Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM treaty or ABMT) was a treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems used in defending areas against missile-delivered nuclear weapons. On May 26 1972, the President of the United States, Richard Nixon and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The treaty was in force for thirty years, from 1972 until 2002. On June 13 2002, six months after giving the required notice of intent, the US withdrew from the treaty.

Early history

Throughout the late 1950s and into the 1960s, the United States had been developing a series of missile systems with the ability to shoot down incoming ICBM warheads. During this period the US maintained a lead in the number and sophistication of their delivery systems, and considered the defense of the US as a part of reducing the overall damage inflicted in a full nuclear exchange. As part of this defence, Canada and the US established the North American Air Defense Command (now called NORAD).

By the early 1960s, US research on the Nike Zeus missile system (see Project Nike) had developed to the point where small improvements would allow it to be used as the basis of a "real" ABM system. Work started on a short-range, high-speed counterpart known as the Sprint to provide defense for the ABM sites themselves. By the mid-1960s, both systems showed enough promise to start development of base selection for a nationwide ABM system, then known as Sentinel.

At this point an intense debate broke out in public over the merits of such a system. A number of serious concerns about the technical abilities of the system came to light, many of which reached popular magazines such as Scientific American. At the same time there were increasingly concerns that if the system did work, then according to Western nuclear doctrine, the Soviets' best course of action was to immediately launch an attack on the US before the system became operational. A possible alternative Soviet response would have been to develop its own ABM system and so return to strategic parity with the US.

As this debate continued, a new development in ICBM technology essentially rendered the points moot. This was the deployment of the MIRV system, allowing a single ICBM missile to deliver several warheads at a time. With this system the USSR could simply overwhelm the ABM defense system with numbers. Upgrading it to counter the additional warheads would cost more than the handful of missiles needed to overwhelm the new system, as the defenders required one rocket per warhead, whereas the attackers could place perhaps 10 warheads on a rocket that was perhaps the same price as the ABM.

At about the same time, the USSR reached strategic parity with the US in terms of ICBM forces. No longer would a war be a matter of the utter destruction of the USSR with the US able to continue on, now both countries would be devastated. This led in the West to the concept of mutually assured destruction, MAD, in which any changes to the strategic balance had to be carefully weighed. ABMs, now ready for use after over a decade of development, seemed to be far too risky – it was better to have no defense than one that might trigger a war.

In the East however, the concept of MAD was almost entirely unknown - studied only by those in the Russian military and Government who analysed Western military behaviour. Russian military theory fully involved the mass use of nuclear devices, in combination with massive conventional forces. The Collapse of The Soviet Military, William E. Odom, Yale University Press, 1998

As relations between the US and USSR warmed in the later years of the 1960s, the US first proposed an ABM treaty in 1967. This proposal was rejected. Following the proposal of the Sentinel and Safeguard decisions on American ABM systems, the SALT I talks began in November 1969. By 1972 agreement had been reached to limiting strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive systems. Each country was allowed one site at which it could base a defensive system, Moscow and Grand Forks, North Dakota. It was signed in Moscow May 26, 1972, and ratified by the Senate August 3, 1972.

It was seen by many in the West as a key piece in nuclear arms control, being an implicit recognition of the need to protect the nuclear balance by ensuring neither side could ever consider itself immune from retaliation.

In the East, however, it was seen as a way to avoid having to maintain an anti-missile technology race at the same time as maintaining a missile race. The US at this time was allocating about 5% of their GDP on military spending. The USSR was allocating about 40% of their GDP, and this from a much smaller economic base. The Collapse of The Soviet Military, William E. Odom, Yale University Press, 1998

For many years the ABM Treaty was, in the West, considered one of the landmarks in arms limitations. It was perceived as requiring two enemies to agree not to deploy a potentially useful weapon, deliberately to maintain the balance of power and as such, was also taken as confirmation of the Russian adherence to the MAD doctrine; after all, why else would they have signed the treaty? in fact, the West badly misread Russian intentions and their position.

After the SDI announcement

The treaty was undisturbed until Ronald Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on March 23 1983. Reagan stated that SDI was "consistent with... the ABM Treaty" and he viewed it as a defensive system that would help reduce the possibility of mutual assured destruction (MAD) becoming reality; he even suggested that the Russians would be given access to the SDI technology.

The project was a blow to Yuri Andropov's so-called "peace offensive". Andropov said that "It is time they stopped... search[ing for the best ways of unleashing nuclear war... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible. It is insane". Pravda. March 27, 1983

(It should however be noted that the public speeches of Russian figures of State represented a mechanism by which Western policy could be disrupted by influencing public opinion. At the time, Russian State policy in fact consisted of "peaceful co-existence", which, in Marxist-Leninist terms, means using every method except war to promulgate the class struggle and revolution.)

SDI research went ahead, although it did not achieve the hoped result. SDI research was cut back following the end of Reagan's presidency, and in 1995 it was reiterated in a presidential joint statement that "missile defense systems may be deployed... will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and will not be tested to... [create that capability." This was reaffirmed in 1997.

However, as is often the case, the unintended effects of a policy prove to be far more profound than the intended effects.

The competitive pressure of SDI added considerable additional strains to the already creaking Soviet economy. The Soviet economy was essentially a war economy, with mildly increased civilian production; it was already slowly becoming clear that the Soviet economy could not continue as it was, with military spending absorbing 40% of GDP; the additional demands from the military-industrial complex to complete with SDI exacerbated this problem and was part of the longer term situation which led to Gorbachev's efforts at economic reform.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 the status of the treaty became unclear, debated by members of Congress and professors of law, Succession of the ABM Treaty,State Succession and the Legal Status of the ABM Treaty, and Miron-Feith Memorandum. In 1997, a memorandum of understanding ^* between the US and four of the former USSR states was signed and subject to ratification by each signatory, however it was not presented to the US Senate for ratification by President Bill Clinton.

On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush gave Russia notice of the United States' withdrawal from the treaty, in accordance with the clause that requires six months notice before terminating the pact. This was the first time in recent history the United States has withdrawn from a major international arms treaty.

Supporters of the withdrawal argued that it was a necessity in order to test and build a limited National Missile Defense to protect the United States from nuclear blackmail by a rogue state. The withdrawal had many critics as well as supporters. John Rhinelander, a negotiator of the ABM treaty, predicted that the withdrawal would be a "fatal blow" to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and would lead to a "world without effective legal constraints on nuclear proliferation."

Reaction to the withdrawal by both Russia and the People's Republic of China was much milder than many had predicted, and followed months of discussion with both Russia and China aimed at convincing both that development of a National Missile Defense was not directed at them. In the case of Russia, the United States has stated that it intends to discuss a massive bilateral reduction in the numbers of nuclear warheads, which would allow Russia to reduce its spending on missiles. In the case of China, statements by Condoleezza Rice, the then U.S. National Security Advisor, appeared to some observers to suggest that the United States would not object to an expansion of China's nuclear arsenal in a manner that would allow it to overwhelm American anti-ballistic capabilities.

The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty was followed shortly thereafter by the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in Moscow on 24 May 2002, potentially the largest ever cut in deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

References

External links

US Announcement of withdrawal (2001)

Arms control | Cold War treaties | Missile defence | United States treaties

Gourt Home::Gourt :: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Early history

After the SDI announcement

See also

References

External links