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Throughout history, induced abortions have been a source of considerable debate and controversy. An individual's personal stance on the complex ethical, moral, and legal issues has a strong relationship with the given individual's value system. A person's position on abortion may be described as a combination of their personal beliefs on the morality of induced abortion and the ethical limit of the government's legitimate authority.

Overview

Abortion debates, especially pertaining to the legal ramifications of abortion laws, are often spearheaded by advocacy groups. These groups tend to fall into one of two camps, with people in favor of legal abortion describing themselves as pro-choice, while those against legal abortion call themselves pro-life. Both "pro-choice" and "pro-life" are loaded terms designed to make the opposition unappealing (anti-choice and anti-life). Individuals are also usually classified as either pro-choice or pro-life, thus reducing what may be complex views to slogans. See below for links to organizations of both types.

In reality, both pro-choice and pro-life are too simplistic to encompass the full complexity of the debate. A person may be personally uncomfortable with, and morally opposed to, abortion (thus being pro-life) while believing the option of abortion should remain legal (thus being pro-choice as well). Furthermore, individuals often place different value on the lives of zygotes, embryos and fetuses at different points in gestation, putting different methods of abortion in different moral lights.

Underlying this debate is another debate, over the proper role of the state: to what extent should a government be allowed to interfere with a woman's reproduction? This is a major issue in a number of countries, such as India and China, which have tried to enforce types of birth control (including forced sterilization), and in the United States, which has historically limited access to birth control.

The debate also touches upon such related (and themselves controversial) issues as contraception, feminism, gender roles, teen pregnancy, and sexual morality. Many (if not most) opponents of abortion are social conservatives, and are motivated not only by concerns about embryonic life but also by unease with, and opposition to, the modern lifestyle choices that they see the procedure as facilitating.

The abortion debate has a prominent place in political campaigning in many countries. In the United States, the Democratic Party tends to campaign in support of the legal right to an abortion, while the Republican Party tends to campaign against this right. These positions are often part of a more general stance on such related subjects as sex education, birth control, stem-cell research, and euthanasia.

The debate is generally heated but nonviolent, though there have been a small number of cases where violence has been used.

Significant issues

Some of the most significant and common issues treated in the abortion debate are:

  • The beginning of personhood (sometimes phrased ambiguously as "the beginning of life"): When is the embryo or fetus considered a person?
  • Universal human rights: Is aborting a zygote, embryo, or fetus a violation of human rights? What about fetuses with genetic disabilities? On the other hand, is not allowing a woman to terminate her unwanted pregnancy a violation of the woman's human rights?
  • Circumstances of conception: How important are the circumstances of conception to the ultimate fate of the embryo or fetus? Does pregnancy induced by rape or incest, or by poor or non-existent birth control use change the permissibility of abortion?
  • Alternatives to abortion: Is adoption a viable and fair alternative to abortion? Are there resources available to aid mothers who are unprepared for parenthood, but who may wish to keep their child?
  • Limit of government authority: Are laws controlling abortion violations of privacy and/or other personal liberty rights?

Rights

The central dilemma in the abortion debate is the clash of presumed and perceived rights. On one hand is the embryo or fetus's presumed right to life, and on the other is a woman's presumed right to control her body (though the debate over the issue has become so complex that each of these terms has itself been extensively debated). One aspect of the issue involves defining at what point an embryo or fetus qualifies as a person, and gains the legal and/or moral right to life. Even if that could be agreed upon, that right would still need to be weighed against the rights of the woman. Yet another debate is the use of fetal and embryonic remains, such as in stem cell research, the chickenpox vaccine, and even the treatment of patients with Alzheimer's disease.

There is also controversy over the rights of individuals other than the pregnant woman and the embryo or fetus. Debate focuses on whether a pregnant woman should have to notify and/or have the consent of others in the following distinct cases: a minor her parents; a legally married or common-law wife her husband; or a pregnant woman the biological father. In a 2003 Gallup poll in the United States, 72% of respondents were in favor of enforced spousal notification, with 26% opposed; of those polled, 79% of males and 67% of females responded in favor.*

Timing

There are a variety of positions regarding the timing of abortions. These include:

  • Abortion should always be legal.
  • Abortion up to the third trimester should be legal; abortion in the third trimester (so-called late-term abortion) should be illegal.
  • Abortion in the first trimester (or before the embryo or fetus is viable outside the womb) should be legal; abortion after that time should be illegal.
  • Abortion should always be illegal, except in some special circumstances—for example, when the woman's long-term health or life is at stake, when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, or when the infant is deformed or likely to be born disabled.
  • Abortion should always be illegal.

Polarization

While both sides have sought to influence public opinion (pregnant women, doctors, lawmakers, voters) the main concern has been with influencing the law, and hence attaining legal support for their positions. Both have likewise drawn their rhetorical arguments from various domains, such as religion, philosophy, law morality and social pragmatism. Every aspect is controversial — the lethal nature and personal, social, and moral effects of the procedure are compared against the social burdens, and sometimes physiological dangers, of carrying the fetus to term.

Many of the terms used in the debate are controversial and often seen as incomplete or dishonest. For example, the word "choice" glosses over which specific choice is being considered, and opponents sometimes argue that the usage of this term negates any consideration of the developing embryo or fetus. Likewise, the word "life" doesn't specify what sort of life is being talked about, whether living cells or a living person. For pro-life activists, the implication is that the fetus is "alive" as a separate individual, and therefore deserving of culturally-determined personhood. Pro-choice activists, on the other hand, often disagree with the usage of the term because in such a context it does not take into consideration the life of the pregnant woman herself. Furthermore, the terms used by both sides to designate the embryo or fetus can cause heated debate: the clinical term "fetus" is seen by some as a dehumanization tactic, whereas the term "unborn baby" goes in the opposite direction, equating a fertilized cell with a newborn. Calling a pregnant woman a "mother", in addition to being technically inaccurate, likewise adds emotionalism and glosses over the distance between fertilization and birth.

In the case of the murder of a pregnant woman, some U.S. states have passed laws which respect the status of fetal being as a living person — charging separate counts for woman and fetus. Note that there are people who agree that killing a woman who is known to be pregnant qualifies as a two counts of murder but also support the choice to abort. However, due to polarization, pro-choice advocates who might otherwise support these laws often feel the need to oppose them due to the precedent they create, which might then be turned against abortion rights.

Official positions

Pro-life

The "pro-life" argument is that an embryo (or, in later stages of development, a fetus) is a human being — entitled to protection — from the moment of conception and therefore has a right to life that must be respected. According to this argument, abortion is homicide. Many take it a step further and say that, unless this homicide is somehow justified, perhaps because it is necessary to save the life of the woman, then abortion is murder. Pro-life advocates often argue against comprehensive sexual education on the grounds that it encourages extramarital sex and thus sends mixed signals to teens, especially girls. Some pro-life advocates also say that there is a positive correlation between widespread comprehensive sex education in schools and an increase in teen sexual activity. While there is some scientific research to support this, claims that sex education results in a rising rate of teen pregnancies, abortions, and sexually transmitted diseases are not supported. Pro-life advocates also promote maintaining strong families and community advocacy of abstinence until marriage.

Pro-choice

The "pro-choice" argument is that a woman's right to control her pregnancy outweighs any right claimed for the embryo or fetus (which pro-choice advocates do not see as having the full rights of a person). This was the essential holding in the landmark Supreme Court of the United States 1973 decision, Roe v. Wade, and it is accepted by most in the pro-choice community.

Pro-choice advocates regularly argue in favor of comprehensive sex education in high school, contraceptive use, and greater involvement by parents in the lives of their teens as the three best ways to reduce unintended pregnancies and therefore the need for abortions. They may not necessarily endorse teen sexuality, but pragmatically recognize that it will exist even under "abstinence-only" sex education. They also note that teens taught only abstinence are less likely to use forms of contraception should they have sex, and therefore are more likely to become pregnant and develop STIs.

Religious groups

Most orthodox religious groups are opposed to abortion, some viewing it as murder.

  • Christians, including both the Catholic Church and evangelical Christian churches, usually hold this position. Some Christian churches that have become more theologically liberal in the last century hold a pro-choice stance.
  • Buddhists also usually take an anti-abortion stance, citing the Pali Canon which states that life begins at conception. Moreover, in Buddhism killing of, say, a mosquito, would be a direct breach of the precept which forbids destruction of life. However, since killing a mosquito is not as serious as killing a person, ending the potential life of a fetus may not equate to murder. In addition, they consider that abortion is preferable if the woman's life is at risk.
  • Islam generally has the stance that if the woman's life is at stake, abortion is permissible under the principle of Shari`ah, the lesser of two evils. Moreover, there are a number of traditional scholars which state that quickening is a sign that the soul has entered the fetus. Otherwise, there is a wide range of positions within Islam. Abortions are usually not prohibited through the fourth month.
  • Judaism traditionally holds life (including the life of a fetus) as sacred, and does not permit abortion on demand. However, it sanctions (or mandates) abortion under some circumstances, namely when the woman's life is threatened.

A number of churches and religious groups in the United States of America support the limited right of women to obtain a safe, legal, medically supervised abortion. A partial list of those organizations.

Underlying value systems

The majority of both pro-life and pro-choice advocates believe that the values underlying the pro-life position are derived from religious beliefs. Many pro-choice advocates, however, believe that any resulting morals, ethics, and laws built upon religious values are predicated upon an inherent religious bias, in contrast to values derived from scientific fact and unbiased logical reasoning which they believe lead inevitably to morals, ethics, and laws consistent with their own position. Consequently, many pro-choice advocates believe that government regulation of abortion stands as a violation of religious freedom and the principle of separation of church and state which are central tenets of many free societies.

Emotions

Both sides of the debate argue in terms of religion, science, morals, logic, and/or law. But they would hardly be drawn into the debate at all were it not for the very strong emotions involved. The pro-life side of the debate is driven by the strong attachment most people feel toward the life of an infant or fetus. It is also driven by attitudes about sexuality, feminism and the rights of teenagers. The pro-choice side of the debate is driven primarily by their belief that a woman has the freedom to make the ultimate decision regarding the termination or full gestation of her pregnancy. Concerns with poverty, privacy, and the lifelong commitment that comes with bearing children are also topics which relate to pro-choice ideas, and are used in defense against what some perceive as invasive regulation by government and religion.

History

Historically, it is unclear how often the ethics of induced abortion were discussed, since few ancient writers wrote about childbirth. Abortion and infanticide are thought to have been commonplace. Among ancient writers opposed to abortion are Hippocrates of Cos and the Roman Emperor Augustus. The early Christian churches generally opposed abortion, drawing upon early Christian writings such as the Didache (circa 100 A.D.). Since ignorance about pre-natal development prevailed, bans against abortion were in many western countries directed only to the period after "quickening" (the time when the fetus begins moving around, approximately the second trimester). By the mid 19th century, abortion was illegal in the US and much of Europe. In the 1960's, laws against abortion began to change in some parts of the world, but in Germany and Spain abortion is still illegal even in the first trimester, although prosecution is rare. Abortion is legal, and even sometimes encouraged in China and India. In a few countries, such as China, the government sometimes forces women to have abortions.

History of the debate in the United States

In the United States, as in many countries, the scientific, religious, and philosophical communities have remained polarized on most of these issues.

During the early part of the twentieth century, illegal abortions in the U.S. were commonplace — often with the knowledge and tacit sanction of officials. The general rule had been that an abortion would not be performed if the child was "quick" or moving within the womb — which generally happens after about four and a half months of gestation. In the 1973 Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade, limits on abortion were established according to gestational trimester periods, establishing a cutoff at the third trimester unless the woman's health was at risk. In subsequent rulings, the Court rejected the trimester framework altogether in favor of a cutoff at the point of fetal viability (Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey).

The political debate tends to center on questions of legality, though such debates are often based on moral questions. In the United States today, the political debate centers on two questions:

  1. Should "partial-birth abortions" (or "Intact dilation and extraction") for medical reasons related to the woman's health * continue to be legal?
  2. Should parental notification be required before a minor can have an abortion?

There are also those who believe that all abortion should be illegal. This could only be accomplished by a constitutional amendment. Despite widespread belief to the contrary, the Supreme Court reversing itself by overturning Roe v. Wade would not outlaw abortion, but rather make the issue a province of the individual states, likely resulting in a patchwork of laws varying from a complete ban in some states to a full guarantee of abortion rights in others.

On November 5, 2003, United States President George W. Bush signed into law the "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act" which makes it illegal for anyone to perform partial-birth abortion. However, members of the pro-choice community, represented by the ACLU, filed a lawsuit protesting the law, and the act has been blocked. At present, the matter is unresolved; however, on February 21, 2006, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

At this time, it is uncertain if Roe v. Wade would be overturned, but opinion polls consistently show that most Americans accept the court decision as necessary to protect a woman's rights. However, recent shifts in the composition of the high court may change things, especially regarding partial-birth abortion (previously upheld 5-4, Justice Kennedy voting to ban the practice though otherwise supporting abortion rights) where Justice O'Connor (who voted not to ban the practice) has been replaced by Justice Alito (who some believe will vote in favor of a ban).

Related issues, such as requiring parental consent for minors, waiting periods, education, and the "Unborn Victims of Violence Act" are also in contention in some states.

On February 22, 2006, the South Dakota State Senate voted 23 to 12 to ban all abortions in the state except in cases where the woman's life is endangered. * The proposal was signed by the governor on March 6, 2006. *

Modern arguments

Overview

The central arguments in the abortion debate are deontological or rights-based. The view that all or almost all abortion should be illegal generally rests on the claims: (1) that the existence and moral right to life of human beings (human organisms) begins at or near conception-fertilisation; (2) that induced abortion is the deliberate and unjust killing of the fetus in violation of its right to life; and (3) that the law should prohibit unjust violations of the right to life. The view that abortion should in most or all circumstances be legal generally rests on the claims: (1) that women have a right to control what happens in and to their own bodies; (2) that abortion is a just exercise of this right; and (3) that the law should not criminalise just exercises of the right to control one’s own body. Both sides of the debate would grant premise (3) of the central pro-life argument and premises (1) and (3) of the central pro-choice argument.

Although both sides are likely to see the rights-based considerations as paramount, some popular arguments appeal to consequentialist or utilitarian considerations. For example, pro-life advocacy groups (see the list below) sometimes draw attention to the abortion-breast cancer hypothesis, post-abortion syndrome, and other alleged medical and psychological risks of abortion. On the other side, some pro-choice groups (see the list below) claim that criminalizing abortion will lead to the deaths of many women through ‘back-alley abortions’; that unwanted children have a negative social impact (or conversely that abortion lowers the crime rate); or that reproductive rights are necessary to achieve the full and equal participation of women in society and the workforce. Consequentialist arguments on both sides tend to be vigorously disputed, though are not widely discussed in the philosophical literature.

Philosophical argumentation on the moral issue

Contemporary philosophical literature contains two kinds of arguments concerning the morality of abortion. One family of arguments (see the following three sections) relates to the moral status of the fetus—the question of whether the fetus has a right to life, is the sort of being it would be seriously wrong to kill, or in other words is a 'person' in the moral sense. An affirmative answer would support claim (1) in the central pro-life argument, while a negative answer would support claim (2) in the central pro-choice argument.

Another family of arguments (see the section on Thomson, below) relates to bodily rights—the question of whether the woman’s bodily rights justify abortion even if the fetus has a right to life. A negative answer would support claim (2) in the central pro-life argument, while an affirmative answer would support claim (2) in the central pro-choice argument.

Arguments based on criteria for personhood
Mary Anne Warren, in her famous article arguing for the permissibility of abortion,Warren 1973 holds that moral opposition to abortion is based on the following argument:

  1. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings.
  2. The fetus is an innocent human being.
  3. Hence it is wrong to kill the fetus.
Warren, however, thinks that 'human being' is used in different senses in (1) and (2). In (1), 'human being' is used in a moral sense to mean a 'person', a 'full-fledged member of the moral community'. In (2), 'human being' means 'biological human'. That the fetus is a biologically human organism or animal is uncontroversial, Warren holds. But it does not follow that the fetus is a person, and it is persons that have rights, such as the right to life.Warren 1973: 457. The same point is made in Tooley 1972: 40-43; Singer 2000: 126-28 and 155-156; Pojman 1994: 280; and elsewhere. Note that 'person' can also be used in two senses. In John Locke’s sense (often employed in discussions of personal identity), 'person' is a descriptive term that tells us about a being's psychological properties. In Warren's sense, 'person' is a moral or evaluative term that tells us about a being's moral properties. Warren and others hold, however, that being a person in the moral sense actually requires being a person in the psychological sense.

To help make a distinction between 'person' and 'biological human', Warren notes that we should respect the lives of highly intelligent aliens, even if they are not biological humans. She thinks there is a cluster of properties that characterize persons:Warren 1973: 458. Glover 1977:127 and English 1975: 316-317 also refer to a 'cluster' of properties as constituting personhood.

  1. consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain
  2. reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems)
  3. self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control)
  4. the capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics
  5. the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both
A person does not have to have each of these, but if something has all five then it definitely is a person whether it is biologically human or not, while if it has none or perhaps only one then it is not a person, again whether it is biologically human or not. The fetus has at most one, consciousness (and this only after it becomes susceptible to pain—the timing of which is disputed), and hence is not a person.Warren 1973: 458-459

Other writers apply similar criteria, concluding that the fetus lacks a right to life because it lacks self-consciousness,Michael Tooley argues that the bearer of a right to life must conceive of itself 'as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states' (Tooley 1972: 44), or must at some time possess 'the concept of a continuing self or mental substance' (Tooley 1984: 218) or rationality and self-consciousness,Singer 2000: 128 and 156-157; Pojman 1994: 281-2 or 'certain higher psychological capacities' including 'autonomy'.McMahan 2002: 260 These writers disagree on precisely which features confer a right to life,On the pro-life side (see below), it is similarly unclear which features one must have a natural capacity for, in order to have a right to life (cf Schwarz 1990: 105-109), or which features constitute a 'future like ours'. but agree those features must be certain developed psychological features which the fetus lacks.

Arguments of this sort face two main objections. The comatose patient objection claims that as patients in a reversible coma do not satisfy Warren's (or other) criteria—they are not conscious, do not communicate, and so on—therefore they would lack a right to life on her view.Marquis 1989: 197; Schwarz 1990: 89; Rogers 1992; Beckwith 1993: 108; Larmer 1995: 245-248; Lee 2005: 263 One response is that 'although the reversibly comatose lack any conscious mental states, they do retain all their unconscious dispositional mental states, since the appropriate neurological configurations are preserved in the brain.'Stretton 2004: 267, original emphasis; see Glover 1977: 98-99; Singer 2000: 137; Boonin 2003: 64-70 This may allow them to satisfy some of Warren’s criteria.

The infanticide objection points out that infants (indeed up to about one year of age, since it is only around then that they begin to outstrip the abilities of non-human animals) have only one of Warren’s characteristics—consciousness—and hence would have to be accounted non-persons on her view; thus her view would permit not only abortion but infanticide. Warren agrees that infants are non-persons (and so killing them is not strictly murder), but denies that infanticide is generally permissible.Warren 1982 For, Warren claims, once a human being is born, there is no longer a conflict between it and the woman's rights, since the human being can be given up for adoption. Killing such a human being would be wrong, not because it is a person, but because it would go against the desires of people willing to adopt the infant and to pay to keep the infant alive.

Nonetheless, Warren grants that her argument entails that infanticide would be morally acceptable under some circumstances, such as those of a desert island. Philosopher Peter Singer similarly concludes that infanticide, particularly of severely disabled infants, is justifiable under certain conditions.Singer 2000: 186-193 And Jeff McMahan grants that under very limited circumstances it may be permissible to kill one infant to save the lives of several others.McMahan 2002: 359-360 Opponents may see these concessions as a reductio ad absurdum of these writers' views; while supporters may see them merely as examples of unpleasant acts being justified in unusual cases.

The natural capacities view
Some opponents of Warren’s view believe that what matters morally is not that one be actually exhibiting complex mental qualities of the sort she identifies, but rather that one have in oneself a self-directed genetic propensity or natural capacity to develop such qualities. In other words, what is crucial is that one be the kind of entity or substance that, under the right conditions, actively develops itself to the point of exhibiting Warren's qualities at some point in its life, even if it does not actually exhibit them because of not having developed them yet (fetus, infant) or having lost them (severe Alzheimer's). Because human beings do have this natural capacity—and indeed have it essentially—therefore (on this view) they essentially have a right to life: they could not possibly fail to have a right to life.Grisez 1970: 277-287; Lee 1996 and 2004; Lee and George 2005: 16-20; Schwarz 1990: 91-93; Beckwith 1993: 108-10; Reichlin 1997: 22-23; and many others. Note that on Marquis’s view (see below), by contrast, one could fail to have a right to life—for example by becoming irreversibly comatose, since one’s future would then lack valuable experiences and activities. Further, since modern embryology shows (it is said) that the fetus begins to exist at conception and has a natural capacity for complex mental qualities, therefore the right to life begins at conception.

Grounding the right to life in essential natural capacities rather than accidental developed capacities is said to have several advantages.See Lee 2004: 254-255; Lee and George 2005: 18-19; Schwarz 1990: 108-109 As developed capacities are on a continuum, admitting of greater and lesser degrees—some, for example, are more rational and self-conscious than others—therefore: (1) the 'developed capacities’ view must arbitrarily select some particular degree of development as the cut-off point for the right to life—whereas the 'natural capacities' view is non-arbitrary; (2) those whose capacities are more developed would have more of a right to life on the 'developed capacities' view—whereas the 'natural capacities' view entails we all have an equal right to life; and (3) the continuum of developed capacities makes the exact point at which personhood ensues vague, and human beings around that point, say between one and two years of age, will have a shadowy or indeterminate moral status—whereas there is no such indeterminacy on the 'natural capacities' view.This third point is discussed in McMahan 2002: 261-265

Some defenders of Warren-style arguments grant that these problems have not yet been fully solved,McMahan 2002: 261-265; Stretton 2004: 281-282 but reply that the 'natural capacities' view fares no better. It is argued, for example, that as human beings vary significantly in their natural cognitive capacities (some are naturally more intelligent than others), and as one can imagine a series or spectrum of species with gradually diminishing natural capacities (for example, a series from humans down to amoebae with only the slightest differences in natural capacities between each successive species), therefore the problems of arbitrariness and inequality will apply equally to the 'natural capacities' view.Stretton 2004: 270-274 (both responses); McMahan 2002: 217 (spectrum argument only) In other words, there is a continuum not only of developed but of natural capacities, and so the 'natural capacities' view will inevitably face these problems as well.

These problems aside, some critics reject the 'natural capacities' view on the basis that it takes mere species membership or genetic potential as a basis for respect (in essence a charge of speciesism),McMahan 2002: 209-217; Stretton 2004: 275-276 or because it entails that anencephalic infants and the irreversibly comatose have a full right to life.Stretton 2004: 276 (both points); Boonin 2003: 55 (irreversibly comatose only) Moreover, as with Marquis’s argument (see below), some theories of personal identity would support the view that the fetus will never itself develop complex mental qualities (rather, it will simply give rise to a distinct substance or entity that will have these qualities), in which case the 'natural capacities' argument would fail.

The deprivation argument
A seminal essay by Don Marquis argues that abortion is wrong because it deprives the fetus of a valuable future.Marquis 1989. For a similar argument (published earlier), see Stone 1987 and 1994. Marquis begins by arguing that what makes it wrong to kill a normal adult human being is the fact that the killing inflicts a terrible harm on the victim. The harm consists in the fact that ‘when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future’:Marquis 1989: 190 I am deprived of all the valuable ‘experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments’ that I would otherwise have had.Marquis 1989: 189 Thus, if a being has a highly valuable future ahead of it—a ‘future like ours’—then killing that being would be seriously harmful and hence seriously wrong.Marquis 1989: 190. The type of wrongness appealed to here is presumptive or prima facie wrongness: as noted below, it may be overridden in exceptional circumstances. But then, as a standard fetus does have a highly valuable future, killing a standard fetus is seriously wrong.Marquis 1989: 192 And so ‘the overwhelming majority of deliberate abortions are seriously immoral’—‘in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being’.Marquis 1989: 183. Although Marquis views the killing of a fetus or normal human adult as seriously wrong, he avoids any reference to 'rights' or the 'right to life', and so is apparently not committed to deontological ethics.

A consequence of this argument is that abortion is wrong in all the cases where killing a child or adult with the same sort of future as the fetus would be wrong. So for example, if involuntary euthanasia of patients with a future filled with intense physical pain is morally acceptable, aborting fetuses whose future is filled with intense physical pain will also be morally acceptable. But it would not do, for example, to invoke the fact that some fetus's future would involve such things as being raised by an unloving family, since we do not take it to be acceptable to kill a five-year-old just because her future involves being raised by an unloving family. Similarly, killing a child or adult may be permissible in exceptional circumstances such as self-defense or (perhaps) capital punishment; but these are irrelevant to standard abortions.

Marquis’s argument has prompted several objections. The contraception objection claims that if Marquis’s argument is correct, then, since sperm and ova (or perhaps a sperm and ovum jointly) have a future like ours, contraception would be as wrong as murder; but as this conclusion is (it is said) absurd—even those who believe contraception is wrong do not believe it is as wrong as murder—the argument must be unsound. One responseStone 1987: 816-817; cf Marquis 1989: 201-202 is that neither the sperm, nor the egg, nor any particular sperm-egg combination, will ever itself live out a valuable future: what will later have valuable experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments is a new entity, a new organism, that will come into existence at or near conception; and it is this entity, not the sperm or egg or any sperm-egg combination, that has a future like ours.

As this response makes clear, Marquis's argument requires that what will later have valuable experiences and activities is the same entity, the same biological organism, as the fetus.This view, known as 'Animalism' (since it takes you and I to be essentially animals rather than Lockean persons or embodied minds or souls), is defended in Olson 1997 The identity objection rejects this assumption. On certain theories of personal identity (generally motivated by thought experiments involving brain or cerebrum transplants), each of us is not a biological organism but rather an embodied mind or a person (in John Locke’s sense) that comes into existence when the brain gives rise to certain developed psychological capacities.Supporters of the embodied mind view include Tooley 1984: 218-219 (using the term ‘subject of consciousness’); McMahan 2002: ch 1; and Hasker 1999: ch 7. Supporters of the personhood view include Warren 1978: 18; McInerney 1990 (though there is some ambiguity); Doepke 1996: ch 9; and Baker 2000. If either of these views is correct, Marquis’s argument will fail; for the fetus (at least the early fetus, lacking the relevant psychological capacities) would not itself have a future of value, but would merely have the potential to give rise to a different entity, an embodied mind or a person, that would have a future of value. The success of Marquis’s argument thus depends on one’s favored account of personal identity.

The interests objection claims that what makes murder wrong is not just the deprivation of a valuable future, but the deprivation of a future that one has an interest in. The fetus has no conscious interest in its future, and so (the objection concludes) to kill it is not wrong. The defender of Marquis-style arguments may, however, give the counterexample of the suicidal teenager who takes no interest in his or her future, but killing whom is nonetheless wrong and murder.Marquis 1989: 198 If the opponent responds that one can have an interest in one's future without taking an interest in it, then the defender of the Marquis-style argument can claim that this applies to the fetus.Cf Stone 1994: 282 n 4 Similarly, if an opponent claims that what is crucial is having a valuable future which one would, under ideal conditions, desire to preserve (whether or not one does in fact desire to preserve it),Boonin 2003: 70-85 then the defender may ask why the fetus would not, under ideal conditions, desire to preserve its future.

The equality objection claims that Marquis’s argument leads to unacceptable inequalities.Paske 1998: 365; Stretton 2004: 250-260; see also McMahan 2002: 234-235 and 271 If, as Marquis claims, killing is wrong because it deprives the victim of a valuable future, then, since some futures appear to contain much more value than others—a 9 year old has a much longer future than a 90 year old, a middle class person’s future has much less gratuitous pain and suffering than someone in extreme poverty—some killings would turn out to be much more wrong than others. But as this is strongly counterintuitive (most people believe all killings are equally wrong, other things being equal), Marquis’s argument must be mistaken. Some writers have concluded that the wrongness of killing arises not from the harm it causes the victim (since this varies greatly among killings), but from the killing’s violation of the intrinsic worth or personhood of the victim.For example, McMahan 2002: 240-265 However, such accounts may themselves face problems of equality, McMahan 2002: 247-248 and so the equality objection may not be decisive against Marquis's argument.

Finally, the psychological connectedness objection claims that a being can be seriously harmed by being deprived of a valuable future only if there are sufficient psychological connections—sufficient correlations or continuations of memory, belief, desire and the like—between the being as it is now and the being as it will be when it lives out the valuable future.McInerney 1990; McMahan 2002: 271; Stretton 2004: 171-179 As there are few psychological connections between the fetus and its later self, it is concluded that depriving the fetus of its future does not seriously harm it (and hence is not seriously wrong). A defence of this objection is likely to rest, as with certain views of personal identity, on thought experiments involving brain or cerebrum swaps; and this may render it implausible to some readers.

The bodily rights argument
In her celebrated article A Defense of Abortion, Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that abortion is in some circumstances permissible even if the fetus has a right to life. Her central argument involves a famous thought experiment. Imagine, Thomson says, that you wake up in bed next to a famous violinist. He is unconscious with a fatal kidney ailment; and because only you happen to have the right blood type to help, the Society of Music Lovers has kidnapped you and plugged your circulatory system into his so that your kidneys can filter poisons from his blood as well as your own. If he is disconnected from you now, he will die; but in nine months he will recover and can be safely disconnected. Thomson takes it that you may permissibly unplug yourself from the violinist even though this will kill him. The right to life, Thomson says, does not entail the right to use another person's body, and so in disconnecting the violinist you do not violate his right to life but merely deprive him of something—the use of your body—to which he has no right. Similarly, even if the fetus has a right to life, it does not have a right to use the pregnant woman's body; and so aborting the fetus is permissible in at least some circumstances.

Critics of this argument generally agree that unplugging the violinist is permissible, but claim there are morally relevant disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. The most common objection is that the violinist scenario, involving a kidnapping, is analogous only to abortion after rape. In most cases of abortion, it is said, the pregnant woman was not raped but had intercourse voluntarily, and thus has either tacitly consented to allowing the fetus to use her body (the tacit consent objectioneg Warren 1973; Steinbock 1992), or else has a duty to sustain the fetus because the woman herself caused the fetus to stand in need of her body (the responsibility objectioneg Beckwith 1993; McMahan 2002). Other common objections turn on the claim that the fetus is the pregnant woman's child whereas the violinist is a stranger (the stranger versus offspring objectioneg Schwarz 1990; Beckwith 1993; McMahan 2002); that abortion kills the fetus whereas unplugging the violinist merely lets him die (the killing versus letting die objectioneg Schwarz 1990; Beckwith 1993; McMahan 2002); or, similarly, that abortion intentionally causes the fetus's death whereas unplugging the violinist merely causes death as a foreseen but unintended side-effect (the intending versus foreseeing objectioneg Finnis 1973; Schwarz 1990; Lee 1996; Lee and George 2005; cf the doctrine of double effect).

Defenders of Thomson's argument—most notably David BooninBoonin 2003: ch 4—reply that the alleged disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion do not hold, either because the factors that critics appeal to are not genuinely morally relevant, or because those factors are morally relevant but do not apply to abortion in the way that critics have claimed. Critics have in turn responded to Boonin's arguments.eg, Beckwith 2006 Thomson's argument thus remains highly controversial; but arguably it does at least show that the moral impermissibility of abortion does not obviously and necessarily follow from the claim that the fetus has a right to life.

Media bias

The book What Liberal Media? (ISBN 0465001769) by Eric Alterman examined media bias. Alterman makes a detailed case against conservative assertions that the media has a liberal bias, and that actually the opposite is true for some subjects. However, Alterman points out that on hot button social issues such as the death penalty and abortion, most journalists are quite liberal, because as the sociologist Herbert Gans explained, journalists are naturally reformist given their choice of profession. In chapter seven (What Social Bias?), Alterman cites the comprehensive (Pulitzer prize-nominated) study by David Shaw called "Abortion Bias Seeps into News," (Los Angeles Times, July 1-5, 1990) which showed that the media was slanted in favor of legal abortion. Alterman notes Shaw's findings were "accepted, and editors, reporters, and producers alike did their best to implement changes in their coverage."

See also

Notes

References

  • Baker, L. 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Beckwith, F. 1993. Politically Correct Death. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, ch 7.
  • Beckwith, F. "Defending Abortion Philosophically". Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 31 (April 2006): 177-203.
  • Boonin, D. 2003. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch 4.
  • Doepke, F. 1996. The Kinds of Things. Chicago: Open Court.
  • Finnis, J. "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion". Philosophy and Public Affairs 2:2 (Winter 1973): 117-145.
  • Glover, J. 1977. Causing Death and Saving Lives. London: Penguin.
  • Grisez, G. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York: Corpus Books.
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  • Himma, Kenneth Einar. “Thomson’s Violinist and Conjoined Twins,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol. 8, no. 4 (Fall 1999)
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  • Lee, P. 1996. Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, ch 4.
  • Lee, P. "The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defense". Bioethics 18:3 (June 2004): 249-263.
  • Lee, P and R George. "The Wrong of Abortion". In A Cohen and C Wellman, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell: 13-26, at 20-21.
  • Mappes, T and D DeGrazia. 2001. Biomedical Ethics, fifth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
  • Marquis, D. "Why Abortion Is Immoral". Journal of Philosophy 86:4 (April 1989): 183-202.
  • McInerney, P. "Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?" Reprinted in Pojman and Beckwith 1998: 357-360.
  • McMahan, J. 2002. The Ethics of Killiing. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Olson, E. 1997. The Human Animal. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Parent, W. 1986. "Editor's introduction". In J Thomson. Rights, Restitution, and Risk. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: vii-x.
  • Paske, G. 1994. "Abortion and the Neo-Natal Right to Life". Reprinted in Pojman and Beckwith 1998: 361-371.
  • Pojman, L. 1994. "Abortion: A Defense of the Personhood Argument". Reprinted in Pojman and Beckwith 1998: 275-290.
  • Pojman, L and F Beckwith, eds. 1998. The Abortion Controversy, 2nd edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
  • Reichlin, M. "The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal". Bioethics 11:1 (1997): 1-23.
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  • Schwarz, S. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press, ch 8.
  • Steinbock, B. 1992. Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses. Oxford: Oxford University Press, at 78.
  • Stone, J. "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17:4 (1987): 815-30.
  • Stone, J. "Why Potentiality Still Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24:2 (1994): 281-94.
  • Stretton, D. "The Deprivation Argument Against Abortion". Bioethics 18:2 (April 2004): 144-180.
  • Stretton, D. "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics 18:3 (June 2004): 264-282.
  • Thomson, J. "A Defense of Abortion". Philosophy and Public Affairs 1:1 (Autumn 1971): 47-66.
  • Thomson, J. "Rights and Deaths". Philosophy and Public Affairs 2:2 (Winter 1973): 146-159.
  • Tooley, M. "Abortion and Infanticide". Philosophy and Public Affairs 2:1 (Autumn 1972): 37-65, at 52-53.
  • Tooley, M. 1984. "In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide". In Pojman and Beckwith 1998: 209-233.
  • Warren, M. "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Monist 57:1 (1973): 43-61. Reprinted in Mappes and DeGrazia 2001: 456-463.
  • Warren, M. "Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?" In R Sikora and B Barry, eds. Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1978: 14-30.
  • Warren, M. 1982. "Postscript on Infanticide". Reprinted in Mappes and DeGrazia 2001: 461-463.

External links

Pro-life links

Pro-choice links

Abortion | Ethics

 

This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the "Abortion debate".

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