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The naval Battle of Port Arthur (February 8-9 1904) was the starting battle of the Russo-Japanese War. It began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers on the Russian fleet anchored at Port Arthur, and continued with an engagement of major surface combatants the following morning.

The Night Attack of February 8-9 1904


Admiral Togo's initial plan was to swoop down upon Port Arthur and deliver a crushing blow to the Russian fleet in a surprise attack soon after the severance of diplomatic relations between the Japanese and Russian governments. However, he received false information from local spies in and around Port Arthur that the garrisons of the forts guarding the port were on full alert, and that several of the Russian battleships had already sortied. Unwilling to risk his precious capital ships to the Russian shore batteries, he held back his main battle fleet, and split his destroyer force into two attack flotillas, one for Port Arthur and the other for the Russian base at Dalny. It was an unlucky arrangement by which nearly half the weight of the attack was lost.

At about 2230 the first Japanese destroyer division evaded patrolling Russian destroyers, but two Japanese destroyers collided and fell behind. At about 0028, the first Japanese division approached the port of Port Arthur without being observed, and launched a torpedo attack against a three-funneled Russian ship and then another against a two-funneled vessel. The two other Japanese destroyer divisions, several of whose ships had lost contact with each other after the earlier collision, were less successful. They arrived too late to benefit from surprise, and made their attacks individually rather than by division. The Oboro made the last attack, around 0200, by which time the Russians were fully awake, and their searchlights and gunfire made accurate and close range torpedo firing impossible.

Despite ideal conditions for a surprise attack, the results were relatively poor. Of the sixteen torpedoes fired, all but three either missed or failed to explode. But luck was against the Russians in so far as two of the three torpedoes hit their best battleships: the Retvizan and the Tsarevich were put out of action for weeks, as was the protected cruiser Pallada.

The Surface Engagement of February 9 1904


Following the night attack, Admiral Togo sent his subordinate, Admiral Shigeto Dewa, with four cruisers on a reconnaissance mission at 0800 to look into the Port Arthur anchorage and assess the damage. By 0900 Admiral Dewa was near enough to make out the Russian fleet through the morning mist. He observed 12 battleships and cruisers, three or four of which seemed to be badly listing or to be aground. The smaller vessels outside the harbor entrance were in apparent disarray. Dewa approached to about 7500 yards of the harbor, but as no notice was taken of the Japanese ships, he was convinced that the night attack had successfully paralyzed the Russian fleet, and sped off to report to Togo. Since Dewa had approached no nearer than 3 nautical miles, it is no wonder that his conclusion was wrong. The Russians had steam up and were lying ready for action.

Unaware that the Russian fleet was ready for battle, Admiral Dewa urged Togo that the moment was extremely advantageous for the main fleet to quickly attack. Although Admiral Togo would have preferred luring the Russian fleet away from the protection of the Russian shore batteries, Dewa's mistakenly optimistic conclusions meant that the risk was justified. Togo ordered the First Division to attack the harbor, with the Third Division in reserve in the rear.

Upon approaching Port Arthur the Japanese came upon Russian destroyer Boyarin, which was on patrol. Boyarin fired on Mikasa at extreme range, then turned and fled. At 1110, at a distance of around 8000 yards, combat commenced between the Japanese and Russian fleets. The Japanese concentrated the fire of their 12" guns on the shore batteries while using their 8" and 6" against the Russian ships. Shooting was poor on both sides, but the Russians were more accurate. It soon became evident that Admiral Dewa had made a critical error. In the first five minutes of the battle Mikasa was hit by a ricocheting shell, which burst over her, wounding the chief engineer, the flag lieutenant, and five other officers and men, wrecking the after bridge.

At 1220 Admiral Togo decided to reverse course and escape the trap. It was highly risky maneuver that exposed the fleet to the full brunt of the Russian shore batteries. Despite the heavy firing, the Japanese battleships completed the maneuver without damage and rapidly withdrew out of range. However, several hits were made on Admiral Hikonojo Kamimura's cruisers as they reached the turning point. At this time Novik closed to within 3300 yards of the Japanese cruisers and fired a torpedo salvo. All missed and Novik received a severe hit below the waterline.

The Battle of Port Arthur thus ended inconclusively. The Japanese suffered no more than 90 killed or wounded, and no ship was seriously damaged. The Russians had 150 killed or wounded, and Bayan, Askold, Diana, and Novik were damaged. Novik, which took the greatest damage, was repaired in only ten days. It was obvious that Admiral Dewa had failed to press his reconnaissance closely enough, and that Admiral Togo's objection to engage the enemy under their shore batteries was justified.

References


  • Kowner, Rotem (2006). "Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War". Scarecrow. ISBN 0-8108-4927-5

  • Nish, Ian (1985). "The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War." Longman. ISBN 0582491142

External links


Battles of the Russo-Japanese War | Naval battles | 1904 | הקרב על פורט ארתור | 旅順攻囲戦 | Obrona Port Artur


 

This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the "Battle of Port Arthur".

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