangshupu (楊樹浦) and Hongkou (虹口). The Chinese 88th Division was to attack the Japanese army headquarters near Zhabei, and the 87th Division was to attack the reinforced Kung-ta Textile Mill, where the Japanese naval command was located. Zhang estimated it would take one week to complete the objectives. However, the operations ran into trouble as the troops fought to a standstill just outside the International Settlement. Japanese strongholds were fortified with thick concrete and were resistant to 150mm howitzers and 500 pound bombs, the only heavy weapons in Chinese possession. Chinese troops could only advance under machine gun cover and get really close to the emplacements to kill those within with hand grenades. The Chinese advance was greatly reduced by this limit and the element of surprise was gradually lost.
On August 16, Zhang Zhizhong ordered his men to take the streets surrounding the Japanese strongholds, rather than assaulting them head-on. Every time a street was successfully cleared, the Chinese would set up sandbag blockades and set fire to allow the Japanese no escape. The tactic was successful as the Chinese were able to destroy many emplacements and outposts in a single day. However, the Japanese then deployed tanks and were able to repel Chinese attacks in the broad streets. The Chinese also ran into the same problem of the lack of heavy weapons to destroy the bunkers easily. Thus, on August 18, the attack was called off.
On August 18, Chen Cheng reached the frontlines to discuss the situation with Zhang Zhizhong. They decided to send the newly arrived 36th Division into the fray, by attacking the Hueishan (匯山) docks on the northern side of the Huangpu River. Meanwhile, the 87th Division broke through Japanese lines at Yangshupu, and pushed onto the Hueishan docks along with the 36th Division. On August 22, the tanks of the 36th Division reached the docks, but were not able to hold the position for long. The Chinese troops were trained insufficiently in coordinating infantry-tank tactics, and the troops were not able to keep up to the tanks' speed. The tanks were vulnerable to Japanese anti-tank weapons and artillery in close quarters and became useless when they entered the city center. The few troops who accompanied the tanks through the city blocks were then trapped by Japanese road blockades and annihilated by flamethrowers and intense machine gun fire. While the Chinese almost succeeded in pushing the Japanese down the Huangpu River, the casualty rate was exceedingly high. In the night of August 22 alone, the 36th Division lost more than ninety officers and a thousand troops.
On August 22, the Japanese 3rd, 8th, and 11th Divisions made an amphibious assault under cover from naval bombardments and proceeded to land in Chuanshakou (川沙口), Shizilin (獅子林), and Baoshan (寶山), towns on the northeast coast and some distance away from downtown Shanghai. Japanese landings in northeast Shanghai suburban areas meant that many Chinese troops, who were deployed in Shanghai's urban center, had to be redeployed to coastal regions to counter the invasion. Thus, the frontline was lengthened from metropolitan Shanghai along the Huangpu River to the northeast coastal districts. The Chinese offensive in the urban center had come to a halt, and the fight in downtown Shanghai essentially became a static battle with both sides suffering heavy losses and making minimal changes in the frontline. The Chinese divisions were able to hold onto Zhabei, Jiangwan, and other downtown positions for three months, until situations in other areas made it strategically impossible to continue defending these positions.
Air operations
On August 14, the Taiwan-based Shikaya and Kisarazu air squadrons of the Japanese air force launched bombing raids against Chinese targets in the Shanghai area. The bombings directly caused tens of thousands of civilian deaths as the explosives landed in populated centers and major transportation hubs. The nascent Chinese air force retaliated and the 4th Flying Group, based in Henan and under the command of Captain Gao Zhihang (高志航), shot down six Japanese planes, while suffering zero losses. This caused a surge of optimism and the government, through radio, immediately announced that August 14 would be the Air Force Day to raise the morale of the Chinese populace. The Chinese air force also bombed various targets in the city and naval ships. From August 15 to 18, the Chinese fought the numerically superior Japanese air force in an intense air battle that saw the two Japanese squadrons destroyed. However, China was fighting the air war with every airplane in its possession, some of them even second-hand purchases from various countries. China was not able to produce any planes of its own and was always running low on replacement parts and supplies for its aircraftSee Soviet Fighters in the Sky of China, by Anatolii Demin. . On the other hand, Japan had a robust aviation industry and was technologically advanced to design and manufacture its own planes and send them to the warzone quite efficiently. Any Japanese losses could be easily reinforced, while China was unable to replace its lost aircraft. Thus, it was inevitable that China would lose air supremacy eventually. In the Shanghai campaign, the Chinese air force shot down 85 Japanese airplanes and sank 51 ships. The Chinese lost 91 planes, which was just under half of the entire air force at China's disposal.
Japanese developments
On August 15, the Japanese formed the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, which was composed of the 3rd and 11th Divisions, under the command of General Matsui Iwane. On August 19, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe announced that by now the Sino-Japanese conflict could only be resolved through war, regardless of any attempts at negotiation by third party nations. Konoe said that the initial plan of localized "containment" around the Shanghai region had now escalated to total war, with the ultimate goal of forcing the Chinese government to cooperate with Japan economically and politically. On August 23, the Japanese began the bombing campaign over Nanjing, and various cities in Central China.Chinese command changes
In the beginning of the battle, Zhang Zhizhong was responsible for the planning and execution of most of the Chinese operations. Zhang was both the commander of the 5th Army and the commander-in-chief for the Nanjing-Shanghai warzone. The failure of the initial Chinese offensive greatly dismayed Chiang Kai-shek and his staff. Chiang criticized Zhang's failure to make sufficient preparations, especially the procurement of weapons capable of penetrating Japanese bunkers, before sending in troops in waves, which resulted in many divisions sustaining a huge number of casualties right from the beginning of the conflict. Zhang was also criticized for his overconfidence and his penchant of holding press conferences, for both foreign and Chinese reporters in the cosmopolitan city. Chiang Kai-shek and his staff, the most prominent including Chen Cheng and Gu Zhutong, began taking over command duties from Zhang Zhizhong. Chiang Kai-shek himself eventually became the commander of the 3rd Warzone that oversaw Shanghai. The Chinese commanders now shifted their attention from the urban fighting in downtown Shanghai to prepare for Japanese landings in the northeast districts.Second phase (August 23 - October 26)
The bloodiest and most intense period of fighting occurred in the period from August 23, when the Japanese began landing in waves, to October 26, when the Chinese retired from metropolitan Shanghai. During this period, the majority of combat concentrated along the 40 kilometer line from metropolitan Shanghai to the town of Liuhe (瀏河), located northeast to the city on the coast where the Japanese made their landings.
Defense against landing (August 23 - September 10)
On August 23, the Japanese Shanghai Expeditionary Force, led by Iwane Matsui, landed in Liuhe, Wusong (吳淞), and Chuanshakou. Chiang Kai-shek had expected these coastal towns to be vulnerable to Japanese landings and ordered Chen Cheng to reinforce the area with the 18th Army. However, the Chinese were no match for Japanese firepower. The Japanese almost always began their amphibious assaults with heavy naval and air bombardment of the Chinese coastal defense works and trenches. It was not unheard of for the Chinese to lose an entire garrison to such bombardments. However, the Chinese were tenacious and would reinforce almost immediately to counter the Japanese troops who had just made their landing after the bombardment.In the two weeks that followed, the Chinese and Japanese troops fought bitter battles in the numerous towns and villages along the coast. The Chinese troops fending off the amphibious assaults had only their small-caliber weapons to depend on, and were not sufficiently supported by the Chinese air force and the inadequate Chinese navy. They paid heavily for the defense. An entire regiment could be reduced to just a few men in action. In addition, Chinese coastal defense works were hastily constructed and did not offer much protection against enemy attacks. Many trenches were newly constructed during the lull of heavy fighting in the coastal villages. Moreover, the sandy soil of the coastal region meant that it was difficult to construct sturdy fortifications. Many trenches would collapse due to rain. It was a race against time to construct and repair these defense works as they were constantly being bombarded by the Japanese. Logistics difficulty also meant it was hard to transport the necessary construction materials to the frontline. The Chinese often had to turn to bombed-out houses for bricks, beams, and others for materials. However, the Chinese fought against great odds and tried to hold onto the coastal villages as long as they could. It was commonplace for the Japanese to successfully occupy the towns in the day under heavy naval support, only to lose it during the night to Chinese counterattacks.
Such attacks and counterattacks continued well into late August, when the fall of Baoshan, a vital coastal town, seemed imminent. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the remaining troops of the 98th Division to defend the town. One battalion, under Yao Ziqing (姚子青), was assigned to the task. The situation in Baoshan was grim, as the Japanese had surrounded the town on September 5. However, Yao ordered his men to defend to the death. Japanese artillery strikes reduced the town to rubble, and Yao was killed in house-to-house fighting. On September 6 Baoshan fell. The entire battalion, except for one soldier, was killed in action. Such level of sacrifice was to continue throughout the Shanghai campaign.
Combat around Luodian (September 11 - 30)
On September 11, with the fall of Baoshan, the Chinese Army moved into defensive positions around Luodian (羅店). Luodian was only a small town, but it was the transportation center connecting Baoshan, downtown Shanghai, Jiading, Songjiang and several other towns with highways. Therefore, the successful defense of Luodian was strategically paramount to the security of Suzhou and Shanghai. As early as August 29, German adviser Alexander von Falkenhausen told Chiang Kai-shek that the town of Luodian had to be held at all costs. For the fight for Luodian, the Chinese concentrated some three hundred thousand soldiers, while the Japanese amassed more than one hundred thousand troops, supported with naval ships, tanks and airplanes.The carnage and intensity of the resulting battle earned the fight for Luodian the nickname "grinding mill of flesh and blood" (血肉磨坊). The Japanese offensive usually began at daybreak with concentrated aerial bombing of Chinese positions. This was followed by the release of observation balloons to pinpoint the exact location of remaining Chinese positions for the artillery and naval strikes to destroy. Japanese infantry would then advance under smokescreen and armored support. Japanese planes would also accompany the infantry and strafe Chinese reinforcements.
Chinese defense was stubborn even in the face of such overwhelming firepower. During the night, Chinese soldiers destroyed highways and mined the paths connecting the coastal towns to Luodian and engaged in night combat to cut off Japanese advance troops. When the day began, the Chinese would garrison the front most defensive lines with comparatively fewer troops to reduce casualties resulting from intense Japanese bombardments. The Chinese would then emerge from rear positions to engage the enemy when the Japanese land offensive started after naval and artillery strikes had ceased.
The defense of Luodian was an uphill battle for the Chinese. In addition to the obvious inferiority of firepower when compared to the Japanese, the Chinese were also in a passive position to face the onslaught, because they were not able to mount effective offensives until the Japanese were practically on top of Luodian. Because of this, the Chinese literally defended to the death to hold onto every square inch of the town. This tactic greatly accelerated the attrition rate within the Chinese ranks. For example, the casualty rate of General Chen Cheng's army group was more than fifty percent. By the end of September, the Chinese had been almost bled dry and were forced to give up Luodian.
Fight for Dachang (October 1 - 26)
On October 1, on the advice from his commanders, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe decided to integrate and escalate the combat in the North China and Central China Theaters and launch an October offensive to subjugate the Chinese government and end the war. By this time, the Japanese had increased troop strength in the Shanghai region to more than two hundred thousand strong. Japanese troops also invaded the town of Liuhang (劉行), south of Luodian. Thus, the frontline moved further south to the banks of the Yunzaobin River (蘊藻濱). The Japanese aim was to cross the Yunzaobin River and take the town of Dachang (大場), which was the communications link between Chinese troops in downtown Shanghai and the northwest outlying towns.If Dachang had fallen, the Chinese troops would have to give up their positions in downtown Shanghai and regions east of the Huangpu River to avoid encirclement by the Japanese army. Thus, the defense of Dachang was vital to how long the Chinese army can stay and continue fighting in the Shanghai warzone. For this, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized whatever remaining troops he could salvage for the defense of Dachang.
The two armies engaged in seesaw battles, with little changes in the frontline along the Yunzaobin River. From September 11 to October 20, the Japanese army was able to advance only five kilometers. At most the positions changed hands five times a day. On October 17, the Guangxi Army under Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi finally arrived to join Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army in the battle for Shanghai. The Chinese then staged a final counteroffensive in an attempt to fully consolidate Chinese positions around Dachang and retake the banks of the Yunzaobin River. However, the counteroffensive was not coordinated well and again the Chinese succumbed to superior Japanese firepower. The Japanese utilized some 700 artillery pieces and 150 bombers for the Dachang operation and the town was totally reduced to the ground. The fighting was so fierce that the average Chinese casualty rate per hour was in the thousands, and a division could be incapacitated in a matter of just a few days. Such fierce fighting continued until October 25, when Dachang finally fell. By then, Chinese troops had no option but to withdraw from downtown Shanghai, which they had held for almost three months.
Third Phase (October 27 - November 26)
Chinese withdrawal from metropolitan Shanghai
Starting the night of October 26, the Chinese began withdrawing from Shanghai urban center. Because Dachang and other vital suburban towns had been lost already, there was no alternative other than to give up all Chinese positions within the city. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Chinese troops to retreat from Zhabei, Jiangwan (江灣), and other positions that the troops had held for seventy-five days without ever faltering. However, Chiang did give directions to have one battalion of the 88th Division remain in Zhabei to defend the Sihang Warehouse on the northern bank of the Suzhou River. Chiang cannot fully retire from downtown Shanghai because the Nine-Power Treaty conference was in session in Brussels for a possible Western intervention in the Sino-Japanese conflict. The rest of the Chinese troops crossed the Suzhou River and regrouped for the final showdown with the Japanese army.Fighting around Suzhou River
Chiang's original plan was to fight in areas south of the Suzhou River and inflict as many Japanese casualties as possible. However, through three months of intense fighting, Chinese troop strength had been greatly reduced. Most units had their strength halved, and as a result a division had the fighting capability of less than two regiments. By now, the Chinese army needed from eight to twelve divisions to match the fighting strength of just one Japanese division. Thus, Chinese commanders were pessimistic about the outcome of the Suzhou River combat. Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Chang Fa-kuei and other commanders insisted that the Chinese troops should enter the Wufu and Xicheng defense lines to protect Nanjing, but Chiang wanted the Chinese troops to make another stand on the southern bank of Suzhou River. On October 28, Chiang Kai-shek even arrived in the battlefield to boost the morale of his troops. However, the situation was bleak. On October 30, the Japanese crossed Suzhou River and the Chinese troops were in danger of envelopment. The Chinese army was at its limit of endurance.Japanese landings at Jinshanwei
As early as October 12, the Japanese chiefs of staffs had already formulated plans to force a landing in Jinshanwei (金山衛), a town located on the northern bank of Hangzhou Bay, south of the Shanghai region. The Jinshanwei landings would facilitate a northward push into Shanghai, to complement the landings in northeastern towns, such as the ones around Baoshan between late August and mid-September, which brought about a southward push. Chiang Kai-shek was aware of the Japanese plan to encircle his army in Shanghai from the north and the south, and had already ordered his commanders to take precautions of the possible Japanese landings at Jinshanwei. However, the impending fall of Dachang in late October forced Chiang to redeploy the Chinese divisions originally stationed along the northern coast of Hangzhou Bay. As a result, the lack of Chinese defenses allowed the Japanese 10th Corps, composed of units diverted from the Battle of Taiyuan in the North China Theater, to land easily in Jinshanwei on November 5. Jinshanwei was only forty kilometers away from the banks of Suzhou River where the Chinese troops had just retreated from the fall of Dachang.Road to Nanjing
Japanese landings at Jinshanwei meant that the Chinese army must retire from the Shanghai front to make a breakout. However, Chiang Kai-shek still placed some hope that the Nine-Power Treaty would result in a military sanction against Japan by the Western Powers. It was not until November 8 that the Chinese central command issued a general retreat to withdraw from the entire Shanghai front. All Chinese units must now move toward western towns such as Kunshan, and then from there enter the final defense lines to stop the Japanese from reaching Nanjing. By then, the Chinese army was utterly exhausted, and with a severe shortage of ammunition and supplies, the defense was faltering. Kunshan was lost in two days, and the remaining troops began moving toward the Wufu Line fortifications on November 13. The Chinese army was fighting with the last of its strength and the frontline was on the verge of collapse.In the chaos that ensued many Chinese units were broken up and lost contact with their communications officers who had the maps and layouts to the fortifications. In addition, once they arrived at Wufu Line, the Chinese troops discovered that some of the civilian officials were not there to receive them as they had already fled and had taken the keys with them. It was devastating that the battered Chinese troops, who had just emerged from the bloodbath in Shanghai and were hoping to enter the defense lines, found that they were not able to utilize these fortifications. Wufu Line was broken through on November 19, and the Chinese troops then moved toward Xicheng Line, which they were forced to give up on November 26 in the midst of the onslaught. The "Chinese Hindenberg Line," which the government had spent millions to construct and was the final line of defense between Shanghai and Nanjing, became indefensible in only two weeks. The Battle of Shanghai was over. However, fighting continued ceaselessly on the road to China's capital and what immediately followed was the Battle of Nanjing, which was itself overshadowed by the Nanjing Massacre after the city had fallen.
Aftermath and appraisal
Loss of Central Army military strength
Even though the Battle of Shanghai was only the first of the twenty-two major battles fought between China and Japan, Chiang Kai-shek's decision to pit his best troops into the battle had significant repercussions. At the outbreak of the war, the Chinese National Revolutionary Army boasted a standing army of some 1.7 million troops, but in reality Chinese military strength was significantly lower. This was because almost all of the troops were poorly trained, poorly equipped, and semi-literate peasants who had little concept of modern warfare. Only about 300,000 were comparatively better trained and were reorganized into some 40 newly-adjusted divisions. Of these, around 80,000 were the best of the best, the German-trained divisions that composed the elite units of Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army. However, even then these divisions were not sufficiently supported by combined arms. Thus, out of a grand total of almost two million men-in-arms, less than one hundred thousand Chinese troops were able to fight Japan more or less vis-à-vis. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to pit all of his crack divisions to fight the grand stand in Shanghai caused his elite units to suffer some sixty percent casualties in the three-month bloodbath. In one single blow, Chiang also lost some 10,000 of the 25,000 junior officers trained by the elite Central Military Academy between 1929 and 1937, in addition to some tens of thousands of potential military officers. Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army was never to recover from these devastating losses. For example, by the time the 88th Division, arguably the best of these elite divisions, began its defense of Nanjing, it had been reduced to seven thousand men, of whom three thousand were new recruits to replace the lost veterans. The destruction of his own military strength also forced Chiang to rely more on other non-Whampoa generals, who commanded the provincial armies and many of whom had questionable loyalty. Because of his reduction in military power, Chiang lost some political leverage to local militarists and was effectively only the head of a loose coalition, rather than the commander-in-chief of a united fighting force. The sapping of China's best fighting men also made the planning and execution of subsequent military operations difficult. In essence, Chiang Kai-shek's concerted pre-war effort to build a truly effective, modernized, national army was greatly devastated by the sacrifices made in the Battle of Shanghai.International response and its consequences
One of the major reasons that the Chinese army held onto the city as long as it did, even though it was on the brink of collapse, was that China was hoping for a western intervention in the Sino-Japanese War. Western nations had been paying little attention to China's plight since they were preoccupied with the situation in Europe, particularly Adolf Hitler's rise and the Spanish Civil War. In addition, most western nations had little prospect that their intervention would help China in the long run because they believed that China would eventually lose. China was militarily weak, economically backward, and politically disunited. It would not make sense for the western powers to help China when seemingly it was bound to be defeated by Japan. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek had to devote everything China had to offer to make sure the Western powers know that the conflict between China and Japan was a major war, not a collection of inconsequential "incidents" as had been the case before. Based on this political strategy, Chiang Kai-shek had to order his troops to fight to the death in an attempt to cause the international community to adopt measures that would help China and sanction Japan. Thus, the course of battle was not determined simply by purely military concerns, but was much influenced by political strategy as well.On September 12, one month after the Battle of Shanghai began, China formally brought the case against Japan to the League of Nations. Again, the League was not able to formulate any effective sanctions against Japan other than an October 4 statement that gave China "spiritual support." The United States was not a member of the League and Great Britain and France were reluctant to challenge Japan. Of all the major western powers, only the United States seemed able to act effectively since it was not embroiled in the volatile European affairs. In addition, on October 5, President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave the Quarantine Speech, calling for the United States to help nations fight against aggressor nations. This speech had a tremendous effect on raising China's morale and further solidified Chiang's hope for western intervention. Because of these images of a stronger America willing to confront Japan, the British representative suggested to close the League case and convene the Nine Power Treaty Conference. Since the Nine-Power Treaty was signed as a result of the Washington Conference of 1922, the opening of the Nine-Power Treaty Conference automatically brought the United States into the effort to rein in Japanese aggression.
American entry into the international response brought new hope to the Chinese, and Chiang Kai-shek again reiterated the need for his troops to hold onto Shanghai to prove that China was indeed worth fighting for. By mid-October, Chinese situation in Shanghai became direr day by day, as the Japanese had made significant gains and the vital town of Dachang had almost fallen. Dachang fell on October 26 and the Chinese withdrew from metropolitan Shanghai. However, because the Nine Power Treaty Conference was to be begin in early November, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his troops to stay in the Shanghai battlefield, instead of retreating to the Wufu and Xicheng Lines to protect Nanjing. He also left one lone battalion to defend the Sihang Warehouse in metropolitan Shanghai. Chiang also visited the frontlines to encourage his troops. On November 3, the Conference finally convened in Brussels. While the western powers were in session to discuss sanctions to check Japanese aggression, Chinese troops were making their final stand in Shanghai and had all hopes for a western intervention that would save China from collapse.
However, the Conference dragged on with little productivity. Japan was invited to the Conference twice but declined, thus a mediation effort directly involving Japan was out of the question. Similar to what had transpired in the League of Nations conference, the western powers, including the United States, were still dominated by isolationism and appeasement. Thus, nothing effective was enacted. On November 5, the Japanese made amphibious landings at Jinshanwei to surround the Chinese troops still fighting in the Shanghai warzone. Chiang was still waiting for the Conference to produce a favorable response and ordered the troops to continue fighting, even though the worn-out troops were in danger of encirclement from the Jinshanwei landings. It was not until three days later on November 8 that the Chinese central command ordered the troops to retire from the entire Shanghai front to protect Nanjing. This three day delay caused a breakdown in Chinese command as the units were devastated by continued fighting, and this directly caused the failure to coordinate the defense around the Chinese Hindenburg Lines guarding Nanjing. On November 24, the Nine-Power Treaty Conference convened for the last time and then adjourned indefinitely, without producing any measures that would stop Japanese aggression. In his report, General Chen Cheng wrote that throughout much of the Shanghai campaign, military strategy was often dominated by political strategy. It was the nation's tragedy that political strategy, especially the one as precarious as the hope for foreign intervention, delayed the troops' breakout from Shanghai and led almost to total annihilation. He wrote that because China was weak, it was in dire need of foreign intervention and had to sacrifice just to prove its capacity to fight and will to resist. By the end of the battle, even though hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops died just to make the point that China was ready to sacrifice, the final hope for a western intervention never materialized.
Effects
In terms of its long-term effects on the war of attrition, the Battle of Shanghai bought enough time for the Chinese government to move some of its vital industries to Wuhan and Xian, and from there to Chongqing, China's wartime capital. The difficulty in dismantling and relocating thousands of tons of machinery and factory equipment, especially in the heat of Japanese bombing campaigns, meant that the Chinese government fell short of its goal of moving the entire industrial base in the Shanghai region. Many factories were destroyed during the fighting and lost their usefulness. Of the nearly twelve hundred factories and workshops of all sizes, only slightly more than ten percent made it out of Shanghai. However, as insignificant as they were, these factories formed the core of China's wartime industry, especially in the bleak days of the blockade of the entire Chinese coast and the closure of the Burma Road. Chiang Kai-shek's strategy of bringing the fight to Shanghai to force Japan to adopt an east-to-west direction of attack also prevented Japan from cutting right into Central China. As a result, the Battle of Wuhan was delayed for almost a year, and the time bought gave the Chinese government a breathing chance during which it recuperated and relocated more resources to Chongqing. Overall, even though Chinese losses were irreparable, the strategy of trading "space for time" proved its worth.The Battle of Shanghai was a military defeat but a high point for Chinese nationalism. The beginning of full-scale war meant that China would no longer stand idly and allow Japan conquer its territories piece by piece as had been the case previously. It also demonstrated China's resolve not to surrender even in the face of overwhelming Japanese firepower. However, Chiang Kai-shek's order to have his troops make one death stand after another greatly sapped his strength and directly caused his army's inability to defend Nanjing for even two weeks. In his memoir, General Li Zongren pointed out that Chiang's staff had proposed that the Chinese army reserve around ten divisions along the Wufu Line to protect Nanjing and felt it made no difference if Shanghai could be held for a few months longer at the expense of huge casualties. However, as China was not able to defeat Japan single-handedly, Chiang believed the best option was to bring the western powers into the war by affecting international opinion through courageous Chinese resistance at Shanghai. Also, Chiang Kai-shek probably did not realize that the war would last as long as it turned out to be - eight years. In his correspondence with Hu Shih, Chiang wrote that China was capable to withstand six months of combat before changes in international situation would end the war. This may have also caused Chiang to devote all of his best troops in the first battle of what would eventually become a protracted war. However, while Chiang's initial assessment was overly optimistic, China continued fighting for eight more years, even when much more powerful nations such as France and others had gone down fighting and surrendered in merely six weeks.
Furthermore, the Battle of Shanghai was the first instance in which the provincial armies cooperated fully with Chiang's Central Army. Only a couple of years before, Chiang Kai-shek, Li Zongren, and several other regional clique leaders had been mortal enemies in various civil wars, fighting for the supremacy over China. But the power of nationalism and a sense of urgency overcame the Chinese leaders and their armies fought side by side against the common enemy. In addition, the Chinese fought stubbornly so that Shanghai would not fall in three days, and that China would not fall in three months as the Japanese had proclaimed in their slogans. This proved to be a huge morale-booster to the Chinese troops, especially in the dark days during which the Chinese army suffered a string of military defeats in the opening stage of the war. In addition, the heavy casualties inflicted by the Chinese and difficulties in conquering the city may have caused the Japanese troops to carry out the Nanjing Massacre as a retributive action against Chinese resistance. China's tenacity and resolve also surprised most international observers who had expected the Chinese to be defeated easily and then sue for peace. All in all, even though the price paid was astronomical, the fact that China was able to withstand repeated strikes one after another and still remain standing in the "bloodiest battle that the world had seen since Verdun" was evidence to China's determination to continue the war and fight to the bitter end.
References
See also
1937 | Battles of the Second Sino-Japanese War | History of Shanghai
"Battle of Shanghai"