shape. The Persian fleet (red) waits some way off to the east. This great distance to the ships played a crucial role in the later stages of the battle.]]

During the Ionian revolt the phalanx was seriously weakened by the arrows of the Persian archers before it reached hand to hand combat with them (where it excelled) because it moved slowly in order to maintain formation. This is why Miltiades who had great experience with the Persian army since he was forced to follow it during its campaign in Scythia in 513 BC ordered his army to run. This could have meant that they could end up fighting in disordered ranks. Herodotus however mentions in the description of the battle that the retreat of the center happened in order, meaning that the formation was not broken during the initial rush. This is supported by the fact that there were few casualties in that phase of the battle. The Greek center was reduced to four ranks, from the normal eight. The wings maintained their eight ranks. If Miltiades only wanted to extend the line and prevent the Persian line from overlapping the Greeks, he would have weakened uniformly the whole army so as not to leave weak points. But Herodotus categorically states that it was a conscious decision by Miltiades to strengthen the sides.

The front of the Greek army numbered 250 x 2 (for the center tribes) plus 125 x 9 (for the side tribes and the Plateans) = 1,625 men. If the Persians had the same density as the Greeks and were 10 ranks strong then the Persian army opposing the Greeks numbered 16,000 men . But if the front had a density of 1 meter compared to 1.4 meters for every Greek and had a density of 40 to 50 ranks as was the maximum possible for the plain, (the Persian army had even fought in 110 ranks,) then the Persian army numbered 44,000 to 55,000 . If the Persian front numbered 2,000 men and they fought in 30 ranks (as Xenophon in Cyropaedia claims) they numbered 60,000. Kampouris suggests it numbered 60,000 since that was the standard size of a major Persian formation equivalent to a modern day army corps. Generally modern Greek (and some non-Greek like Bussolt Busolt D. Griechichse Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaeroneia, vol I, Gotha 1893 and Glotz Glotz G., Roussel P., Cohen R., Histoire Grecque vol. I-IV, Paris 1948 ) historians consistently give the Persians numbers ranging from 20,000 to 60,000, or about five times the Athenian/Platean army ^*" target="_blank" >^*" target="_blank" >^*" target="_blank" >^*. If the Persian army was this small then the Eretrians, combined with the Athenians and Plateans could match it, and possibly have sought battle outside Eretria. Naxos alone could field "8,000 shields" in 500 BC Herodotus, IV 30 and with this force successfully defended against the 200-ship Persian invasion 10 years earlier.

The enemies engage in hand to hand combat

As the Greeks advanced, their strong wings drew ahead of the center, which retreated according to plan. The retreat must have been significant since Herodotus mentions that the center retreated towards Mesogeia, not several steps. However ranks did not break since the overall casualties were low and most were attained during the last phase of the battle. The Greek retreat in the center, besides pulling the Persians in, also brought the Greek wings inwards, shortening the Greek line. The result was a double envelopment, and the battle ended when the whole Persian army, crowded into confusion, broke back in panic towards their ships and were pursued by the Greeks. The sides were maintained empty so that the Persian ranks would break, since even a desperate army that maintained numerical advantage after a battle could still defeat its enemy. Some, unaware of the local terrain ran towards the swamps, where they drowned.

Herodotus records that 6,400 Persian bodies were counted on the battlefield, and it is unknown how many perished in the swamps. Also seven Persian ships are mentioned captured though none are mentioned sunk. The Athenians lost 192 men and the Plateans 11, most during the final chase when their heavy armor proved a disadvantage. Among dead was Kallimachus. A story is given to us about Kynaigeirus, brother of the poet Aeschylus who was also among the fighters. He charged into the sea, grabbed one Persian trireme and started pulling it towards shore. A member of the crew saw him and cut off his hand. He then grabbed it with his other arm, which the Persian also cut off. Then he bit the ship with his mouth and continued trying to pull it towards shore. At this point he was decapitated, thus dying.

Aftermath

The Greek upset of the Persians, who had not been defeated on land for many decades, caused great problems for the Persians. The Persians were shown as vulnerable. Many subject peoples revolted following the defeat of their overlords at Marathon. Order was not restored for several years.

Simonides captured the feeling on his famous epigram

Ελλήνων προμαχούντες Αθηναίοι Μαραθώνι

χρυσοφόρων Μήδων εστόρεσαν δύναμιν

which means

Athenians, by first battling for the Greeks at Marathon

humiliated the power of the gold-bearing Medes

For the Athenians, the victory gave confidence to the people. Two years later ostracism was exercised for the first time Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, part 22

Conclusion

The longest lasting legacy of Marathon was the double envelopment. Some historians have claimed it was random rather than a concientious decision by Miltiades. As they say, was it really Cannae before Cannae? Christodoulou Demetrios, Η στρατιωτική ιστορία της αρχαίας Ελλάδος, μία άλλη προσέγγιση (=The military history of ancient Greece, another point of view), Στρατιωτική Ιστορία (=Military history) magazine, issue 20 April 1998, Periscopio editions Athens . In hoplitic battles the two sides were usually stronger than the center because either they were the weakest point (right side) or the strongest point (left side). However before Miltiades (and after him until Epameinondas) this was only a matter of quality, not quantity. Miltiades had personal experience from the Persian army and knew its weaknesses. As his course of action after the battle shows (invasions of the Cyclades islands), he had an integrated strategy on defeating the Persians, hence there is no reason he could have not thought of a good tactic. The double envelopment has been used ever since, e.g. the German Army used a tactic at the battle of Tannenberg during World War I similar to that used by the Greeks at Marathon.

Date of the battle

Marathon run

Another point of debate is which way the runner took. There are two exits from the battlefields. One is towards the south that follows modern-day Marathonos avenue leading through Pikermi over the pass of Stavros Agias Paraskevis and down modern day Messogeion avenue to Athens, which is 40.8 kilometers long. (Following the ancient roads, the modern road has been lengthened somewhat to accommodate vehicular traffic to and from Mesogeia). The other is towards the north, over the modern village of Vranas, up the relatively high mountain pass towards modern day Dionyssos and the northern suburbs of Athens, which is 34.5 kilometers long. It is more likely that the runner followed the safer, shorter but more tiring northern route than the longer but unsafe southern route. For the first modern marathon during the 1896 Olympics the southern route was chosen, probably because it was the main modern route between Marathon and Athens. That event was won by the Greek Spyros Loues who, being a local, knew that he had to conserve forces to pass the Stavros Agias Paraskevis pass, unlike his foreign competitors who were unaware of the terrain and abandoned there. The race today is run over a distance of 42.195 km (26.2 miles). This length was set during the 1908 Olympics because the royal family wanted to see the runners starting from the balcony of the palace.

Evidence that the runner did exist and did run is given by the following popular legend first recorded by Andreas Karkavitsas in the 19th century and also Linos Politis I. Kakrides, Οι αρχαίοι Έλληνες στην νεοελληνική λαική παράδοση (=The ancient Greeks in modern Greek popular traditions), Athens 1989 On the plain of Marathon there was once a big battle. Many Turcs⁽¹⁾ with many ships came to enslave the land and from there pass to Athens... The blood turned into a river, and reached from the roots of Vranas until Marathon on the other side. It reached the sea and painted the waves red. Lots of lamentation and evil took place. In the end the Greeks won... Then two run to bring the news to Athens. One of them went on horseback and the other on foot and in full gear. The rider went towards Halandri and the one on foot towards Stamata. Swift-footed he went up Aforesmos and down towards the village. As women saw him they run towards him:

Stamata, they shouted, stamata'' (=stop). They wanted to ask what happened in the battle. He stopped a moment to catch his breath and then took the road again. Finally he reaches Psychico. There he was almost near death '' (pige na ksepscyhesei) , his feet were shaking, he felt like falling down. But he composed himself, took a deep breath, continued and finally reached Athens.

We won he said, and immediately he fell down and died. The rider has yet to come. But there where the foot runner stopped and took a breath is named after his act. The first village is called Stamata and the second Psychico.

Footnotes